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1. Introduction
Pioneering the modern literature on heuristics in cognition,
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman contended that “peo-
ple rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and pre-
dicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky
& Kahneman 1974, p. 1124). Intense controversy has de-
veloped over the virtues and vices of such heuristics, most
of them “fast and frugal,” that play a role in many areas (see
Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Gilovich et al. 2002). But the rele-
vant literature has only started to investigate the possibility
that in the moral and political domains, people also rely on
simple rules of thumb that often work well but that some-
times misfire (see Baron 1994a; 1998; Messick 1993). In
fact, the central point seems obvious. Much of everyday
morality consists of simple, highly intuitive rules that gen-
erally make sense, but that fail in certain cases. It is wrong
to lie or steal, but if a lie or a theft would save a human life,
lying or stealing is probably obligatory. Not all promises
should be kept. It is wrong to try to get out of a longstand-
ing professional commitment at the last minute, but if your
child is in the hospital, you may be morally required to do
exactly that.
One of my major goals in this article is to show that
heuristics play a pervasive role in moral, political, and legal
judgments, and that they sometimes produce significant
mistakes. I also attempt to identify a set of heuristics that
now influence both law and policy, and try to make plausi-
ble the claim that some widely held practices and beliefs are
a product of those heuristics. Often moral heuristics repre-
sent generalizations from a range of problems for which
they are indeed well-suited (see Baron 1994a), and hence,
most of the time, such heuristics work well. The problem
comes when the generalizations are wrenched out of con-
text and treated as freestanding or universal principles, ap-
plicable to situations in which their justifications no longer
operate. Because the generalizations are treated as free-
standing or universal, their application seems obvious, and
those who reject them appear morally obtuse, possibly even
monstrous. I contend that the appearance is misleading and
even productive of moral mistakes. There is nothing obtuse,
or monstrous, about refusing to apply a generalization in
contexts in which its rationale is absent.
Because Kahneman and Tversky were dealing with facts
and elementary logic, they could demonstrate that the
heuristics sometimes lead to errors. Unfortunately, that
cannot easily be demonstrated here. In the moral and po-
litical domains, it is hard to come up with unambiguous
cases in which the error is both highly intuitive and on re-
flection uncontroversial – that is, cases in which people can
ultimately be embarrassed about their own intuitions.
Nonetheless, I hope to show that whatever one’s moral
commitments, moral heuristics exist and indeed are om-
nipresent. We should not treat the underlying moral intu-
itions as fixed points for analysis, rather than as unreliable
and potentially erroneous. In the search for reflective equi-
librium, understood to be coherence among our judgments
at all levels of generality (Rawls 1971), it is important to see
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that some of our deeply held moral beliefs might be prod-
ucts of heuristics that sometimes produce mistakes.
If moral heuristics are in fact pervasive, then people with
diverse foundational commitments should be able to agree,
not that their own preferred theories are wrong, but that
they are often applied in a way that reflects the use of
heuristics. Utilitarians ought to be able to identify heuris-
tics for the maximization of utility; deontologists should be
able to point to heuristics for the proper discharge of moral
responsibilities; and those uncommitted to any large-scale
theory should be able to specify heuristics for their own
more modest normative commitments. And if moral
heuristics exist, blunders are highly likely not only in moral
thinking, but in legal and political practice as well. Con-
ventional legal and political arguments are often a product
of heuristics masquerading as universal truths. Hence, I will
identify a set of political and legal judgments that are best
understood as a product of heuristics, and that are often
taken, wrongly and damagingly, as a guide to political and
legal practice, even when their rationale does not apply.
2. Ordinary heuristics and an insistent
homunculus
2.1. Heuristics and facts
The classic work on heuristics and biases deals not with
moral questions but with issues of fact. In answering hard
factual questions, those who lack accurate information use
simple rules of thumb. How many words, in four pages of a
novel, will have “ing” as the last three letters? How many
words, in the same four pages, will have “n” as the second-
to-last letter? Most people will give a higher number in re-
sponse to the first question than in response to the second
(Tversky & Kahneman 1984) – even though a moment’s re-
flection shows that this is a mistake. People err because they
use an identifiable heuristic – the availability heuristic – to
answer difficult questions about probability. When people
use this heuristic, they answer a question of probability by
asking whether examples come readily to mind. How likely
is a flood, an airplane crash, a traffic jam, a terrorist attack,
or a disaster at a nuclear power plant? Lacking statistical
knowledge, people try to think of illustrations. For those
without statistical knowledge, it is far from irrational to use
the availability heuristic; the problem is that this heuristic
can lead to serious errors of fact, in the form of excessive
fear of small risks and neglect of large ones.
Or consider the representativeness heuristic, in accor-
dance with which judgments of probability are influenced
by assessments of resemblance (the extent to which A
“looks like” B). The representativeness heuristic is famously
exemplified by people’s answers to questions about the
likely career of a hypothetical woman named Linda, de-
scribed as follows: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken,
and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student,
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and
social justice and also participated in antinuclear demon-
strations” (see Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Mellers et al.
2001). People were asked to rank, in order of probability,
eight possible futures for Linda. Six of these were fillers
(such as psychiatric social worker, elementary school
teacher); the two crucial ones were “bank teller” and “bank
teller and active in the feminist movement.”
More people said that Linda was less likely to be a bank
teller than to be a bank teller and active in the feminist
movement. This is an obvious mistake, a conjunction error,
in which characteristics A and B are thought to be more
likely than characteristic A alone. The error stems from the
representativeness heuristic: Linda’s description seems to
match “bank teller and active in the feminist movement” far
better than “bank teller.” In an illuminating reflection on
the example, Stephen Jay Gould observed that “I know [the
right answer], yet a little homunculus in my head continues
to jump up and down, shouting at me – ‘but she can’t just
be a bank teller; read the description’” (Gould 1991,
p. 469). Because Gould’s homunculus is especially inclined
to squawk in the moral domain, I shall return to him on sev-
eral occasions.
Of course, the early work on heuristics has been subject
to intense criticism, sometimes with the claim that in the
real world, most heuristics work quite well (Gigerenzer
2000; Gigerenzer et al. 1999). In this view, many findings of
cognitive errors are an artifact of the laboratory setting and
of clever experimental designs involving unfamiliar prob-
lems; in the real world, people may be much less likely to
err, perhaps because the heuristics are sensible, perhaps
because they are not applied indiscriminately (Krueger &
Funder 2004; cf. Kahneman & Tversky 1996). In addition,
some of the key ideas, including availability and represen-
tativeness, have been challenged as inadequately specified
and as subject to ad hoc applications (Gigerenzer 1996; cf.
Kahneman & Tversky 1996, p. 591). For present purposes,
it is unnecessary to resolve these debates here. No one de-
nies that with respect to facts, human beings use simple
rules of thumb that can produce serious mistakes; even the
“recognition heuristic,” said to enable people to make re-
markably accurate judgments about the size of cities or
prospects in sports events (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002),
will produce severe and predictable errors. If this is true for
facts, it is highly likely to be true for political and moral
judgments as well.
With respect to moral heuristics, existing work is sugges-
tive rather than definitive; a great deal of progress remains
to be made, above all through additional experimental work
on moral judgments. Some of the moral heuristics that I
shall identify might reasonably be challenged as subject to
ad hoc rather than predictable application. One of my pri-
mary hopes is to help stimulate further research, testing
when and whether people use moral heuristics that pro-
duce sense or nonsense in particular cases.
2.2. Attribute substitution and prototypical cases
What is a heuristic? Kahneman and Frederick have recently
suggested that heuristics are mental shortcuts used when
people are interested in assessing a “target attribute” and
when they substitute a “heuristic attribute” of the object,
which is easier to handle (Kahneman & Frederick 2002).
Heuristics therefore operate through a process of attribute
substitution. The use of heuristics gives rise to intuitions
about what is true, and these intuitions sometimes are bi-
ased, in the sense that they produce errors in a predictable
direction. Consider the question of whether more people
die from suicides or homicides. Lacking statistical informa-
tion, people might respond by asking whether it is easier to
recall cases in either class (the availability heuristic). The
approach is hardly senseless, but it might also lead to errors,
a result of “availability bias” in the domain of risk percep-
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tion (see Kuran & Sunstein 1999). For the size of cities, the
recognition heuristic, which is a close cousin of the avail-
ability heuristic, has the same problem, leading to what
might be called “recognition bias.” Sometimes heuristics
are linked to affect, and indeed affect has even been seen
as a heuristic (Slovic et al. 2002); but attribute substitution
is often used for factual questions that lack an affective
component.
Similar mechanisms are at work in the moral, political,
and legal domains. Unsure of what to think or do about a tar-
get attribute (what morality requires, what the law is), peo-
ple might substitute a heuristic attribute instead – asking,
for example, about the view of trusted authorities (a leader
of the preferred political party, an especially wise judge, or
a religious figure). Every law professor in the United States
knows that in approaching difficult constitutional questions,
many law students are drawn to a kind of “Justice Antonin
Scalia heuristic.” If students are unsure how to analyze a
constitutional problem, they might ask instead what Justice
Scalia (an influential conservative on the United States
Supreme Court) thinks – and either follow him or do the op-
posite. In the areas of morality, politics, and law, attribute
substitution is pervasively involved. Often the process works
by appeal to prototypical cases. Confronted by a novel and
difficult problem, observers often ask whether it shares fea-
tures with a familiar problem. If it seems to do so, then the
solution to the familiar problem is applied to the novel and
difficult one. Of course it is possible that in the domain of
values as well as facts, real-world heuristics generally per-
form well in the real world – so that moral errors are re-
duced, not increased, by their use, at least compared to the
most likely alternatives (see my remarks on rule-utilitarian-
ism later). The only claim here is that some of the time, our
moral judgments can be shown to misfire.
The principal heuristics should be seen in light of dual-
process theories of cognition (Kahneman & Frederick
2002). Those theories distinguish between two families of
cognitive operations, sometimes labeled System I and Sys-
tem II. System I is intuitive; it is rapid, automatic, and ef-
fortless (and it features Gould’s homunculus). System II, by
contrast, is reflective; it is slower, self-aware, calculative,
and deductive. System I proposes quick answers to prob-
lems of judgment, and System II operates as a monitor, con-
firming or overriding those judgments. Consider, for exam-
ple, someone who is flying from New York to London in the
month after an airplane crash. This person might make a
rapid, barely conscious judgment, rooted in System I, that
the flight is quite risky; but there might well be a System II
override, bringing a more realistic assessment to bear. Sys-
tem I often has an affective component, but it need not; for
example, a probability judgment might be made quite
rapidly and without much affect at all.
There is growing evidence that people often make auto-
matic, largely unreflective moral judgments, for which they
are sometimes unable to give good reasons (see Greene &
Haidt 2002; Haidt 2001; cf. Pizarro & Bloom 2003). Moral,
political, or legal judgments often substitute a heuristic at-
tribute for a target attribute; System I is operative here as
well, and it may or may not be subject to System II over-
ride. Consider the incest taboo. People have moral revul-
sion against incest even in circumstances in which the
grounds for that taboo seem to be absent; they are subject
to “moral dumbfounding” (Haidt et al. 2004), that is, an in-
ability to give an account for a firmly held intuition. It is
plausible, at least, to think that System I is driving their
judgments, without System II correction. The same is true
in legal and political contexts as well.
3. Heuristics and morality
To show that heuristics operate in the moral domain, we
have to specify some benchmark by which we can measure
moral truth. On these questions I want to avoid any espe-
cially controversial claims. Whatever’s one view of the foun-
dations of moral and political judgments, I suggest, moral
heuristics are likely to be at work in practice. In this section
I begin with a brief account of the possible relationship be-
tween ambitious theories (understood as large-scale ac-
counts of the right or the good) and moral heuristics. I sug-
gest that for those who accept ambitious theories about
morality or politics, it is tempting to argue that alternative
positions are mere heuristics; but this approach is un-
promising, simply because any ambitious theory is likely to
be too contentious to serve as the benchmark for measur-
ing moral truth. Progress is best made, not by opposing
(supposedly correct) ambitious theories to (supposedly
blundering) common sense morality, but in two more mod-
est ways: first, by showing that moral heuristics are at work
in any view about what morality requires; and second, by
showing that such heuristics are at work in a minimally con-
tentious view about what morality requires. I will identify a
number of such heuristics in Section 4.
3.1. Theories, heuristics, and ambitious starts
Many utilitarians, including John Stuart Mill and Henry
Sidgwick, argue that ordinary morality is based on simple
rules of thumb that generally promote utility but that some-
times misfire (see Mill 1861/1971, pp. 28–29; Sidgwick
1907/1981, pp. 199–216; cf. Hare 1981; Smart 1973). For
example, Mill emphasizes that human beings “have been
learning by experience the tendencies of experience,” so
that the “corollaries from the principle of utility” are being
progressively captured by ordinary morality (Mill 1861/
1971, p. 29).1 Is ordinary morality a series of heuristics for
what really matters, which is utility?
With the aid of modern psychological findings, utilitari-
ans might be tempted to make exactly this argument (see
Baron 1998). They might contend that ordinary moral com-
mitments are a set of mental shortcuts that generally work
well, but that also produce severe and systematic errors
from the utilitarian point of view. Suppose that most peo-
ple reject utilitarian approaches to punishment and are in-
stead committed to retributivism; this is their preferred
theory. Are they responding to System I? Might they be
making a cognitive error? (Is Kantianism a series of cogni-
tive errors?) Note that with respect to what morality re-
quires, utilitarians frequently agree with their deontologi-
cal adversaries about concrete cases; they can join in
accepting the basic rules of criminal and civil law. When de-
ontologists and others depart from utilitarian principles,
perhaps they are operating on the basis of heuristics that
usually work well but sometimes misfire.
But it is exceedingly difficult to settle large-scale ethical
debates in this way. In the case of many ordinary heuristics,
based on availability and representativeness, a check of the
facts, or of the elementary rules of logic, will show that peo-
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ple err. In the moral domain, this is much harder to demon-
strate. To say the least, those who reject utilitarianism are
not easily embarrassed by a demonstration that their moral
judgments can lead to reductions in utility. For example,
utilitarianism is widely challenged by those who insist on the
importance of distributional considerations. It is far from
clear that a moderate utility loss to those at the bottom can
be justified by a larger utility gain for many at the top (Rawls
1971; see also Nussbaum 1984; Sen 1980–1981).
Emphasizing the existence of moral heuristics, those who
reject utilitarianism might well turn the tables on their utili-
tarian opponents. They might contend that the rules recom-
mended by utilitarians are consistent, much of the time, with
what morality requires – but also that utilitarianism, taken
seriously, produces serious mistakes in some cases. In this
view, utilitarianism is itself a heuristic, one that usually works
well but leads to systematic errors. And indeed, many de-
bates between utilitarians and their critics involve claims, by
one or another side, that the opposing view usually produces
good results, but also leads to severe mistakes and should be
rejected for that reason (see Smart & Williams 1973).
These large debates are not easy to resolve, simply be-
cause utilitarians and deontologists are most unlikely to be
convinced by the suggestion that their defining commit-
ments are mere heuristics. Here, there is a large difference
between moral heuristics and the heuristics uncovered in
the relevant psychological work, in which the facts or sim-
ple logic provide a good test of whether people have erred.
If people tend to think that more words, in a given space,
end with the letters “ing” than have “n” in the next-to-last
position, something has clearly gone wrong. If people think
that some person Linda is more likely to be “a bank teller
who is active in the feminist movement” than a “bank
teller,” there is an evident problem. If citizens of France or
Germany think that New York University is more likely to
have a good basketball team than St. Joseph’s University,
because they have not heard of the latter, then a simple ex-
amination of the record will show that they are wrong. In
the moral domain, factual blunders and simple logic do not
provide such a simple test.
3.2. Neutral benchmarks and weak consequentialism
My goal here is, therefore, not to show that common sense
morality is a series of heuristics for the correct general the-
ory (as suggested by Sidgwick and Mill), but more cau-
tiously, that in many particular cases, moral heuristics are at
work – and that this point can be accepted by people with
diverse general theories, or with grave uncertainty about
which general theory is correct. In the cases catalogued in
Section 5, I contend that it is possible to conclude that a
moral heuristic is at work without accepting any especially
controversial normative claims. In several of the examples,
that claim can be accepted without accepting any con-
testable normative theory at all. Other examples will re-
quire acceptance of what I shall call “weak consequential-
ism,” in accordance with which the social consequences of
the legal system are relevant, other things being equal, to
what law ought to be doing.
Weak consequentialists need not be utilitarians; they do
not have to believe that law and policy should attempt to
maximize utility. They might agree that violations of rights
count among the consequences that ought to matter, so that
deontological considerations play a role in the overall as-
sessment of what should be done. Consider Amartya Sen’s
frequent insistence that consequentialists can insist that
consequences count without accepting utilitarianism and
without denying that violations of rights are part of the set
of relevant consequences (see Sen 1982; 1985). Thus Sen
urges an approach that “shares with utilitarianism a conse-
quentialist approach (but differs from it in not confining at-
tention to utility consequences only)” while also attaching
“intrinsic importance to rights (but . . . not giving them
complete priority irrespective of other consequences)”
(Sen 1996, p. 1038). Weak consequentialism is in line with
this approach. In evaluating decisions and social states,
weak consequentialists might well be willing to give a great
deal of weight to nonconsequentialist considerations.
Of course, some deontologists will reject any form of con-
sequentialism altogether. They might believe, for example,
that retribution is the proper theory of punishment, and
that the consequences of punishment are never relevant to
the proper level of punishment. Some of my examples will
be unpersuasive to deontologists who believe that conse-
quences do not matter at all. But weak consequentialism
seems to me sufficiently nonsectarian, and attractive to suf-
ficiently diverse people, to make plausible the idea that in
the cases at hand, moral heuristics are playing a significant
role. And for those who reject weak consequentialism, it
might nonetheless be productive to ask whether, from their
own point of view, certain rules of morality and law are re-
flective of heuristics that sometimes produce serious errors.
3.3. Evolution and rule-utilitarianism: Simple heuristics
that make us good?
Two clarifications before we proceed. First, some moral
heuristics might well have an evolutionary foundation (de
Waal 1996; Katz 2000; Sober & Wilson 1999). Perhaps 
natural selection accounts for automatic moral revulsion
against incest or cannibalism, even if clever experiments, 
or life, can produce situations in which the revulsion is
groundless. In the case of incest, the point is straightfor-
ward: The automatic revulsion might be far more useful,
from the evolutionary perspective, than a more fine-
grained evaluation of contexts (Stein 2001). In fact, an evo-
lutionary account might be provided for most of the heuris-
tics that I explore here. When someone has committed a
harmful act, evolutionary pressures might well have incul-
cated a sharp sense of outrage and a propensity to react in
proportion to it. As a response to wrongdoing, use of an out-
rage heuristic might well be much better than an attempt
at any kind of consequentialist calculus, weak or strong. Of
course, many moral commitments are a product not of evo-
lution but of social learning and even cascade effects (see
Sunstein 2003); individuals in a relevant society will in-
evitably be affected by a widespread belief that it is wrong
to tamper with nature (discussed later), and evolutionary
pressures need not have any role at all.
Second, and related, some or even most moral heuristics
might have a rule-utilitarian or rule-consequentialist de-
fense (see Hooker 2000). The reason is that in most cases
they work well despite their simplicity, and if people at-
tempted a more fine-grained assessment of the moral issues
involved, they might make more moral mistakes rather than
fewer (especially because their self-interest is frequently at
stake). Simple but somewhat crude moral principles might
lead to less frequent and less severe moral errors than com-
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plex and fine-grained moral principles. Compare the avail-
ability heuristic. Much of the time, use of that heuristic pro-
duces speedy judgments that are fairly accurate, and those
who attempt a statistical analysis might make more errors
(and waste a lot of time in the process). If human beings use
“simple heuristics that make us smart” (Gigerenzer et al.
1999), then they might also use “simple heuristics that make
us good.” I will offer some examples in which moral heuris-
tics seem to me to produce significant errors for law and pol-
icy, but I do not contend that we would be better off with-
out them. On the contrary, such heuristics might well
produce better results, from the moral point of view, than
the feasible alternatives – a possibility to which I will return.
4. The Asian disease problem and moral framing
In a finding closely related to their work on heuristics, Kah-
neman and Tversky find “moral framing” in the context of
what has become known as “the Asian disease problem”
(Kahneman & Tversky 1984). Framing effects do not in-
volve heuristics, but because they raise obvious questions
about the rationality of moral intuitions, they provide a valu-
able backdrop. Here is the first component of the problem:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an
unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the
consequences are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability
that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Most people choose Program A.
But now consider the second component of the problem,
in which the same situation is given, but followed by this de-
scription of the alternative programs:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600
people will die.
Most people choose Problem D. But a moment’s re-
flection should be sufficient to show that Program A and
Program C are identical, and so too for Program B and Pro-
gram D. These are merely different descriptions of the
same programs. The purely semantic shift in framing is suf-
ficient to produce different outcomes. Apparently, people’s
moral judgments about appropriate programs depend on
whether the results are described in terms of “lives saved”
or in terms of “lives lost.” What accounts for the difference?
The most sensible answer begins with the fact that human
beings are pervasively averse to losses (hence the robust
cognitive finding of loss aversion, Tversky & Kahneman
1991). With respect to either self-interested gambles or
fundamental moral judgments, loss aversion plays a large
role in people’s decisions. But what counts as a gain or a loss
depends on the baseline from which measurements are
made. Purely semantic reframing can alter the baseline and
hence alter moral intuitions (for many examples involving
fairness, see Kahneman et al. 1986).
This finding is usually taken to show a problem for stan-
dard accounts of rationality. Recently, however, it has been
argued that subjects are rationally responding to the infor-
mation provided, or “leaked,” by the speaker’s choice of
frame (McKenzie 2004). Certainly, the speaker’s choice
might offer a clue about the desired response; some sub-
jects in the Asian disease problem might be responding to
that clue. But even if people are generally taking account of
the speaker’s clues,2 that claim is consistent with the propo-
sition that frames matter a great deal to moral intuitions,
which is all I am stressing here.
Moral framing has been demonstrated in the important
context of obligations to future generations (see Frederick
2003), a much-disputed question of morality, politics, and
law (Morrison 1998; Revesz 1999). To say the least, the ap-
propriate discount rate for those yet to be born is not a ques-
tion that most people have pondered, and hence their judg-
ments are highly susceptible to different frames. From a
series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors sug-
gest that people are indifferent between saving one life to-
day and saving 45 lives in 100 years (Cropper et al. 1994).
They make this suggestion on the basis of questions asking
people whether they would choose a program that saves
“100 lives now” or a program that saves a substantially larger
number “100 years from now.” It is possible, however, that
people’s responses depend on uncertainty about whether
people in the future will otherwise die (perhaps technolog-
ical improvements will save them?); and other ways of fram-
ing the same problem yield radically different results (Fred-
erick 2003). For example, most people consider “equally
bad” a single death from pollution next year and a single
death from pollution in 100 years. This finding implies no
preference for members of the current generation. The sim-
plest conclusion is that people’s moral judgments about ob-
ligations to future generations are very much a product of
framing effects (for a similar result, see Baron 2000a).3
The same point holds for the question of whether gov-
ernment should consider not only the number of “lives” but
also the number of “life-years” saved by regulatory inter-
ventions. If the government focuses on life-years, a pro-
gram that saves children will be worth far more attention
that a similar program that saves senior citizens. Is this im-
moral? People’s intuitions depend on how the question is
framed (see Sunstein 2004). People will predictably reject
an approach that would count every old person as worth
“significantly less” than what every young person is worth.
But if people are asked whether they would favor a policy
that saves 105 old people or 100 young people, many will
favor the latter, in a way that suggests a willingness to pay
considerable attention to the number of life-years at stake.
At least for unfamiliar questions of morality, politics, and
law, people’s intuitions are very much affected by framing.
Above all, it is effective to frame certain consequences as
“losses” from a status quo; when so framed, moral concern
becomes significantly elevated. It is for this reason that po-
litical actors, and those involved in law, often phrase one or
another proposal as “turning back the clock” on some social
advance. The problem is that for many social changes, the
framing does not reflect social reality, but is simply a verbal
manipulation.
Let us now turn to examples that are more controversial.
5. Moral heuristics: A catalogue
My principal interest here is the relationship between
moral heuristics and questions of law and policy. I separate
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the relevant heuristics into four categories: (1) those that
involve morality and risk regulation; (2) those that involve
punishment; (3) those that involve “playing God,” particu-
larly in the domains of reproduction and sex; and (4) those
that involve the act-omission distinction. The catalogue is
meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
5.1. Morality and risk regulation
5.1.1. Cost–benefit analysis. An automobile company is
deciding whether to take certain safety precautions for its
cars. In deciding whether or not to do so, it conducts a cost–
benefit analysis, in which it concludes that certain precau-
tions are not justified – because, say, they would cost $100
million and save only four lives, and because the company
has a “ceiling” of $10 million per life saved (a ceiling that is,
by the way, significantly higher than the amount the United
States Environmental Protection Agency uses for a statisti-
cal life). How will ordinary people react to this decision?
The answer is that they will not react favorably (see Viscusi
2000, pp. 547, 558). In fact, they tend to punish companies
that base their decisions on cost–benefit analysis, even if a
high valuation is placed on human life. By contrast, they im-
pose less severe punishment on companies that are willing
to impose a “risk” on people, but that do not produce a for-
mal risk analysis that measures lives lost and dollars, and
trades one against another (see Tetlock 2000; Viscusi 2000).
The oddity here is that under tort law, it is unclear that a
company should be liable at all if it has acted on the basis
of a competent cost–benefit analysis; such an analysis might
even insulate a company from a claim of negligence. What
underlies people’s moral judgments, which are replicated in
actual jury decisions (Viscusi 2000)?
It is possible that when people disapprove of trading
money for lives, they are generalizing from a set of moral
principles that are generally sound, and even quite useful,
but that work poorly in some cases. Consider the following
moral principle: Do not knowingly cause a human death. In
ordinary life, you should not engage in conduct with the
knowledge that several people will die as a result. If you are
playing a sport or working on your yard, you ought not to
continue if you believe that your actions will kill others. In-
voking that idea, people disapprove of companies that fail
to improve safety when they are fully aware that deaths will
result. By contrast, people do not disapprove of those who
fail to improve safety while believing that there is a “risk”
but appearing not to know, for certain, that deaths will en-
sue. When people object to risky action taken after cost–
benefit analysis, it seems to be partly because that very
analysis puts the number of expected deaths squarely “on
screen” (see Tetlock 2000).
Companies that fail to do such analysis, but that are
aware that a “risk” exists, do not make clear, to themselves
or to anyone else, that they caused deaths with full knowl-
edge that this was what they were going to do. People dis-
approve, above all, of companies that cause death know-
ingly. There may be a kind of “cold-heart heuristic” here:
Those who know they will cause a death, and do so anyway,
are regarded as cold-hearted monsters.4 In this view, critics
of cost–benefit analysis should be seen as appealing to Sys-
tem I, and as speaking directly to the homunculus: “is a cor-
poration or public agency that endangers us to be pardoned
for its sins once it has spent $6.1 million per statistical life
on risk reduction?” (Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004).
Note that it is easy to reframe a probability as a certainty
and vice versa; if I am correct, the reframing is likely to have
large effects. Consider two cases:
(a) Company A knows that its product will kill ten peo-
ple. It markets the product to its ten million customers with
that knowledge. The cost of eliminating the risk would have
been $100 million.
(b) Company B knows that its product creates a one in
one million risk of death. Its product is used by ten million
people. The cost of eliminating the risk would have been
$100 million.
I have not collected data, but I am willing to predict that
Company A would be punished more severely than Com-
pany B, even though there is no difference between them.
I suggest, then, that a moral heuristic is at work, one that
imposes moral condemnation on those who knowingly en-
gage in acts that will result in human deaths. And of course
this heuristic does a great deal of good. The problem is that
it is not always unacceptable to cause death knowingly, at
least if the deaths are relatively few and an unintended
byproduct of generally desirable activity. When govern-
ment allows new highways to be built, it knows that people
will die on those highways; when government allows new
coal-fired power plants to be built, it knows that some peo-
ple will die from the resulting pollution; when companies
produce tobacco products, and when government does not
ban those products, hundreds of thousands of people will
die; the same is true for alcohol. Of course it would make
sense, in all of these domains, to take extra steps to reduce
risks. But that proposition does not support the implausible
claim that we should disapprove, from the moral point of
view, of any action taken when deaths are foreseeable.
There is a complementary possibility, involving the con-
fusion between the ex ante and ex post perspectives. If a life
might have been saved by a $50 expenditure on a car, peo-
ple are going to be outraged, and they will impose punish-
ment. What they will not see or incorporate is the fact, eas-
ily perceived ex ante, that the $50-per-car expenditure
would have been wasted on millions of other people. It is
hardly clear that the ex ante perspective is always prefer-
able. But something has gone badly wrong if the ex post
perspective leads people to neglect the tradeoffs that are
actually involved.
I believe that it is impossible to vindicate, in principle,
the widespread social antipathy to cost–benefit balancing.5
But here too, “a little homunculus in my head continues to
jump up and down, shouting at me” that corporate cost–
benefit analysis, trading dollars for a known number of
deaths, is morally unacceptable. The voice of the ho-
munculus, I am suggesting, is not reflective, but is instead
a product of System I, and a crude but quite tenacious
moral heuristic.
5.1.2. Emissions trading. In the last decades, those in-
volved in enacting and implementing environmental law
have experimented with systems of “emissions trading”
(Sunstein 2002). In those systems, polluters are typically
given a license to pollute a certain amount, and the licenses
can be traded on the market. The advantage of emissions
trading systems is that if they work well, they will ensure
emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost.
Is emissions trading immoral? Many people believe so.
Political theorist Michael Sandel, for example, urges that
trading systems “undermine the ethic we should be trying
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to foster on the environment” (Sandel 1997; see also Kel-
man 1981). Sandel contends:
[T]urning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold
removes the moral stigma that is properly associated with it. If
a company or a country is fined for spewing excessive pollutants
into the air, the community conveys its judgment that the pol-
luter has done something wrong. A fee, on the other hand,
makes pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages,
benefits and rent.
In the same vein, Sandel objects to proposals to open car-
pool lanes to drivers without passengers who are willing to
pay a fee. Here, as in the environmental context, it seems
unacceptable to permit people to do something that is
morally wrong as long as they are willing to pay for the priv-
ilege.
I suggest that, like other critics of emissions trading pro-
grams, Sandel is using a moral heuristic; in fact, he has been
fooled by his homunculus. The heuristic is this: People
should not be permitted to engage in moral wrongdoing for
a fee. You are not allowed to assault someone as long as you
are willing to pay for the right to do so; there are no trad-
able licenses for rape, theft, or battery. The reason is that
the appropriate level of these forms of wrongdoing is zero
(putting to one side the fact that enforcement resources are
limited; if they were unlimited, we would want to eliminate,
not merely to reduce, these forms of illegality). But pollu-
tion is an altogether different matter. At least some level of
pollution is a byproduct of desirable social activities and
products, including automobiles and power plants. Of
course, certain acts of pollution, including those that
amount to the intentional or reckless infliction of harm, are
morally wrong; but the same cannot be said of pollution as
such. When Sandel objects to emissions trading, he is treat-
ing pollution as equivalent to a crime in a way that over-
generalizes a moral intuition that makes sense in other con-
texts. There is no moral problem with emissions trading as
such. The insistent objection to emissions trading systems
stems from a moral heuristic.
Unfortunately, that objection has appeared compelling
to many people, so much as to delay and to reduce the use
of a pollution reduction tool that is, in many contexts, the
best available (Sunstein 2002). Here, then, is a case in
which a moral heuristic has led to political blunders, in the
form of policies that impose high costs for no real gain.
5.1.3. Betrayals. To say the least, people do not like to be
betrayed. A betrayal of trust is likely to produce a great deal
of outrage. If a babysitter neglects a child or if a security
guard steals from his employer, people will be angrier than
if the identical acts are performed by someone in whom
trust has not been reposed. So far, perhaps, so good: When
trust is betrayed, the damage is worse than when an other-
wise identical act has been committed by someone who was
not a beneficiary of trust. And it should not be surprising
that people will favor greater punishment for betrayals than
for otherwise identical crimes (see Koehler & Gershoff
2003). Perhaps the disparity can be justified on the ground
that the betrayal of trust is an independent harm, one that
warrants greater deterrence and retribution – a point that
draws strength from the fact that trust, once lost, is not eas-
ily regained. A family robbed by its babysitter might well 
be more seriously injured than a family robbed by a thief.
The loss of money is compounded and possibly dwarfed by
the violation of a trusting relationship. The consequence of
the violation might also be more serious. Will the family
ever feel entirely comfortable with babysitters? It is bad to
have an unfaithful spouse, but it is even worse if the infi-
delity occurred with your best friend, because that kind of
infidelity makes it harder to have trusting relationships with
friends in the future.
In this light, it is possible to understand why betrayals
produce special moral opprobrium and (where the law has
been violated) increased punishment. But consider a find-
ing that is much harder to explain: People are especially
averse to risks of death that come from products (like
airbags) designed to promote safety (Koehler & Gershoff
2003). The aversion is so great that people have been found
to prefer a higher chance of dying, as a result of accidents
from a crash, to a significantly lower chance of dying in a
crash as a result of a malfunctioning airbag. The relevant
study involved two principal conditions. In the first, people
were asked to choose between two equally priced cars, Car
A and Car B. According to crash tests, there was a 2%
chance that drivers of Car A, with Air Bag A, will die in se-
rious accidents as a result of the impact of the crash. With
Car B, and Air Bag B, there was a 1% chance of death, but
also an additional chance of one in 10,000 (0.01%) of death
as a result of deployment of the air bag. Similar studies in-
volved vaccines and smoke alarms.
The result was that most participants (over two-thirds)
chose the higher risk safety option when the less risky one
carried a “betrayal risk.” A control condition demonstrated
that people were not confused about the numbers: when
asked to choose between a 2% risk and a 1.01% risk, peo-
ple selected the 1.01% risk so long as betrayal was not in-
volved. In other words, people’s aversion to betrayals is so
great that they will increase their own risks rather than sub-
ject themselves to a (small) hazard that comes from a de-
vice that is supposed to increase safety. “Apparently, people
are willing to incur greater risks of the very harm they seek
protection from to avoid the mere possibility of betrayal”
(Koehler & Gershoff 2003, p. 244). Remarkably, “betrayal
risks appear to be so psychologically intolerable that people
are willing to double their risk of death from automobile
crashes, fires, and diseases to avoid incurring a small possi-
bility of death by safety device betrayal.”
What explains this seemingly bizarre and self-destructive
preference? I suggest that a heuristic is at work: Punish, and
do not reward, betrayals of trust. The heuristic generally
works well. But it misfires in some cases, as when those who
deploy it end up increasing the risks they themselves face.
An airbag is not a security guard or a babysitter, endanger-
ing those whom they have been hired to protect. It is a
product, to be chosen if and only if it decreases aggregate
risks. If an airbag makes people safer on balance, it should
be used, even if in a tiny percentage of cases it will create a
risk that would not otherwise exist. People’s unwillingness
to subject themselves to betrayal risks, in circumstances in
which products are involved and they are increasing their
likelihood of death, is the moral cousin to the use of the rep-
resentativeness heuristic in the Linda case. Both stem from
a generally sound rule of thumb that leads to systematic er-
rors.
In a sense, the special antipathy to betrayal risks might
be seen to involve not a moral heuristic but a taste. In
choosing products, people are not making purely moral
judgments; they are choosing what they like best, and it just
turns out that a moral judgment, involving antipathy to be-
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trayals, is part of what they like best. It would be useful to
design a purer test of moral judgments, one that would ask
people not about their own safety but about that of others
– for example, whether people are averse to betrayal risks
when they are purchasing safety devices for their friends or
family members. There is every reason to expect that it
would produce substantially identical results to those in the
experiments just described. Closely related experiments
support that expectation (see Ritov & Baron 2002, p. 168).
In deciding whether to vaccinate their children from risks
for serious diseases, people show a form of “omission bias.”
Many people are more sensitive to the risk of the vaccina-
tion than to the risk from diseases – so much so that they
will expose their children to a greater risk from “nature”
than from the vaccine. (There is a clear connection between
omission bias, trust in nature, and antipathy to “playing
God,” as discussed later.) The omission bias, I suggest, is
closely related to people’s special antipathy to betrayals. It
leads to moral errors, in the form of vaccination judgments,
and undoubtedly others, by which some parents increase
the fatality risks faced by their own children.
5.2. Morality and punishment
5.2.1. Pointless punishment? In the context of punish-
ment, moral intuitions are sometimes disconnected from
the consequences of punishment, suggesting that a moral
heuristic may well be at work (see Darley et al. 2000). Sup-
pose, for example, that a corporation has engaged in seri-
ous wrongdoing. People are likely to want to punish the cor-
poration as if it were a person (see Kahneman et al. 1998;
Sunstein et al. 2002). They are unlikely to inquire into the
possibility that the consequences of serious punishment
(say, a stiff fine) will not be to “hurt” corporate wrongdoers,
but instead to decrease wages, increase prices, or produce
lost jobs. Punishment judgments are rooted in a simple
heuristic, to the effect that penalties should be a propor-
tional response to the outrageousness of the act. In think-
ing about punishment, people use an outrage heuristic (see
Kahneman & Frederick 2002, pp. 49, 63). According to this
heuristic, people’s punishment judgments are a product of
their outrage. This heuristic may produce reasonable re-
sults much of the time, but in some cases, it seems to lead
to systematic errors – at least if we are willing to embrace
weak consequentialism.
Consider, for example, an intriguing study of people’s
judgments about penalties in cases involving harms from
vaccines and birth control pills (Baron & Ritov 1993). In
one case, subjects were told that the result of a higher
penalty would be to make companies try harder to make
safer products. In an adjacent case, subjects were told that
the consequence of a higher penalty would be to make the
company more likely to stop making the product, with the
result that less safe products would be on the market. Most
subjects, including a group of judges, gave the same penal-
ties in both cases. “Most of the respondents did not seem to
notice the incentive issue” (see Baron 1993a, pp. 108, 123).
In another study, people said that they would give the same
punishment to a company that would respond with safer
products and one that would be unaffected because the
penalty would be secret and covered by insurance (whose
price would not increase) (Baron 1993a). Here, too, the ef-
fects of the punishment did not affect judgments by a ma-
jority of respondents.
A similar result emerged from a test of punishment judg-
ments that asked subjects, including judges and legislators,
to choose penalties for dumping hazardous waste (Baron et
al. 1993). In one case, the penalty would make companies
try harder to avoid waste. In another, the penalty would lead
companies to cease making a beneficial product. Most peo-
ple did not penalize companies differently in the two cases.
Most strikingly, people preferred to require companies to
clean up their own waste, even if the waste did not threaten
anyone, instead of spending the same amount to clean up
far more dangerous waste produced by another, now-de-
funct company.
How could this preference make sense? Why should a
company be asked to engage in a course of action that costs
the same but that does much less good? In these cases, it is
most sensible to think that people are operating under a
heuristic, mandating punishment that is proportional to
outrageousness, and requiring that punishment be based
not at all on consequential considerations. As a general rule,
of course, it is plausible to think that penalties should be
proportional to the outrageousness of the act; utilitarians
will accept the point as a first approximation, and retribu-
tivists will insist on it. But it seems excessively rigid to adopt
this principle whether or not the consequence would be to
make human beings safer and healthier. Weak consequen-
tialists, while refusing to reject retributivism, will condemn
this excessive rigidity. Those who seek proportional pun-
ishments might well disagree in principle. But it would be
worthwhile for them to consider the possibility that they
have been tricked by a heuristic – and that their reluctance
to acknowledge the point is a product of the insistent voice
of their own homunculus.
5.2.2. Probability of detection. Now we turn to some
closely related examples from the domain of punishment.
On the economic account, the state’s goal, when imposing
penalties for misconduct, is to ensure optimal deterrence
(for this point and some complexities, see Polinsky &
Shavell 1998). To increase deterrence, the law might in-
crease the severity of punishment, or instead increase the
likelihood of punishment. A government that lacks sub-
stantial enforcement resources might impose high penal-
ties, thinking that it will produce the right deterrent “signal”
in light of the fact that many people will escape punishment
altogether. A government that has sufficient resources
might impose a lower penalty, but enforce the law against
all or almost all violators. These ideas lead to a simple the-
ory in the context of punitive damages for wrongdoing: The
purpose of such damages is to make up for the shortfall in
enforcement. If injured people are 100% likely to receive
compensation, there is no need for punitive damages. If in-
jured people are 50% likely to receive compensation, those
who bring suit should receive a punitive award that is twice
the amount of the compensatory award. The simple exer-
cise in multiplication will ensure optimal deterrence.
But there is a serious question of whether people accept
this account, and if not, why not. (For the moment, let us put
to one side the question of whether they should accept it in
principle.) Experiments suggest that people reject optimal
deterrence and that they do not believe that the probability
of detection is relevant to punishment. The reason is that
they use the outrage heuristic. I participated in two experi-
ments designed to cast light on this question (Sunstein et al.
2000). In the first experiment, subjects were given cases of
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wrongdoing, arguably calling for punitive damages, and also
were provided with explicit information about the probabil-
ity of detection. Different subjects saw the same case, with
only one difference: the probability of detection was sub-
stantially varied. Subjects were asked about the amount of
punitive damages that they would choose to award. The goal
was to see if subjects would impose higher punishments
when the probability of detection was low. In the second ex-
periment, subjects were asked to evaluate judicial and exec-
utive decisions made to reduce penalties when the probabil-
ity of detection was high, and to increase penalties when the
probability of detection was low. Subjects were questioned
about whether they approved or disapproved of varying the
penalty with the probability of detection.
The findings were simple and straightforward. The first
experiment found that varying the probability of detection
had no effect on punitive awards. Even when people’s at-
tention was explicitly directed to the probability of detec-
tion, they were indifferent to it. The second experiment
found that strong majorities of respondents rejected judi-
cial decisions to reduce penalties because of a high prob-
ability of detection – and also rejected executive decisions
to increase penalties because of a low probability of de-
tection. In other words, people did not approve of an ap-
proach to punishment that would make the level of pun-
ishment vary with the probability of detection. What
apparently concerned them was the extent of the wrong-
doing and the right degree of moral outrage – not optimal
deterrence.
Of course many people have principled reasons for em-
bracing retributivism and for rejecting utilitarian accounts
of punishment. And some such people are likely to believe,
on reflection, that the moral intuitions just described are
correct – that what matters is what the defendant did, not
whether his action was likely to be detected. But if we em-
brace weak consequentialism, we will find it implausible to
suggest that the aggregate level of misconduct is entirely ir-
relevant to punishment. We will be unwilling to ignore the
fact that if a legal system refuses to impose enhanced pun-
ishment on hard-to-detect wrongdoing, it will end up with
a great deal of wrongdoing. People’s unwillingness to take
any account of the probability of detection suggests the pos-
sibility that a moral heuristic is at work, one that leads to
real errors. Because of the contested nature of the ethical
issues involved, I cannot demonstrate this point; but those
who refuse to consider the probability of detection might
consider the possibility that System I has gotten the better
of them.
5.3. Playing God: Reproduction, nature, and sex
Issues of reproduction and sexuality are prime candidates
for the operation of moral heuristics. Consider human
cloning, which most Americans reject and believe should be
banned. Notwithstanding this consensus, the ethical and le-
gal issues here are extremely difficult. To make progress, it
is necessary to distinguish between reproductive and non-
reproductive cloning; the first is designed to produce chil-
dren, whereas the second is designed to produce cells for
therapeutic use. Are the ethical issues different in the two
cases? In any case, it is important to identify the particular
grounds for moral concern. Do we fear that cloned children
would be means to their parents’ ends, and if so, why? Do
we fear that they would suffer particular psychological
harm? Do we fear that they would suffer from especially se-
vere physical problems?
In a highly influential discussion of new reproductive tech-
nologies, above all cloning, ethicist Leon Kass (1998, pp. 17–
19) points to the “wisdom in repugnance.” Kass writes:
People are repelled by many aspects of human cloning. They re-
coil from the prospect of mass production of human beings, with
large clones of look-alikes, compromised in their individuality,
the idea of father-son or mother-daughter twins; the bizarre
prospects of a woman giving birth to and rearing a genetic copy
of herself, her spouse or even her deceased father or mother;
the grotesqueness of conceiving a child as an exact replacement
for another who has died; the utilitarian creation of embryonic
genetic duplicates of oneself, to be frozen away or created when
necessary, in case of need for homologous tissues or organs for
transplantation; the narcissism of those who would clone them-
selves and the arrogance of others who think they know who de-
serves to be cloned or which genotype any child-to-be should be
thrilled to receive; the Frankensteinian hubris to create human
life and increasingly to control its destiny; man playing God . . .
We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not
because of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but be-
cause we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the
violation of things that we rightfully hold dear. . . . Shallow are
the souls that have forgotten how to shudder.
Kass is correct to suggest that revulsion toward human
cloning might be grounded in legitimate concerns, and I
mean to be agnostic here on the question of whether hu-
man cloning is ethically defensible. But I want to suggest
that moral heuristics, and System I, are responsible for what
Kass seeks to celebrate as that which “we intuit and feel, im-
mediately and without argument.” In fact Kass’s catalogue
of alleged errors seems to me to be an extraordinary exer-
cise in the use of such heuristics. Availability operates in this
context, not to drive judgments about probability, but to call
up instances of morally dubious behavior (e.g., “mass pro-
duction of human beings, with large clones of look-alikes,
compromised in their individuality”). The representative-
ness heuristic plays a similar role (e.g., “the Frankenstein-
ian hubris to create human life and increasingly to control
its destiny”). But I believe that Kass gets closest to the cog-
nitive process here with three words: “man playing God.”
In fact, we might well think that “do not play God” is the
general heuristic here, with different societies specifying
what falls in that category and with significant changes over
time. Even in secular societies, a closely related heuristic
plays a large role in judgments of fact and morality: Do not
tamper with nature. This heuristic affects many moral judg-
ments, though individuals and societies often become ac-
customed to various kinds of tampering (consider in vitro
fertilization). An anti-tampering heuristic helps explain many
risk-related judgments. For example, “[h]uman interven-
tion seems to be an amplifier in judgments on food riskiness
and contamination,” even though “more lives are lost to nat-
ural than to man-made disasters in the world” (Rozin 2001,
pp. 31, 38). Studies show that people overestimate the car-
cinogenic risk from pesticides and underestimate the risks
of natural carcinogens (Rozin 2001). People also believe
that nature implies safety, so much so that they will prefer
natural water to processed water even if the two are chem-
ically identical (Rozin 2001).
The moral injunction against tampering with nature
plays a large role in public objections to genetic engineer-
ing of food, and hence legal regulation of such engineering
is sometimes driven by that heuristic rather than by a de-
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liberative, System II encounter with the substantive issues.
For genetic engineering, the anti-tampering heuristic dri-
ves judgments even when the evidence of risk is slim
(McHughen 2000). In fact, companies go to great lengths
to get a “natural” stamp on their products (Schlosser 2002),
even though the actual difference between what counts as
a “natural additive” and an “artificial additive” bears little or
no relation to potential harm to consumers. So too, in the
domains of reproduction and sexuality, where a pervasive
objection is that certain practices are “unnatural.” And for
cloning, there appears to be a particular heuristic at work:
Do not tamper with natural processes for human repro-
duction. It is not clear that this heuristic works well; but it
is clear that it systematically misfires.
Issues at the intersection of morality and sex provide an
obvious place for the use of moral heuristics. Such heuris-
tics are peculiarly likely to be at work in any area in which
people are likely to think, “That’s disgusting!” Any examples
here will be contentious, but let us return to the incest
taboo. We can easily imagine incestuous relationships, say
between first cousins or second cousins, which ought not to
give rise to social opprobrium but which might nonetheless
run afoul of social norms or even the law (Haidt 2001). The
incest taboo is best defended by reference to coercion, psy-
chological harm, and risks to children who might result
from incestuous relationships. But in many imaginable
cases, these concrete harms are not involved.
Of course, it is plausible to say that the best way to de-
fend against these harms is by a flat prohibition on incest,
one that has the disadvantage of excessive generality but the
advantage of easy application. Such a flat prohibition might
have evolutionary origins (Stein 2001); it might also have
strong rule-utilitarianism justifications. We would not like
to have family members asking whether incest would be a
good idea in individual cases, even if our underlying con-
cern is limited to coercion and psychological harm. So de-
fended, however, the taboo stands unmasked as a moral
heuristic. In this vein, Haidt and his coauthors (Haidt et al.
2004) refer to “moral dumbfounding” – to the existence of
moral judgments that people “feel” but are unable to jus-
tify. In the domain of sex and reproduction, many taboos
can be analyzed in similar terms.
5.4. Acts and omissions
To say the least, there has been much discussion of whether
and why the distinction between acts and omissions might
matter for morality, law, and policy. In one case, for exam-
ple, a patient might ask a doctor not to provide life-sustain-
ing equipment, thus ensuring the patient’s death. In an-
other case, a patient might ask a doctor to inject a substance
that will immediately end the patient’s life. Many people
seem to have a strong moral intuition that the failure to pro-
vide life-sustaining equipment, and even the withdrawal of
such equipment, is acceptable and legitimate – but that the
injection is morally abhorrent. And indeed, American con-
stitutional law reflects judgments to exactly this effect: Peo-
ple have a constitutional right to withdraw equipment that
is necessary to keep them alive, but they have no constitu-
tional right to physician-assisted suicide (see Washington
vs. Glucksberg 1997, pp. 724–25). But what is the morally
relevant difference?
It is worth considering the possibility that the act–omis-
sion distinction operates as a heuristic for a more complex
and difficult assessment of the moral issues at stake. From
the moral point of view, harmful acts are generally worse
than harmful omissions, in terms of both the state of mind
of the wrongdoer and the likely consequences of the wrong.
A murderer is typically more malicious than a bystander
who refuses to come to the aid of someone who is drown-
ing; the murderer wants his victim to die, whereas the by-
stander need have no such desire. In addition, a murderer
typically guarantees death, whereas a bystander may do no
such thing. (I put to one side some complexities about cau-
sation.) But in terms of either the wrongdoer’s state of mind
or the consequences, harmful acts are not always worse
than harmful omissions. The moral puzzles arise when life,
or a clever interlocutor, comes up with a case in which there
is no morally relevant distinction between acts and omis-
sions, but when moral intuitions (and the homunculus)
strongly suggest that there must be such a difference. As an
example, consider the vaccination question discussed ear-
lier; many people show an omission bias, favoring inaction
over statistically preferable action (Baron & Ritov 1993).
Here an ordinarily sensible heuristic, favoring omissions
over actions, appears to produce moral error.
In such cases, we might hypothesize that moral intuitions
reflect an overgeneralization of principles that usually make
sense – but that fail to make sense in the particular case (see
Baron 1994a). Those principles condemn actions but per-
mit omissions, a difference that is often plausible in light of
relevant factors, but that, in hard cases, cannot be defended
(but see Kamm 1998). I believe that the persistent accep-
tance of withdrawal of life-saving equipment, alongside
persistent doubts about euthanasia, is a demonstration of
the point. There is no morally relevant difference between
the two; the act–omission distinction makes a difference
apparent or even clear when it is not real (on some compli-
cations regarding this, see Sunstein 1999).
This point cannot be demonstrated here; further experi-
ments on the nature of moral intuitions in this domain
would be extremely valuable (for an illustration, see Haidt
& Baron 1996). But compare the dispute over two well-
known problems in moral philosophy (see Thomson 1986,
pp. 94–116). These problems do not involve the act–omis-
sion distinction; no omission is involved. But the problems
implicate closely related concerns. The first, called the trol-
ley problem, asks people to suppose that a runaway trolley
is headed for five people, who will be killed if the trolley
continues on its current course. The question is whether
you would throw a switch that would move the trolley onto
another set of tracks, killing one person rather than five.
Most people would throw the switch. The second, called
the footbridge problem, is the same as that just given, but
with one difference: the only way to save the five is to throw
a stranger, now on a footbridge that spans the tracks, into
the path of the trolley, killing that stranger but preventing
the trolley from reaching the others. Most people will not
kill the stranger. But what is the difference between the two
cases, if any? A great deal of philosophical work has been
done on this question, much of it trying to suggest that our
firm intuitions can indeed be defended in principle.
Without engaging these arguments, let me suggest the
possibility of a simpler answer. As a matter of principle,
there is no difference between the two cases. People’s dif-
ferent reactions are based on moral heuristics that con-
demn the throwing of the stranger but support the throw-
ing of the switch. As a matter of principle, it is worse to
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throw a human being in the path of a trolley than to throw
a switch that (indirectly?) leads to a death. The relevant
heuristics generally point in the right direction. To say the
least, it is desirable for people to act on the basis of a moral
heuristic that makes it extremely abhorrent to throw inno-
cent people to their death. But the underlying heuristics
misfire in drawing a distinction between the two cleverly
devised cases. Hence, people struggle heroically to rescue
their intuitions and to establish that the two cases are gen-
uinely different in principle. But they aren’t. In this sense,
a moral heuristic, one that stems from System I and has
“ecological rationality” (Gigerenzer 2000), leads to errors.
And this objection does not bear only on ingeniously devised
hypothetical cases. It suggests that a moral mistake pervades
both commonsense morality and law, including constitu-
tional law, by treating harmful omissions as morally unprob-
lematic or categorically different from harmful actions.
Is there anything to be said to those who believe that
their moral judgments, distinguishing the trolley and foot-
bridge problems, are entirely reflective, and embody no
heuristic at all? Consider a suggestive experiment designed
to see how the human brain responds to the two problems
(Greene et al. 2001). The authors do not attempt to answer
the moral questions in principle, but they find “that there
are systematic variations in the engagement of emotions in
moral judgment,” and that brain areas associated with emo-
tion are far more active in contemplating the footbridge
problem than in contemplating the trolley problem. An im-
plication of Greene et al.’s finding is that human brains are
hard-wired to distinguish between bringing about a death
“up close and personal” and doing so at a distance. Of
course, this experiment is far from decisive; emotions and
cognition are not easily separable (Nussbaum 2002), and
there may be good moral reasons why certain brain areas
are activated by one problem and not by the other. Perhaps
the brain is closely attuned to morally irrelevant differ-
ences. But consider the case of fear, where an identifiable
region of the brain makes helpfully immediate but not en-
tirely reliable judgments (Ledoux 1996), in a way that sug-
gests a possible physical location for some of the operations
of System I. The same may well be true in the context of
morality, politics, and law (Greene & Haidt 2002).6
6. Exotic cases, moral judgments, and reflective
equilibrium
Some of these examples will seem more contentious than
others. But taken as a whole, they seem to me to raise seri-
ous doubts about the wide range of work that approaches
moral and political dilemmas by attempting to uncover
moral intuitions about exotic cases of the kind never or
rarely encountered in ordinary life. Should you shoot an in-
nocent person if that is the only way to save twenty inno-
cent people (Williams 1973)? What is the appropriate moral
evaluation of a case in which a woman accidentally puts
cleaning fluid in her coffee, and her husband, wanting her
dead, does not provide the antidote, which he happens to
have handy (see Thomson 1986, p. 31)? If Martians arrived
and told you that they would destroy the world unless you
tortured a small child, should you torture a small child? Is
there a difference between killing someone by throwing
him into the path of a train and killing someone by divert-
ing the train’s path to send it in his direction?
I believe that in cases of this kind, the underlying moral
intuitions ordinarily work well, but that when they are
wrenched out of familiar contexts, their reliability, for pur-
poses of moral and legal analysis, is unclear. Consider the
following rule: Do not kill an innocent person, even if this is
necessary to save others. (I put to one side the contexts of
self-defense and war.) In all likelihood, a society does much
better if most people have this intuition, if only because
judgments about necessity are likely to be unreliable and
self-serving. But in a hypothetical case, in which it really is
necessary to kill an innocent person to save twenty others,
our intuitions might well turn out to be unclear and con-
tested – and if our intuitions about the hypothetical case
turn out to be very firm (do not kill innocent people, ever!),
they might not deserve to be so firm, simply because they
have been wrenched out of the real-world context, which is
where they need to be to make sense.
The use of exotic cases has been defended, not on the
ground that they are guaranteed to be correct, but as a
means of eliciting the structure of our moral judgments in a
way that enables us to “isolate the reasons and principles”
that underlie our responses (Kamm 1993, p. 8; see generally,
Sorenson 1992). But if those responses are unreliable, they
might not help to specify the structure of moral judgments,
except when they are ill-informed and unreflective. For iso-
lating reasons and principles that underlie our responses, ex-
otic cases might be positively harmful (cf. Flanagan 1993).
In short, I believe that some philosophical analysis, based
on exotic moral dilemmas, is inadvertently and even comi-
cally replicating the early work of Kahneman and Tversky
by uncovering situations in which intuitions, normally quite
sensible, turn out to misfire. The irony is that where Kah-
neman and Tversky meant to devise cases that would
demonstrate the misfiring, some philosophers develop ex-
otic cases with the thought that the intuitions are likely to
be reliable and should form the building blocks for sound
moral judgments. An understanding of the operation of
heuristics offers reason to doubt the reliability of those in-
tuitions, even when they are very firm (cf. the emphasis on
moral learning from real-world situations in Churchland
1996).
Now, it is possible that the firmness of the underlying in-
tuitions is actually desirable. Perhaps social life is better, not
worse, because of the large number of people who treat
heuristics as moral rules and who believe (for example) that
innocent people should never be killed. If the heuristic is
treated as a universal and freestanding principle, perhaps
some mistakes will be made, but only in highly unusual
cases, and perhaps people who accept the principle will
avoid the temptation to depart from it when the justifica-
tion for doing so appears sufficient, but really is not. In
other words, a firm rule might misfire in some cases, but it
might be better than a more fine-grained approach, which,
in practice, would misfire even more. Those who believe
that you should always tell the truth may do and be much
better, all things considered, than those who believe that
the truth should be told only on the basis of case-specific,
all-things-considered judgments in its favor.
To the extent that moral heuristics operate as rules, they
might be defended in the way that all rules are – as much
better than the alternatives, even if they produce errors in
some imaginable cases. I have noted that moral heuristics
might show a kind of “ecological rationality,” thus working
well in most real-world contexts (Gigerenzer 2000); recall
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the possibility that human beings live by simple heuristics
that make us good. My suggestion is not that the moral
heuristics, in their most rigid forms, are socially worse than
the reasonable alternatives. It is hard to resolve that ques-
tion in the abstract. I am claiming only that such heuristics
lead to real errors and significant confusion. Of course, a
great deal of experimental work remains to be done on this
question; existing research has only scratched the surface.
Within philosophy, there is a large literature on the role
of intuitions in moral argument, much of it devoted to their
role in the search for reflective equilibrium (Hooker 2000;
Raz 1994). In John Rawls’ influential formulation, people’s
judgments about justice should be made via an effort to en-
sure principled consistency between their beliefs at all lev-
els of generality (Rawls 1971). Rawls emphasizes that dur-
ing the search for reflective equilibrium, all beliefs are
revisable in principle. But as Rawls also emphasizes, some
of our beliefs, about particular cases and more generally,
seem to us especially fixed, and it will take a great deal to
uproot them. It is tempting to use an understanding of
moral heuristics as a basis for challenging the search for re-
flection equilibrium, but I do not believe that anything said
here supports that challenge (see Pizarro & Bloom 2003,
emphasizing the potential role of conscious deliberation in
informing and reshaping our moral intuitions). Recall that
in Rawls’ formulation, all of our intuitions are potentially re-
visable, including those that are quite firm.
What I am adding here is that if moral heuristics are per-
vasive, then some of our apparently fixed beliefs might result
from them. We should be aware of that fact in attempting to
reach reflective equilibrium. Of course, some beliefs that are
rooted in moral heuristics might turn out, on reflection, to be
correct, perhaps for reasons that will not occur to people who
use the heuristics mechanically. I am suggesting only that
judgments that seem most insistent, or least revisable, may
result from overgeneralizing intuitions that work well in
many contexts, but that also misfire (see the discussion of
wide and narrow reflective equilibrium in Stein 1996).
If this is harder to demonstrate in the domain of morality
than in the domain of facts, it is largely because we are able
to agree, in the relevant cases, about what constitutes factual
error, and are often less able to agree about what constitutes
moral error. With respect to the largest disputes about what
morality requires, it may be too contentious to argue that
one side is operating under a heuristic, whereas another side
has it basically right. But I hope that I have said enough to
show that in particular cases, sensible rules of thumb lead to
demonstrable errors not merely in factual judgments, but in
the domains of morality, politics, and law, as well.
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NOTES
1. In a widely held view, a primary task of ethics is to identify
the proper general theory and to use it to correct intuitions in cases
in which they go wrong (Hooker 2000). Consider here the
provocative claim that much of everyday morality, nominally con-
cerned with fairness, should be seen as a set of heuristics for the
real issue, which is how to promote utility (see Baron 1998; to the
same general effect, with numerous examples from law, see
Kaplow & Shavell 2002).
2. Note also that loss aversion is quite robust in the real world
(Benarzi & Thaler 2000; Camerer 2000), and it has not been
shown to be solely or mostly a result of the speaker’s clues. Also
note that the nature of the clue, when there is one, depends on
the speaker’s appreciation of the existence of framing effects –
otherwise the clue would be ineffective.
3. Here too the frame may indicate something about the
speaker’s intentions, and subjects may be sensitive to the degree
of certainty in the scenario (assuming, for example, that future
deaths may not actually occur). While strongly suspecting that
these explanations are not complete (see Frederick 2003), I mean
not to reject them, but only to suggest the susceptibility of intu-
itions to frames (for skeptical remarks, see Kamm 1998).
4. I am grateful to Jonathan Haidt for this suggestion.
5. I put to one side cases in which those who enjoy the bene-
fits are wealthy and those who incur the costs are poor; in some
situations, distributional considerations will justify a departure
from what would otherwise be compelled by cost–benefit analy-
sis (on this and other problems with cost–benefit analysis, see
Sunstein 2002).
6. To see the implications, consider the controversial area of
capital punishment, and let us simply assume that for each execu-
tion, at least five murders are prevented (see the Dezhbakhsh et
al. [2004] finding that each execution prevents eighteen murders,
with a margin of error of ten). If the assumption is correct, the re-
fusal to impose capital punishment will effectively condemn nu-
merous innocent people to death. Many people think that capital
punishment counts as an “act,” while to refuse to impose it counts
as an “omission,” and that the two are morally different. Many oth-
ers point to differences in the nature of the causal chains, which
might make capital punishment unacceptable even if the failure
to impose it leads to the death of innocent people. I cannot resolve
the moral issues in this space. But for weak consequentialists, it is
at least worth considering the possibility that if capital punishment
deters large numbers of murders, then it cannot be so easily con-
demned on moral grounds – at least if we do not employ an act–
omission distinction in a context in which that distinction might be
difficult to defend in principle.
Similar issues are raised by the debate over torture. If torture
would prevent the death of many innocent people, or if torture
would prevent many other tortures, might not a ban on torture be
seen as a moral heuristic, one that misfires in imaginable cases?
Open Peer Commentary
Cognitivism, controversy, and moral
heuristics
Matthew D. Adler
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
madler@law.upenn.edu
Abstract: Sunstein aims to provide a nonsectarian account of moral
heuristics, yet the account rests on a controversial meta-ethical view. Fur-
ther, moral theorists who reject act consequentialism may deny that Sun-
stein’s examples involve moral mistakes. But so what? Within a theory that
counts consequences as a morally weighty feature of actions, the moral
judgments that Sunstein points to are indeed mistaken, and the fact that
governmental action at odds with these judgments will be controversial
doesn’t bar such action.
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What are moral heuristics? Noncognitivists and cognitivists will
answer this question differently. Noncognitivists deny that there
are moral truths, or facts, or that moral statements express beliefs.
Rather, these statements express the speaker’s feelings, commit-
ments, or other such conative attitudes. The debate about cogni-
tivism remains a live one within meta-ethics, animated by two
deep truisms about morality: that there are moral disagreements,
and that moral judgments prompt action (Miller 2003). Noncog-
nitivists have trouble with the first truism (How can there be dis-
agreements about nonfactual matters?), but cognitivists have trou-
ble with the second (Since beliefs, alone, don’t prompt action, how
can moral judgments?).
Sunstein’s approach to moral heuristics is cognitivist. Indeed, he
assumes that the construct of a moral heuristic entails cognitivism.
“To show that heuristics operate in the moral domain, we have to
specify some benchmark by which we can measure moral truth”
(target article, sect. 3, para. 1). Yet, consider Sunstein’s generic
definition of a heuristic as an automatic, unreflective, decision-
making process that substitutes a heuristic attribute for a target at-
tribute. Judge Ji reaches a moral judgment about some action or
some other object of moral assessment, focusing on heuristic at-
tribute H rather than the target attribute T that (in some sense) is
the “morally relevant” feature of the object. Does the characteri-
zation of T rather than H as morally relevant entail cognitivism?
Maybe not. It would seem that the noncognitivist can say some-
thing like this: T is the feature that Ji would focus on after full,
“System II” processing; H is the feature that Ji attends to as a re-
sult of quick, “System I” processing.
So Sunstein seems to be wrong to think that the general concept
of a moral heuristic entails cognitivism; but he is right that his par-
ticular conception does so. His cognitivist take on moral heuristics
is this: H is the feature that Ji focuses on after quick, System I pro-
cessing, whereas T is the feature that is truly morally relevant.
Let us now assume moral cognitivism. This position, albeit
meta-ethically controversial, is one that I (and Sunstein) believe
to be correct. If there are indeed moral facts and truths, does it
follow that there are moral heuristics? It is important to distin-
guish, here, between intratheoretical and intertheoretical claims
about moral heuristics. Different moral theories, such as act con-
sequentialism, or rule consequentialism, or rule contractarianism,
or Kantianism, offer different substantive accounts of moral
truths. The intratheoretical claim is that, for any plausible moral
theory, there can be cases where some Ji as a result of quick pro-
cessing focuses on a heuristic feature H of some assessment ob-
ject rather than the truly relevant feature T of that object identi-
fied by the theory. This intratheoretical claim is surely correct. The
very point of cognitivism, and particular cognitivist theories, is to
delineate moral truths that can depart from, and provide critical
purchase on, the actual judgments that an individual engaged in
moral assessment happens to reach.
Sunstein argues, however, not merely for the intratheoretical
claim, but for the much stronger, intertheoretical claim. His ex-
amples (involving framing, risk regulation, punishment, playing
God, and the act/omission distinction) are offered as cases where
individual judgments are incorrect across a wide range of moral
theories – all plausible theories, in the case of framing, and all
“weakly consequentialist” theories, in the case of the other heuris-
tics. This claim underestimates, I think, just how diverse moral
theories are (Kagan 1998). Moral theorists continue to disagree
about the foundations of moral truth. Is this ultimately a matter of
producing good consequences (where the notion of “good conse-
quences” might itself be more or less welfarist and more or less
egalitarian); of implementing some hypothetical contract; of fol-
lowing universalizable principles; or of reflecting human nature?
Moral theorists also continue to disagree about the primary object
of moral assessment: acts, rules, virtues, motives, or something
else. For example, the act consequentialist thinks that the right ac-
tion is the action with the best consequences; the rule conse-
quentialist thinks that the right action is the action conforming to
the rule with the best consequences.
These intertheoretical disagreements reflect the wide range of
preliminary moral judgments that the theorist will have and that
any theory attempts to fit: judgments about particular cases, and
more systemic judgments about the connection of “morality” to
concepts like “welfare,” “rights,” “autonomy,” “equality,” “ratio-
nality,” and so on. The threshold theoretical choice between cog-
nitivism and noncognitivism, and the subsequent adoption of a
particular cognitivist theory, is a matter of appropriately synthe-
sizing these preliminary judgments, accepting some and rejecting
others. (That is one way of understanding Rawls’ claims about “re-
flective equilibrium”). Given the multiplicity of preliminary judg-
ments, and the fuzziness of the notion of appropriate synthesis,
the plurality of moral theories is not surprising. This plurality, in
turn, makes Sunstein’s intertheoretical claims quite ambitious.
Consider framing. Couldn’t framing be the upshot of rule con-
sequentialism, or indeed of any other theory that makes rules
rather than actions the primary object of moral assessment? If in-
dividuals naturally frame effects as losses or gains from some base-
line, then moral loss aversion may economize on deliberation costs
relative to full-blown moral deliberation about actions. If the
economies are substantial enough, and if the error rate of framing
relative to full-blown deliberation is not too high, framing would
presumably be required by the optimal rule.
As for the risk regulation, punishment, playing God, and act/
omission cases: Sunstein suggests that individual judgments in
these instances depart from “weak consequentialism,” offered as
a “nonsectarian” principle endorsable by a wide range of moral
theories (see sects. 3.2 and 5). But there is an ambiguity here.
“Weak consequentialism” might mean: (1) the principle that con-
sequences are a morally relevant feature of actions, perhaps lexi-
cally subordinate to other, nonconsequentialist factors; or (2) the
principle that the consequences of actions are a morally weighty
feature, with sufficient force to override nonconsequentialist fac-
tors in a significant range of choice situations. Sunstein defines
“weak consequentialism” in the first way, as the view that “the so-
cial consequences of the legal system are relevant, other things 
being equal, to what law ought to be doing” (sect. 3.2). Two 
paragraphs later, he contrasts deontologists “who believe that 
consequences do not matter at all” with weak consequentialists,
reinforcing the first definition of weak consequentialism. But the
risk regulation, punishment, playing God, and act/omission cases
are all consistent with weak consequentialism in this sense. For
these are all cases in which putative nonconsequentialist factors,
such as imposing proportionate penalties, or expressing respect
for various goods, or not tampering with nature, or not actively
causing harm, are in play. Only if consequences can sometimes
override such factors in determining morally appropriate actions
do the cases illustrate moral mistakes. And this second variant of
weak consequentialism is substantially more “sectarian” than the
first.
Does this matter? Sunstein is willing to bite the bullet of moral
controversy at the meta-ethical level. Why not bite it at the sub-
stantive level too? Cost–benefit analysis implements weak conse-
quentialism in the second, more sectarian sense: the view that
consequences (in particular, overall welfare) are a morally weighty
feature of government choices (Adler & Posner 1999). Given a
sufficiently robust commitment to cost–benefit analysis, one can
say that the risk regulation, punishment, playing God, and act/
omission cases illustrate moral mistakes. Such a commitment
would be controversial, but that doesn’t mean that it is incorrect,
or that government shouldn’t act on it. Morally conscientious gov-
ernment actors must ultimately settle on a moral theory (or a prob-
ability distribution across theories) and choose. The fact that a par-
ticular choice will be controversial, flying in the face of other
theories and ordinary moral judgments, will itself be handled dif-
ferently by different theories. Cost–benefit analysis understands
controversy as a potential source of discontent with governmental
choice (a hedonic cost) and perhaps an obstacle to implementa-
tion (an enforcement cost), but these must be balanced against the
benefits of controversial choices.
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Alternative perspectives on omission bias
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Abstract: The act/omission distinction is likely to lead to biases and be
used as a moral heuristic. However, it is frequently difficult to determine
whether this act/omission distinction is responsible for a judgment outside
the lab. Further, more encompassing theories of omission bias are needed
to make progress in dealing with its harmful consequences. One such the-
ory is briefly presented.
The distinction between actions and omission, Sunstein argues, is
used as a heuristic that is often appropriate, but also leads to sys-
tematic moral errors. Regarding this, several issues must be con-
sidered. First, note that it can be difficult to evaluate the presence
of an omission bias from the type of examples often used to elicit
moral judgments. Attitudes towards action and omission are not
easy to disentangle from status quo versus change, natural versus
unnatural, and direct versus indirect cause distinctions; further
complicating matters, people sometimes show a bias towards ac-
tion (Baron & Ritov 2004; Patt & Zeckhauser 2000; Ritov & Baron
1990).
Progress has been made in elucidating these issues about omis-
sion bias. However, the point needs to be raised here, because ex-
tending omission bias findings to moral, political, and legal issues
in which other “confounded” distinctions cannot be controlled,
means that it is difficult for us to know whether the act/omission
distinction is pertinent to the types of moral intuitions discussed
by Sunstein. For example, the aversion to euthanizing by action
compared to relative acceptance of euthanizing by omission could
easily be driven by feelings about direct causation of harm or by
distinguishing between not impeding natural death and causing an
unnatural one. Even in the artificial case of the trolley scenario,
there are problems, namely, that outcomes are not equal from the
active and passive killing, as people are likely to experience more
difficulty afterward with their choice if they kill by throwing some-
one off of a footbridge than if they kill by throwing a switch. The
action choice would make a person susceptible to post-traumatic
stress disorder (Grossman 1996), so one can hardly equate the
outcomes in the trolley problem. Sunstein seems to implicitly rec-
ognize this problem with the trolley scenario, noting that humans
may be genetically programmed to distinguish between causing
death from near or from far.1
Regardless of these and other subtleties, which are important
to consider when attempting to apply findings of omission bias, let
us grant that an omission bias exists in at least some contexts,
which the literature suggests (Anderson 2003; Baron & Ritov
2004). If we grant that it is a bias, that this distinction is taken into
consideration when it is irrelevant, we must concede that it then
causes real harm by leading to moral judgments that, upon further
reflection, are considered erroneous.
An important question then becomes: where does this distinc-
tion originate and how do preferences become skewed and applied
when they are irrelevant? In terms of reducing the harm caused by
moral heuristics, understanding the source of the heuristic may
prove to be crucial, for “debiasing” by education about a heuristic
or bias is not always effective (e.g., Wilson et al. 2002).
Several explanations for omission bias have been proposed. One
type of proposal is to embed the distinction between action and
omission within another distinction and claim that the bias is sub-
ordinate to another bias (e.g., towards the status quo, normality,
or indirectly caused over directly caused harm). These proposals,
even if they have validity, do not so much address our need for a
source, as change the locus of the search for a source.
Another type of proposal suggests that people have different
emotional reactions to actions and omissions, and that the moral
judgment is a consequence of a more basic emotional response.2
It has been suggested that enhanced regret for actions over omis-
sions could be the emotional source.3 I have also suggested that
even in the absence of feeling this distinction, the knowledge that
others make the distinction would lead one to make the same dis-
tinction that others do, to avoid the blame of others for harm from
actions. Again, although these explanations may have validity, this
shifts the locus for explaining the distinction elsewhere, rather
than explaining it in a more satisfying way.
Thus, I wish to suggest a more encompassing explanation
which, while speculative, indicates the kind of theory that is
needed to make further progress in omission bias research.
The concept behind this proposal is that there is a structural,
environmental problem that distorts people’s perceptions of ac-
tions and omissions. That problem is an asymmetry in the collec-
tion and processing of information relating to actions and omis-
sions. In everyday experience, action and omission decisions
happen on an ongoing basis. However, people are not aware of the
consequences of all of their choices. Perhaps actions tend to focus
our attention on consequences, so that consequences that result
from action are likely to undergo more elaborated processing and
are more likely to be processed at all. Although there is no reason
to suppose actions or omissions generally result in more harm,
people may come to be of the opinion that actions are more risky
because they are more aware of the losses that they have incurred
in the past as a result of action. Relative ignorance of those results
for inaction might lead to a perception that omission options are
actually somewhat safer, leading to a small bias in their favor. If
there is validity to this explanation, the omission bias is likely to be
recalcitrant, as it would result from an attitude accrued over a
large number of experiences.
In summary, I agree with Sunstein that the act/omission dis-
tinction is likely used as a moral heuristic in important areas of ap-
plied decision-making. However, we must be cautious in applying
this research to real-world problems that could have multiple
sources of justification and/or intuition feeding a judgment. Fur-
thermore, we do not yet have a firm idea of what causes omission
bias, or how to debias it, which will have important implications
for how we view and deal with this as a “moral heuristic.” The pri-
mary challenge facing researchers in this area is to develop and
test larger-scale theories that do more than shift the locus of the
distinction, explain omission bias in a more complete manner, and
lend themselves to effective debiasing strategies.
NOTES
1. If correct, this is likely just an innate preference to avoid killing con-
specifics, which is not flexible enough to handle our recently developed
ability to kill at a distance (Grossman 1996).
2. For more on this general type of explanation, see Haidt (2001) and
Pizarro and Bloom (2003), who provide perspectives on this position.
3. Note that although there is evidence for this emotional effect, it oc-
curs only provisionally (reviewed in Anderson 2003).
Moral heuristics: Rigid rules or flexible inputs
in moral deliberation?
Elizabeth Anderson
Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003.
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Abstract: Sunstein represents moral heuristics as rigid rules that lead us
to jump to moral conclusions, and contrasts them with reflective moral de-
liberation, which he represents as independent of heuristics and capable
of supplanting them. Following John Dewey’s psychology of moral judg-
ment, I argue that successful moral deliberation does not supplant moral
heuristics but uses them flexibly as inputs to deliberation. Many of the
flaws in moral judgment that Sunstein attributes to heuristics reflect in-
stead the limitations of the deliberative context in which people are asked
to render judgments.
Sunstein’s theory of moral heuristics continues a tradition of un-
derstanding moral judgment advanced by John Dewey. Dewey
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(1922) argued that habits – what Sunstein calls heuristics and what
philosophers call intuitions – govern moral thought in the imme-
diate, nondeliberative, emotionally engaged way Sunstein de-
scribes. Like Sunstein, he argued that habits may make sense in
the contexts in which they evolved, but misfire when placed in
novel contexts. Then we need to consider the consequences of
their operation by engaging what Sunstein calls “System II,” and
thereby arrive at more reflective judgments of what we ought to
do. However, Dewey and Sunstein part ways regarding the rela-
tionship of reflection to habit. Sunstein, recapitulating a standard
reason/emotion dichotomy, suggests that reflection is indepen-
dent of habit and should simply supplant, without modifying,
habit, when the latter misfires. Dewey argued that reflection de-
pends on habit. It is always predicated on “the brute act of hold-
ing something dear” (1915, p. 46) – on intuitive valuations provi-
sionally accepted as given, although they may have been modified
by earlier reflections entrenched in habit, and may be called into
question and further modified at later times. Moral intuitions or
habits properly function as inputs to moral reflection rather than
as fixed, rigid conclusions.
Dewey’s theory suggests an alternative interpretation of the
flaws Sunstein identifies in our moral judgments. Sunstein locates
these flaws in inherent defects or limitations in our heuristics.
Dewey would locate them in the limitations of our deliberative
context. Following Dewey’s cue, I suggest that Sunstein’s evidence
for our innate judgmental defects often reflects limitations built
into the reflective contexts into which subjects have been placed.
These limitations are of two sorts: (1) the deliberative context may
not be the right one for solving the problem given to it; or (2) it
may lack background information needed to make sense of the
other information subjects have. These problems arise most evi-
dently in Sunstein’s punishment cases.
Sunstein claims that judges and juries should consider the con-
sequences of punishment in determining how much guilty defen-
dants should be punished. He attributes people’s resistance to do-
ing this to the outrage heuristic, which insists that punishment be
determined by the gravity of the wrongdoing. I suggest that this
resistance is rather a product of the limited role of courtroom de-
liberation in the division of moral labor. People already know that
judges and jurors are assigned a limited task – determining the
culpability of this defendant, the punishment this defendant de-
serves, and the problems this defendant is responsible for cor-
recting. They know that decision-makers in the courtroom setting
are deliberately denied information about the consequences of
punishment (e.g., whether defendants are insured) so as not to
distract them with information irrelevant to the limited task they
are supposed to solve. Moreover, courtroom settings are not
equipped to handle isolated bits of information about the conse-
quences of punishment. What is a courtroom decision-maker to
do with information about the probability of detection, without
any information about how much the wrongdoing would decline
in the face of increased penalties? Knowing the limited role of
courtroom decision-makers and the lack of background informa-
tion needed to deal with information about consequences, people
placed in courtroom roles are rational to disregard this informa-
tion.
We could imagine courtrooms set up differently, to take account
of such information. Jurors in ancient Athens routinely considered
the consequences of punishment on innocent third parties when
deciding punishments. Defendants found guilty of a crime would
drag in their wailing wives, children, and other dependents, who
would beg the jurors for mercy so that they would not suffer for
the crimes of the household head. If this were the norm for U.S.
courtrooms, no doubt jurors would consider the consequences of
punishment on innocents in their deliberations. Such considera-
tion would not replace the emotionally grounded outrage heuris-
tic with affectless rational deliberation, but rather enter an addi-
tional heuristic, grounded in pity, as an input in juror deliberation.
It is not evident that consequentialists should approve such a
modification of our practices of courtroom deliberation. It would
dramatically reduce the deterrent power of punishment on peo-
ple with dependents. It would enable corporations to get away
with wrongdoing by choosing to shift the costs of punishment to
their employees, or by credibly threatening to leave the market to
even more negligent producers. The courtroom is not the right
place to deal with such consequences.
Instead, we charge this task to legislatures and administrative
agencies, who have broad investigative powers, access to back-
ground information needed to put data about consequences to ef-
fective use, and facility with sophisticated deliberative tools, in-
cluding not just cost–benefit analysis but processes for soliciting
responses to proposed policies from stakeholders and citizens at
large. If holding each firm responsible for its own waste cleanup
is inefficient, we can levy a general tax on toxic chemical produc-
tion and devote the revenues to cleaning up polluted sites. This
administrative solution is preferable to relying on courts to decide
who should clean up which sites. If safer vaccine makers would
exit the market under certain liability rules, the state can indem-
nify them from lawsuits, provided they meet specified safety stan-
dards. Such “System II” deliberative contexts do not override, but
rather incorporate, the force of emotionally engaged moral heuris-
tics. The high crime and low enforcement rates of the 1970s cre-
ated widespread public outrage at lawlessness and disorder. Leg-
islatures responded to this outrage by drastically increasing
penalties on relatively minor crimes, such as drug possession – just
as Sunstein thinks ought to happen when enforcement levels are
low.
Dewey argued that, given the inescapability and indispensabil-
ity of evaluative habits to decision making, our task is to design de-
cision-making institutions so that our heuristics function flexibly
and in response to the widest view of the consequences of conduct
for all. Rigidity and narrowness are not inherent features of our
evaluative habits, but reflect defects in the social contexts that in-
culcate and trigger them. Properly structured reflection does not
override our heuristics, but incorporates them as flexible inputs to
deliberation.
Biting the utilitarian bullet
Jonathan Baron
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
19104-6241. baron@psych.upenn.edu
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron
Abstract: The heuristics-and-biases approach requires a clear separation
of normative and descriptive models. Normative models cannot be justi-
fied by intuition, or by consensus. The lack of consensus on normative the-
ory is a problem for prescriptive approaches. One solution to the pre-
scriptive problem is to argue contingently: if you are concerned about
consequences, here is a way to make them better.
Of course I agree, in spades, with the gist of Sunstein’s argument.
The extension of the heuristics-and-biases approach to the realms
of morality and public policy is natural, and the target article pre-
sents this approach in a balanced way. I suspect, though, that most
of the criticisms of this approach, and of the article, will say that
he goes too far in making assumptions about normative models.
So I want to provide a counter-weight by arguing that he does not
go far enough.
The idea of a moral heuristic arises within an approach to the
study of judgment that relies on three types of models: normative,
descriptive, and prescriptive (Baron 1985; 2004). The normative
model is the standard by which we evaluate a judgment as being
better or worse. Heuristics are part of descriptive models, by
which we explain systematic departures from normative models.
Prescriptive models are suggestions about what someone should
do, all things considered.
I have argued that normative theory must be separated from in-
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tuitive judgment, lest we lose it as a tool for criticizing and im-
proving judgment. We cannot base normative theory on intuition,
or on what intelligent people can be convinced of. Thus, in order
to say that some judgment is biased, we need to do more than show
that it is not reflectively endorsed, or even that it is “inconsistent.”
The definition of consistency itself often presumes a normative
theory (Baron 1994a).
Sunstein argues that “any ambitious theory is likely to be too
contentious to serve as the benchmark for measuring moral truth”
(sect. 3, para. 1). Why? Must we assume that consensus must be
achieved in order to make progress? Must we accept the argument
that “many people disagree” (or even “most scholars disagree”) as
a killer argument against an ambitious normative theory such as
utilitarianism, without examining the reasons for disagreement
and whether they are responsive to the best arguments in favor of
the theory? Some proponents of utilitarianism (an ambitious the-
ory, for sure) think that some form of it can be derived logically
from a useful analytic framework, such as the analysis of decisions
into acts, states, and outcomes, with beliefs depending on states,
and values depending on outcomes (e.g., Baron 2004; Broome
1991; Hare 1981; Kaplow & Shavell 2002). When opponents ne-
glect our arguments, are we to simply give in? Give in to what?
Consider the problem that non-utilitarians have with distribu-
tion. Sunstein argues, “It is far from clear that a moderate utility
loss to those at the bottom can be justified by a larger utility gain
for many at the top” (sect. 3.1, para. 3). It is indeed far from clear
intuitively, but the intuition that makes it unclear seems to be an
overextension of a good utilitarian heuristic – that, other things
being equal, the poor benefit more than the rich from a given good
– to utility itself. Greene and Baron (2001) asked their subjects to
evaluate distributions of utility, after making utility ratings of other
goods (so that they had some idea of what utility was). The sub-
jects showed declining marginal utility for the goods, as we would
expect, but they showed just as much “declining marginal utility”
for utility! This made them internally inconsistent. Greene and
Baron argued that Rawls’s objection to the distributional conse-
quences of utilitarianism is based on this overextension. Sunstein
admits that such basic principles as Rawls’s difference principle
could result from overextension of intuitive heuristics. My point
here is that this kind of overextension may account for much of the
difficulty of reaching consensus.
Some biases can be demonstrated by showing that they are not
reflectively endorsed. They result from System I. Yet, many
demonstrations of biases, such as omission bias, present the two
cases to be compared (act and omission) adjacently, so that sub-
jects have a chance to reflect. Many biases typically demonstrated
with separated examples are also found with adjacent presentation
(Frisch 1993). Some non-moral biases seem to resist even exten-
sive argumentation, although they are clearly biases, such as Ells-
berg’s ambiguity effect (Baron & Frisch 1994; see also Baron
2000b, pp. 268–73).
Possibly the most serious question that results from lack of con-
sensus about normative theory is what prescriptive implications
can be drawn from heuristics-and-biases research on policy judg-
ments. It is difficult to impose utilitarianism on law and public pol-
icy when most people do not accept utilitarianism. Sunstein him-
self has faced this problem repeatedly and dealt with it creatively
(Sunstein 2002; Sunstein & Thaler 2003).
Perhaps one other way to move forward without requiring con-
sensus on utilitarianism (or any normative theory) is to focus on
utilitarianism’s main feature, its focus on consequences. Sunstein
comes close to this in his emphasis on “weak consequentialism.”
Assume for a moment that the way to bring about the best conse-
quences on the whole, to maximize utility, is to try to maximize
utility. Then, any biases or heuristics that lead to different policies
will make outcomes worse. The argument then becomes a condi-
tional: If you are concerned about policies leading to conse-
quences that are less good than they could be, then try to correct,
or work around, the heuristics and biases that lead to suboptimal
consequences (as argued in Baron 1998).
A possible problem with this argument is that the assumption it
requires may be incorrect. It may be that we maximize utility only
by trying to do something else, as Sunstein argues in the section
on exotic cases. But the examples that make this argument plausi-
ble come mostly from personal behavior. In the domain of judg-
ments about public policy, many other examples (such as those
cited by Baron 1998) argue that the assumption is approximately
correct: If we try harder to bring about good consequences,
putting aside our nonconsequentialist intuitions, we might actu-
ally succeed.
Towards an intuitionist account of moral
development
Karen Bartsch and Jennifer Cole Wright
Psychology Department, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3415.
bartsch@uwyo.edu narvik@uwyo.edu
Abstract: Sunstein’s characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an
intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not
lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral
principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather
than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for fu-
ture research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
Sunstein argues that, like other types of judgment, our moral judg-
ments often employ heuristics (i.e., “mental short-cuts” or “rules-
of-thumb”) that lead to blunders in the moral, legal, and political
domains. Though we generally agree with his discussion, Sun-
stein’s intriguing portrayal of moral decision-making fails to ade-
quately distinguish between two distinct aspects of the phenome-
non. The first is the process by which moral heuristics are
employed; the second is the structure of moral heuristics them-
selves.
Concerning process, Sunstein claims that moral heuristics are
employed by the “intuitive system,” which is known for being
“rapid, automatic, and effortless” (sect. 2.2, para. 3). We believe
that Sunstein’s indictment of moral heuristics relies on a complaint
against the intuitive system that may be unwarranted. First, intu-
itions are not necessarily grounded in heuristics. Second, we see
no reason why “intuitive responsiveness” must lead to error. In
fact, it may protect us from error; for, when adequately developed,
intuitive responsiveness may reliably lead to appropriate moral
judgments – a possibility we will expand on shortly.
Concerning structure, Sunstein’s discussion oscillates between
at least two distinct types of moral heuristics: those of the tradi-
tional “rule-of-thumb” type (e.g., “do not tamper with nature”),
and others more instinctive/affective in nature (e.g., the “outrage
heuristic”). We will focus on the former. Sunstein argues that these
heuristics are context-insensitive in a way that leads to unjustified,
and sometimes dangerous, over-generalizations. We suggest that
the structure of such heuristics is indistinguishable from the struc-
ture of moral principles. That is, we see no relevant structural dif-
ference between heuristics like “punish, and do not reward, be-
trayals of trust” and principles like “do not knowingly cause human
death.” Consequently, pace Sunstein, the problem with heuristics
is a problem with principles, as well.
Consider two of Sunstein’s moral heuristics: “people should not
be permitted to engage in moral wrongdoing for a fee” and “do
not tamper with nature.” As Sunstein points out, these heuristics
are structurally blind to the many morally relevant details present
in particular situations. But so are moral principles. Consider two
well-known principles: “always keep your promise” (Kant 1948/
1964) and “maximize utility” (Mill 1861/1957). Using these prin-
ciples to guide one’s judgments can lead to moral blunders. For
instance, keeping one’s promise is problematic in situations where
it is morally appropriate to break the promise. Thus, the problems
with applying a maxim to a complicated, contextualized problem
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exist regardless of whether the maxim is a principle or a heuristic.
Moreover, this is so whether such heuristics/principles are utilized
rapidly, automatically, and effortlessly, or in deliberative reason-
ing. By themselves, they do not specify how/when they should be
employed, how/when they admit of exceptions, how/when they
ought to be used in conjunction with other heuristics/principles,
and so on. In other words, there is a gap between how far reliance
on moral heuristics/principles takes us and where we need to be
in order to achieve appropriate moral judgments.
Some moral philosophers have answered this dilemma by posit-
ing a moral “sensitivity” (e.g., McDowell 1998; Railton 2000; Wig-
gins 1987/2002). But, what could this “sensitivity” be? We think
that it may be the product of a well-functioning intuitive system,
one that allows for rapid, automatic, effortless responsiveness
without heuristics/principles. The question for moral psychology,
then, becomes: how does one develop a well-functioning intuitive
system, and thus moral maturity. If Sunstein’s critique of “rule-of-
thumb” moral heuristics is correct (which we think it is), then the
fact that heuristics and principles have identical structures sug-
gests that this development cannot occur through the internaliza-
tion of heuristics/principles alone.
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus’s model of expertise (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus 1986; 1991) might provide insight into the development
of moral maturity. Their model suggests that heuristics/principles
play a circumscribed role in moral development. If we consider
moral maturity akin to other forms of expertise, then its develop-
ment might be best characterized as a movement away from,
rather than towards, moral judgments guided by heuristics/prin-
ciples. In the expertise model, heuristics/principles are intro-
duced early in development as basic rules that identify features
recognizable without the benefit of experience (e.g., when learn-
ing chess, each piece is assigned a value and one is taught the rule
“always exchange if the total value of pieces captured exceeds the
value of pieces lost”). Reliance on such heuristics/principles is
gradually replaced with procedural knowledge (i.e., know-how)
gained through experience. Such knowledge leads to intuitive re-
sponsiveness. Intuitive responsiveness is the hallmark of expertise
generally, because it enables rapid, automatic, effortless judg-
ments in response to particular environmental contingencies. Im-
portantly, such responsiveness is also reliably appropriate: this is
what makes an expert an expert.
Examples might help. Just as the professional ski racer knows
precisely how to adjust her posture to bring herself quickly around
a steep turn; just as the concert pianist’s fingers move skillfully
across the keys; just as the master chess player can play 5–10 sec-
ond/move games without significant degradation in her perfor-
mance – so, too, might the morally mature person simply see the
moral relevance of particular situations and evaluate accordingly.
Of course, we do not contend that intuitive responses are always
correct, anymore than Sunstein maintains that they are always
wrong. We simply wish to point out the need to treat the intuitive
aspect of decision-making as a matter orthogonal to the issue of
how heuristics/principles are applied, and to recognize that an in-
tuitive response may in fact be characteristic of moral maturity.
In order to test the adequacy of the expertise model, re-
searchers must gain insight into the development of moral matu-
rity. This suggests a shift in emphasis from a focus on moral rea-
soning to the following sorts of questions: What kinds of activities
lead to the development of moral know-how? What kinds of in-
struction/modeling are children morally responsive to? What kind
of feedback best engenders moral sensitivity? Sunstein states that
a primary goal of his article is to stimulate future research. We
hope such research will include an exploration of these develop-
mental issues, examining the potentially independent roles of in-
tuitive processing and the application of heuristics/principles.
Neurobiology supports virtue theory on the
role of heuristics in moral cognition
William D. Casebeer
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943.
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Abstract: Sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence
moral judgment. His case could be strengthened by tightening neurobio-
logically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, con-
sidering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide re-
flective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically
examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of
heuristics in moral reasoning.
I agree with much of what Sunstein says about the role heuristics
play in moral judgment and applaud his effort to make moral the-
orizing responsive to what is known about how human beings 
reason in concrete circumstances. The case for the existence of 
moral heuristics can be strengthened, however, by: (1) tightening
working definitions regarding what constitutes a heuristic, with
requisite sensitivity to their neurobiological underpinnings, (2)
pressing for wide reflective equilibrium as we formulate our back-
ground “most plausible moral theory” so as to avoid charges of cir-
cularity, and (3) systematically considering what one major moral
theory, a naturalized virtue theory, would say about the role
heuristics play in moral cognition.
As we triangulate on a good theory about what a heuristic is, we
should keep in mind the neurobiological substrates that constitute
them. Despite the advanced state of play in the study of heuristics,
it is difficult to articulate a framework that tells us with rigor just
what they are. As Gigerenzer notes, one-word explanations can be-
come surrogates for what should be richer psychological/neurobi-
ological theories, saying of the representativeness, availability, and
anchoring heuristics that “thirty years and many experiments later
these three ‘heuristics’ remain vague and undefined, unspecified
both with respect to the antecedent conditions that elicit (or sup-
press) them and also to the cognitive processes that underlie them”
(Gigerenzer 2000, p. 290). In like vein, I worry whether candidate
moral heuristics offered by Sunstein (e.g., “people should not be
allowed to engage in moral wrongdoing for a fee,” “condemn as
morally wrong things that outrage you,” or “do not tamper with nat-
ural processes for human reproduction”) really constitute heuris-
tics. They sound much like candidates for potential moral princi-
ples (though not very promising ones). If I have independent
reason (let’s stipulate this for the moment) for believing people
ought not to be treated as a mere means, in what sense am I bring-
ing a “heuristic” to bear on moral problem-solving when I apply
Kant’s categorical imperative? Are heuristics present only in Sys-
tem I? Kantians would insist that they (not weak consequentialists)
are in fact responding to the demands of the thoughtful, more de-
tached, System II with their principles, as the deliverances of the
categorical imperative are not automatized, influenced by emo-
tion, subject to framing effects, and the like (or so they might main-
tain – this is probably false when we examine the neurobiological
evidence). Allowing neurobiology to upwardly constrain theorizing
about what is a heuristic will be useful, as minds and brains are al-
ways token-identical and perhaps even type-identical in some cir-
cumstances. If upon empirical investigation a heuristic has no plau-
sible neurobiological substrate, nor any law-like connection to
activation of evolved brain systems and architecture, that makes it
a bad candidate for election to office. For reviews of the neurobi-
ology of moral cognition, see Greene and Haidt (2002), Casebeer
(2003a), and Casebeer and Churchland (2003).
My second concern is closely related. As a general method-
ological principle, theorizing in all domains should strive for con-
silience: at the very least, domains should be consistent, and in ex-
emplary cases one domain might even be reduced to another
(much scientific progress had been made in this way). “Wide,”
rather than “narrow,” reflective equilibrium should be the norm.
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Weak consequentialism fares better on this score card than the
neo-Luddite natural law theory that would (for example) follow
the prime directive with regard to natural human reproduction.
But there may be other moral theories that fare even better than
weak consequentialism on this score. If so, Sunstein’s own back-
ground theory will be another species of heuristic. If not, Sunstein
may have to spend more time “in the weeds” with regard to the
difficult task of moral justification, otherwise friends of natural law
or unrepentant deontologists will say that Sunstein himself is of-
fering only a heuristic and not a truth yardstick (is weak conse-
quentialism justified primarily by intuitions that are themselves
pumped by ecologically invalid heuristics?). I don’t think Sun-
stein’s argument is viciously circular, but others may. In any case,
investigation of moral cognition always involves a background nor-
mative moral theory, itself being justified well or poorly, and that
justification should involve wide reflective equilibrium (indeed,
this is one method for successfully bridging the is/ought gap that
purportedly threatens to make the study of moral psychology ir-
relevant to moral theorizing).
My third concern is that the best candidate for the “big tent” in
which other moral theories are seen as (sometimes praiseworthy)
heuristics was not mentioned: namely, a fully naturalized neo-Aris-
totelian virtue theory. There’s more to the moral life than rights and
consequences. Indeed, consideration of only these two compo-
nents of “moral ecosystems” tends to de-emphasize the cognitive
work Sunstein rightly sees as not informing some contemporary
moral theorizing. Virtue theory tends to require richer moral psy-
chology, more awareness of the importance of ecological validity,
and a willingness to recognize the limits of theory. Virtue theory
comes down “in the middle” with regard to whether morality is uni-
versal or particular. (This will affect whether or not we view moral
theories as being merely heuristics; for an introduction to particu-
larism, see Hooker & Little 2001.) A scientifically burnished Aris-
totle will treat moral statements as being statements about what
maximizes human flourishing cum functionality. Cognitive acts that
enable us to maximize our proper functioning (by whatever proxi-
mate mechanism) are not merely heuristics; instead, we can to a
first approximation “read off” moral theories from the cognitive
models we build in various environments (most of them social) to
enable us to effectively confront mismatches between our func-
tional demands and our environment. In some cases, those moral
theories will be deontic, in others, utilitarian. Weak consequential-
ism becomes a heuristic itself, given normative backbone by virtue
theory. A highly consilient virtue theory would thus become the
yardstick against which we could call some varieties of moral cop-
ing heuristics, but at least heuristics with sometime ecological va-
lidity. For more detail on this approach, see Casebeer (2003b),
Churchland (1998), or Arnhart (1998). All told, I compliment Sun-
stein for accomplishing the difficult integrative work required if we
are to improve moral judgment in actual practice.
About emotional intelligence and moral
decisions
Pablo Fernandez-Berrocal and Natalio Extremera
Facultad Psicologia, University of Malaga, Malaga, 29071 Spain.
berrocal@uma.es nextremera@uma.es
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Abstract: This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral
heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is
that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence
this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abili-
ties in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences
(specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence
bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects
in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other
more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”
In their initial articles on heuristic and biases, Tversky and Kah-
neman used examples to illustrate heuristics that did not differ in
their affective valence. Thus, to explain the availability heuristic
they gave the example of how participants overestimated the num-
ber of words that begin with the letter r, but underestimated the
number of words that have r as the third letter. Then they gave an
example about risk perception as to assess our vulnerability to sex-
ual assault. Although the difference may be obvious to the intelli-
gent reader, research ignored the emotional component for a long
time. Fortunately, research and conceptualization of heuristics
has progressed to include important aspects such as emotions and
individual differences (Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Schwarz &
Vaughn 2002; for a review, see Gilovich et al. 2002).
In the sphere of moral reasoning, the concurrence of the ratio-
nal and the affective element when making a moral decision has
been emphasized (Greene & Haidt 2002). In this sense, we would
like to point out the importance of Emotional Intelligence (EI) in
the resolve of moral decisions. Why EI? Because EI involves strik-
ing a balance between emotion and reason in which neither is
completely in control.
We will focus on two examples to show the influence of EI in
moral decisions: The Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahne-
man 1981, p. 453) and a divorce decision.
The Asian disease problem. It is true that within this kind of
problem people’s intuitions depend on how the question is framed
(for a review, see Dawes 1998). However, previous studies have
shown individual differences on a variety of framing problems.
People of higher cognitive ability (i.e., individuals with higher
need for cognition or verbal and mathematical SAT scores) were
disproportionately likely to avoid fallacy (Smith & Levin 1996;
Stanovich & West 1998).
On the other hand, studies have shown the influence of emo-
tion on risk perception. Lerner and Keltner (2001) showed the
general tendency for angry and happy individuals to seek risks and
for fearful individuals to avoid them, and these patterns were held
independent of framing. But, how do people’s emotional abilities
influence their moral decisions? Fernandez-Berrocal and Ex-
tremera (in preparation, Study 1) have shown, using “the Asian
disease problem,” the influence of emotional intelligence (EI) on
risk decisions. To evaluate EI, subjects completed an abridged
version of Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS-24) a month before
taking the task (Fernandez-Berrocal et al. 2004; Fernandez-
Berrocal et al. 2005; Salovey et al. 1995). TMMS-24 is a measure
of what Salovey’s research group has termed Perceived Emotional
Intelligence (PEI), or the knowledge individuals have about their
own emotional abilities (Salovey et al. 2002). This scale addresses
three key aspects of PEI: Attention conveys the degree to which
individuals tend to observe and think about their feelings and
moods; Clarity evaluates the tendency to discriminate between
emotions and moods; Repair refers to the subject’s tendency to
regulate his/her feelings.
As previous research found, our results showed that 80% of a
sample of university students (N  189) became risk averse (i.e.,
choose the certain outcome) when identical choices were framed
as gains. But when the results are analysed considering individu-
als scores on Repair, we find a different pattern. Specifically, 85%
of low Repair individuals chose the certain outcome, but only 57%
of individuals with high Repair chose this option (z  1.78; p 
.05). This preference of high Repair by risk seeking is similar to
that reported in studies with happy or optimistic individuals
(Lerner & Keltner 2001).
A divorce decision. Fernandez-Berrocal and Extremera (in
preparation, Study 2) studied people’s reactions towards an emo-
tional dilemma closer to decisions people make in everyday life: a
divorce decision. Two groups of participants were studied (N 
142): high school students (N  63) and university students (N 
79). Participants completed the TMMS-24, and one month later
they watched a fragment of the movie “The Bridges of Madison
County.” In this film, the main character, played by Meryl Streep,
is a married woman, mother of two children, whose relationship
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with her husband is very apathetic. She falls in love with a pho-
tographer, played by Clint Eastwood, who visits the town. In a very
emotionally intense moment of the film, she has to make the de-
cision of whether to stay with her husband or run away with her
lover. This decision is visually represented in the movie when she
is inside her husband’s truck and she has to decide whether to
open the door to get out of his truck and get in Clint Eastwood’s
car, or to stay in her husband’s truck. Participants watch this frag-
ment of the movie and then they are asked to write what they
would do if they were in the same situation, and to justify their
choice.
Results showed that 73% of high school students choose the op-
tion “go with him.” In contrast, only 54% of university students
prefer this option (z  1.66; p  .05). If we examine the differ-
ences on EI scores measured with TMMS-24 between these two
groups of students, significant differences on Clarity are found.
Specifically, university students understand their emotions better
than high school students (F(1, 139)  11.69). If we consider the
relation between the score on Clarity and the decision made by
participants in each group, we find that high school students who
chose “go with him” obtained lower scores on Clarity (M  2.61;
SD  .78). In contrast, the highest scores on Clarity were obtained
by those university students who chose to stay with their family (M
 3.47; SD  .89).
The moral and emotional dilemma presented to the protagonist
does not have one unique solution, and it is impossible to assess
objectively which of the options is the better one. However, if we
ask different people what they would do, we find that moral and
emotional understanding of the situation is influenced by age
(meaning life experience) and by their EI, specifically by their
level of understanding emotions. These findings suggest that the
quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and that
EI might determine decisions in different moral tasks.
Sunstein’s promising proposal about moral heuristics should
take into account these results to avoid errors committed by ini-
tial studies on heuristics in cognition missing the influence of emo-
tion and of individual differences in decision-making processes.
Moral heuristics and the means/end
distinction
Barbara H. Fried
Law School, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. Bfried@Stanford.edu
http://www.Stanford.edu
Abstract: A mental heuristic is a shortcut (means) to a desired end. In the
moral (as opposed to factual) realm, the means/end distinction is not self-
evident: How do we decide whether a given moral intuition is a mere
heuristic to achieve some freestanding moral principle, or instead a free-
standing moral principle in its own right? I discuss Sunstein’s solution to
that threshold difficulty in translating “heuristics” to the moral realm.
Sunstein’s suggestion that many of our most tenacious moral in-
stincts may simply be moral heuristics that have outlived or out-
reached their usefulness helps illuminate some otherwise inex-
plicable features of our common-sense morality. At the same time,
transposing the notion of a “heuristic” from the factual to the
moral realm poses some difficulties. I want to press a bit on the
central difficulty here, that is, the distinction between a moral
heuristic and a freestanding moral principle.
A moral heuristic, by analogy to heuristics in the factual arena,
is defined as a mental shortcut we employ to get us to what we
think “morality” requires. In other words, it is not itself a free-
standing moral principle, but instead just a means to advance
some other, often unstated, moral principle. That definition opens
up the possibility, seized on by Sunstein, that we can demonstrate
“error” without judging the moral truth of the underlying moral
principles themselves: A moral heuristic misfires if, adopted in or-
der to advance a given freestanding moral principle (whether good
or bad), it turns out not to advance it at all. So far, so good. But
how do we tell whether a given moral intuition is a freestanding
moral principle, or instead a moral heuristic in service to some
other moral principle? Here, the analogy to factual heuristics runs
into some trouble. In the factual context, the means/end distinc-
tion is self-evident. To use one of Sunstein’s examples, if we are
trying to guess how many words in four pages of a novel have “n”
as the next-to-last letter, the desired end is a correct estimate; the
particular illustrations we conjure up to answer that question, in
response to the availability heuristic or other rules of thumb, are
the means. But when someone says, “A company should never
knowingly manufacture a product that will foreseeably kill 10 peo-
ple,” how do we tell whether this is a moral heuristic in service of
some other moral principle, or instead a moral principle in its own
right?
The answer Sunstein gives is, in effect, a procedural one: a
moral intuition counts as a freestanding moral principle only if the
holder judges it, upon System II reflection, to be coherent with all
other moral principles he or she holds. I’m not sure anyone can
ever do better than this, but there are some difficulties lurking
here.
First, the requirement of “moral coherence” built into Sun-
stein’s version of reflective equilibrium seems too stringent. Con-
sider Sunstein’s suggestion that a “cold heart heuristic” may be at
work in our response to risk regulation: “Those who know they will
cause a death, and do so anyway, are regarded as cold-hearted
monsters” (sect. 5.1.1, para. 3). Most people would agree, on re-
flection, that the intuition misfires when (in Sunstein’s example of
Companies A and B) it causes people to judge identical conduct
differently based on mere verbal differences. But consider an-
other case of the System I “cold heart” moral intuition at work that
is much harder to write off as mere moral error: the standard
heroic rescue cases. Baby Jessica falls down a well. With all the
world watching her plight on the evening news, we commit mil-
lions of dollars of society’s resources to rescue the victim, putting
the rescuers in physical peril. If you asked citizens whether they
would be willing to commit one-tenth of that amount to safety
measures that would save 100 lives, almost all will refuse. That we
feel far more empathy for identifiable victims than statistical ones
may be highly regrettable (Loewenstein et al. 2005). But can we
dismiss it as simply the product of a moral (“cold heart”) heuristic
that has misfired in service of some freestanding moral principle
(e.g., save lives where possible)? Why is it not a moral principle in
its own right? Consider, in this regard, Allan Gibbard’s (1986)
thoughtful suggestion that, even if the fewest lives will be lost by
allocating the entire safety budget to prevention and none to
costly, heroic rescues, “[i]t may nevertheless be dehumanizing to
stand idly by when strenuous, expensive effort has a substantial
chance of saving lives.” Clearly, a public that simultaneously
wishes to maximize the number of lives saved and not to feel it has
“stood idly by” while recognizable people die, is going to be torn
between two contradictory impulses that are hard to reconcile into
one coherent moral scheme. But surely it misses something to
write off the latter impulse as the product of a “cold heart heuris-
tic” – with the implication that everyone would produce a better
world by their own lights if their System II self could only train
their System I self to stand idly by when the costs of rescue be-
come too great.
Second, although Sunstein clearly intends his criterion for
smoking out “moral heuristics” to be neutral, as among different
moral principles, I don’t think it is. The requirement that a moral
principle on reflection must “cohere[] . . . at all levels of general-
ity” (sect. 1, para. 3) with all other moral principles one holds, if it
has any constraining force at all, seems clearly biased in favor of
certain moral systems, in particular welfarism. This is so, because
the commitments of welfarism to commensurability between dif-
ferent values, indifference to the identity of persons, and the ab-
sence of agent-relative obligations, produce a set of working prin-
ciples that (whatever their other virtues or drawbacks) tend to
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cohere at all levels of generality. Deontological principles, in con-
trast, do not – at least once one descends from broad injunctions
like “treat others as ends in themselves,” to the incommensurate
set of rights and duties such injunctions are typically taken to im-
ply. Thus, the answer to Sunstein’s sly rhetorical question, “Is Kant-
ianism a series of cognitive errors?” is probably yes, at least as
judged by his criterion.
A more neutral criterion, I think, would have to shed the sub-
stantive requirement of “moral coherence,” leaving something
closer to a pure procedural requirement: A moral intuition gets to
be called a moral principle in its own right only if, after hard
scrutiny alongside other principles one holds, one still holds to it
as an end in itself, and not an uncertain means to some other end.
Although that test may seem too toothless to compel any familiar
moral intuition to be re-characterized as a mere heuristic, I share
Sunstein’s optimistic belief that it might suffice, at least for some
of the more dubious intuitions he catalogues here.
Moral judgments in narrative contexts
Richard J. Gerrig
Department of Psychology, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY
11794-2500. rgerrig@notes.cc.sunysb.edu
Abstract: In narrative contexts, people often find themselves mentally
rooting for “bad guys.” These circumstances lead to questions about how
Sunstein’s moral heuristics function during narrative experiences. In par-
ticular, must people undertake explicit moral analysis for the heuristics to
apply?
At the outset of the movie “Matchstick Men,” a character named
Frank Mercer is on the telephone trying to complete a con job. 
Although we don’t see the person on the other end of the phone,
her voice and utterances identify her as a rather helpless elderly
woman. Even so, it is hard to watch the scene without rooting that
Frank’s con will succeed. Although his actions are far from heroic,
he is momentarily the hero of the tale and so his goals are the view-
ers’ goals – however immoral those goals might be. A movie critic
offered a similar analysis of moral disengagement in narrative ex-
periences: “Narrative art forms like novels and movies are gov-
erned by certain mysterious but implacable laws, and one of them
is that when people are in danger of being caught – even if they
are doing something awful – we root for them to get away. Our
identification overcomes our scruples” (Denby 1991, p. 32).
These anecdotes of narrative experiences provide interesting
cases for Sunstein’s account of moral heuristics. In Frank Mercer’s
case, it seems clear that he will profit from his immoral action. As
such, viewers’ tacit approval of his behavior suggests that the
heuristic Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust does not
govern responses in this situation. Similarly, we might expect view-
ers to be outraged by the way in which Frank victimizes the el-
derly woman, so that the outrage heuristic would assert itself. This
does not appear to be the case. Why not?
Consider Denby’s assertion that “identification overcomes our
scruples.” Perhaps we can encapsulate this insight in the heuristic
The hero should succeed where “hero” refers to the character or
group whose goals viewers have (locally) come to embrace. We
could give the same gloss for this putative heuristic as Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), and Sunstein, in turn, have given for the ones
they have articulated. Specifically, for most of the narrative situa-
tions people face, it seems likely that rooting for the hero will be
an entirely moral response – one that rises above external criti-
cism. However, the heuristic would leave viewers vulnerable to
unfortunate occasions upon which writers and directors arrange
for viewers to identify with the wrong individuals (or individuals
in the wrong). Then, the heuristic would lead to moral lapses. Still,
it should be the case that were we to tally up the situations in which
viewers mentally root for moral outcomes (as a consequence of
characters accomplishing their goals) those situations would out-
number those in which they root for characters such as Frank
Mercer to succeed.
Suppose that a heuristic such as The hero should succeed does,
in fact, play a role in narrative experiences. Then, it also seems to
be the case that it takes precedence over other heuristics such as
Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust – judging, at least,
by the responses that reach the viewers’ consciousness. During the
moment-by-moment experience of the scene in which Frank
Mercer attempts to hustle the helpless elderly woman, there’s lit-
tle hint that viewers examine the scene with sufficient rigor to re-
alize that Frank is betraying the woman’s trust.
This observation leads to the broader issue of when and how it
is that moral heuristics operate. We typically think of heuristics as
being automatic – availability or representativeness affect judg-
ments without any particular entry conditions. The putative
heuristic The hero should succeed has the same feel to it. That is,
viewers do not need to make a conscious identification with a par-
ticular character before they start to embrace that character’s
goals. The question with respect to moral heuristics is whether
people need to make an overt analysis of a situation as one in which
moral judgments are relevant, before those moral heuristics come
into play. With respect to Frank Mercer, it seems quite likely that
one could get most viewers to apply Punish, and do not reward,
betrayals of trust once they began to align themselves with the vic-
tim rather than with the “hero.” Similarly, suppose viewers were
rooting for a bank robber to escape the clutches of the police. If
they took a moment for moral reflection, they might feel chas-
tened and root instead for the police. The issue, once again, is why
reflection appears to be required. Do other forces take prece-
dence (e.g., The hero should succeed)? Do aspects of narrative ex-
periences suppress or attenuate moral responses? Do moral judg-
ments (driven by heuristics) only occur when viewers expend
strategic effort?
Although the focus here has been on anecdotes from movies,
there’s every reason to believe that people have the same re-
sponses to narratives in other media (Gerrig 1993). In addition, it
probably doesn’t much matter that “Matchstick Men” is a fictional
narrative. Theorists sometimes seize upon Coleridge’s (1817/
1907) phrase “the willing suspension of disbelief” (p. 6) as a way
of conceptualizing how it is that people experience fictional nar-
ratives. In that context, we might imagine that part of what gets
willingly suspended in narrative contexts would be the impulse to
make moral judgments. However, “the willing suspension of dis-
belief” does not survive either philosophical or empirical scrutiny
(e.g., Carroll 1990; Prentice & Gerrig 1999). Rather, it seems that
people must effortfully encode experiences as fictional – they con-
struct disbelief rather than suspend it. If moral judgments are af-
fected by concomitants of narrative experiences, that ought to be
equally true for nonfictional as for fictional narratives. The chal-
lenge, therefore, is to specify under what general circumstances
moral heuristics are able to have an impact on covert or overt
moral judgments.
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Heuristics, moral imagination, and the future
of technology
Michael E. Gorman
Department of Science, Technology, and Society, School of Engineering and
Applied Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4744.
meg3c@virginia.edu
Abstract: Successful application of heuristics depends on how a problem
is represented, mentally. Moral imagination is a good technique for re-
flecting on, and sharing, mental representations of ethical dilemmas, in-
cluding those involving emerging technologies. Future research on moral
heuristics should use more ecologically valid problems and combine quan-
titative and qualitative methods.
Linking moral reasoning to heuristics is a useful approach that
connects the process of ethical decision-making with the problem-
solving literature. As Sunstein points out, ethical frameworks like
utilitarianism can even be turned into heuristics. When I teach
ethics, I often ask my students to apply different ethical ap-
proaches to a problem as if they were heuristics, designed to pro-
voke considerations of alternatives.
The effective use of all but the most general heuristics depends
on how the problem is represented (Gorman 1992). Sunstein
raises the issue of representation indirectly in his brief discussion
of moral framing, but misses the way in which stories and
metaphors create mental models that guide thinking about moral
dilemmas outside of the psychology laboratory. For example, con-
sider the trolley task, in which switching tracks to save five people
by killing one is compared with throwing one stranger in front of
the tracks to save five. To understand why practical reasoners
might consider these two situations different, it is necessary to un-
derstand their mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983). The action
of throwing a stranger in front of a train is likely to result both in
the death of the stranger and the five people. Why would the trol-
ley stop for a single person and not five? This possible mental
model converts the abstract decision into a story. Others might
have different mental models of this problem, but that is the point.
Consider another example from environmental ethics. A
heuristic such as “do not tamper with nature” depends on your
mental model of nature, a construct that varies across cultures
(Gorman & Mehalik 2002).
The problem is that people’s mental models are often implicit;
these need to be inferred, which is the classic problem of repre-
sentation in cognitive psychology. The solution in the ethics liter-
ature is to encourage people to engage in moral imagination (Wer-
hane 1999) – the ethical application of mental models (Johnson
1993). The first step in moral imagination is similar to the first step
in innovative problem-solving, that is,to become aware of one’s
own mental model of a situation, so that one can explore a space
of alternate solutions. This awareness step is particularly difficult,
because many people reason from deeply held ideological frame-
works that they represent as truths, as reality; therefore, the idea
of exploring alternatives is heresy. Seeing these “realities” as views
is a critical first step in listening to other views and considering al-
ternatives.
Moral imagination is particularly critical as emerging technolo-
gies create new moral dilemmas never experienced in human his-
tory. Sunstein mentions the issue of cloning, and Kass’s reliance on
“moral repugnance” to decide what is ethical. Repugnance is
based on deeply held unquestioned beliefs; moral imagination
asks one to examine the basis for those beliefs.
Cloning and other technologies give human beings abilities re-
served for the Gods in most traditional stories that serve as the ba-
sis for morality. Consider convergent technologies (Nano, Bio,
Info, Cogno) that include possibilities such as interfaces that will
allow for neural control of devices, wearable sensors that will ex-
tend human capabilities beyond the traditional five senses, and the
development of “intelligent” military vehicles (Roco & Bainbridge
2002). These developments will create dilemmas that will require
the modification of existing mental models and moral heuristics –
without, however, abandoning higher-level ethical principles like
Kant’s “never use human beings merely as a means.”
Future research on moral heuristics should use more ecologi-
cally valid problems (see Gorman et al. [2000] for examples), em-
ploying methodologies like protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon
1984) and reflective diaries (Shrager 2004) to track the reasoning
process as it occurs, supplemented afterwards by the sorts of prob-
ing questions asked by Kohlberg (Rest & Narvaez 1994). The
moral problems studied by these methods should include those
raised by emerging technologies, which will help anticipate pub-
lic reaction before technological options have been “locked in”
and human choices are constrained.
What’s in a heuristic?
Ulrike Hahn, John-Mark Frost, and Greg Maio
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3AT, United Kingdom.
hahnu@cardiff.ac.uk frostjm@cardiff.ac.uk maio@cardiff.ac.uk
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/psych/home/hahnu
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Abstract: The term “moral heuristic” as used by Sunstein seeks to bring
together various traditions. However, there are significant differences be-
tween uses of the term “heuristic” in the cognitive and the social psycho-
logical research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct
evidential criteria. We suggest the term “moral heuristic” should refer to
processes, which means that further evidence is required.
The target article presents an exciting synthesis of interdiscipli-
nary research. Ideas from cognitive and social psychology are
brought together with moral and legal philosophy. A common dif-
ficulty in interdisciplinary work, however, is that terms are used in
subtly different ways across disciplines: the same term across dis-
ciplines might not only alert to common themes, but also obscure
substantive differences. The notion of “heuristic” now possesses
this ambiguity and has become a set of loosely correlated con-
cepts, rather than a well-defined technical term. In cognitive psy-
chology, this term was first used to denote problem-solving pro-
cedures that are easier to use than more complex algorithms, but
were not guaranteed to provide a solution (Newell & Simon 1972).
Famously, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) used “heuristic” to re-
fer to procedures for probability judgment or “intuitive statistics,”
which contrast with a more cumbersome, correctness guarantee-
ing procedure. For others, “heuristics” denote simple, special pur-
pose strategies that are adaptations to the environment. These
strategies will not always be right, but there need be no other 
strategy that would be, and the key to identification of putative
heuristics is showing their ecological rationality, typically through
computational demonstration of how they exploit patterns of in-
formation in the environment so as to make accurate inferences
(see e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002). All of these uses refer to
procedures that can be applied to many problems of widely vary-
ing content; heuristics are not declarative content statements such
as “dogs bark.” A rather distinct use of the term heuristic is found
in the cognitive literature, which seeks to clarify the nature of our
lay theories about the world, such as our naïve physics (see e.g.,
Profitt & Kaiser 2002). Here, the term heuristic refers to an im-
plicit theory, that is, typically content statements, though much of
the interest in this area stems from systematic errors relative to
scientific theories about the world.
Within social psychology, models of persuasion treat heuristics
as rules of thumb that are quick and easy guides for evaluating the
validity of persuasive messages, such as “if an expert says it, it must
be true.” In this literature, the features that make such statements
heuristics are how and when they are used. Contemporary mod-
els of persuasion indicate that people tend to use “heuristics”
when they are unmotivated and unable to process the issue deeply
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(Maio & Haddock, in press). When motivation and ability are
higher, people tend to scrutinize the relevant arguments more
carefully and disregard any heuristics that are unreliable or irrel-
evant. In this literature, “correctness,” though relevant, is down-
played. There is no algorithm for deciding whether someone
spoke the truth – and the relevant standard by which something
is deemed to be a heuristic is typically other reasoning by the same
user, in situations of high engagement. This means it might even
be possible for a particular statement to function as a heuristic on
one occasion and as a valid premise on another (Kruglanski et al.
2004). In contrast, and more akin to the terminology of the naïve
physics literature, Baron (e.g., 1993a; 1994a) introduces the term
“moral heuristic” for the rules that constitute our “naïve morality”
(e.g., Baron 1993a). Examples include “it is wrong to hurt some
people for the benefit of others” or “harmful commissions are
worse than harmful omissions.” Though similar in appearance to
persuasion heuristics, the status of these rules as heuristics is not
determined by processing context. Another perspective on moral
reasoning emphasises that moral judgment might be achieved
through two separate cognitive systems: an intuitive system and a
reasoning system (Haidt 2001). The “intuitive system,” which
Sunstein equates with heuristics, is characterised as fast and ef-
fortless; its processing is unintentional, typically inaccessible to
awareness, and involves parallel processing and pattern matching.
For moral judgment, this intuitive system additionally involves
emotion (Greene & Haidt 2002; Haidt 2001).
Crucially, these related but distinct notions of the term “heuris-
tic” all require different kinds of evidence. Evidence for “cogni-
tive” heuristics in the Tversky and Kahneman sense requires pat-
terns of judgment that deviate in the predicted fashion from some
standard of correctness (see also, Kahneman & Tversky 1996). By
contrast, the Gigerenzer sense requires evidence of the opposite,
namely, accuracy. Whether processing was deliberate or auto-
matic, conscious or unconscious, or involves affect, is, at least in
the first instance, unimportant for both (though see now, Kahne-
man 2002; Kahneman & Frederick 2002) and evidence for heuris-
tics in problem-solving was even derived largely from verbal pro-
tocols of reasoners describing their thinking out loud. By contrast,
evidence for “persuasion” heuristics requires demonstration that
their use is influenced by motivation and ability. Finally, evidence
for the “intuitive system” is virtually orthogonal to that required
for “cognitive” heuristics: standards of correctness are irrelevant,
and processing characteristics are all important.
Sunstein’s article seems to simultaneously endorse all of the
above uses, in that “deviations from correctness” and “output from
System 1” and “adaptiveness” are variously emphasised. However,
most of the examples given are content rules, part of our naïve
morals in Baron’s sense. That is, they are “moral principles that are
generally sound, and even quite useful, but that work poorly in
some cases” (sect. 5.1.1, para. 2). Evidence for these principles as
heuristics is then supplied by describing a case for which they
seemingly lead to an “incorrect” answer.
In order to evaluate Sunstein’s proposal we turn to considera-
tion of legal systems as complex systems explicating our sense of
right and wrong. Setting aside the vexed issue of absolute stan-
dards of correctness, one finds that it is a property of all legal rules
and principles that eventually cases will emerge for which their ap-
plication suggests an undesired outcome. Real legal systems try to
minimize this problem through a proliferation of rules of differ-
ent scope, whereby the system is supplemented with further rules
defining exceptions and exceptions to exceptions. Unanticipated
exceptions will nevertheless arise. In other words, legal norms are
inherently defeasible (see e.g., Bankowski et al. 1995). Seen in this
light, there is little point in calling a moral content statement a
“heuristic” simply because it can and eventually will give rise to an
unwanted “overgeneralization.”
This suggests to us that the term “moral heuristic” would bet-
ter be limited to processes. The target article provides no real ev-
idence to this effect. However, we have, for example, recently
found intriguing effects of typicality. In several experiments (Frost
et al., in preparation), we asked participants to analyse their rea-
sons for the value of equality in a typical context (gender discrim-
ination) and an atypical context (handedness discrimination). Re-
sults indicated that participants who generated reasons in a typical
context later acted in a more egalitarian manner than participants
who generated reasons in the atypical context, despite listing sim-
ilar numbers of reasons for the value and being equally confident
in their reasons. Here, issues of correctness seem unproblematic,
as participants see no reason why their behaviour on the same task
should differ according to exposure to previous material. At the
same time, it seems safe to assume that the workings of this par-
ticular typicality effect are entirely opaque to participants. In
short, the concept of a moral heuristic might yet prove useful in
explaining moral judgment and behaviour, but only if it is about
more than particular content rules or principles, which are prone
to exception.
Invisible fences of the moral domain
Jonathan Haidt
Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904.
haidt@virginia.edu http://www.people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/
Abstract: Crossing the border into the moral domain changes moral
thinking in two ways: (1) the facts at hand become “anthropocentric” facts
not easily open to revision, and (2) moral reasoning is often the servant of
moral intuitions, making it difficult for people to challenge their own in-
tuitions. Sunstein’s argument is sound, but policy makers are likely to re-
sist.
Look at it from Bin Laden’s point of view. For years the United
States had been. . . . don’t worry, I’m not going to finish the sen-
tence. I can’t. I study morality and I know that terrorism is driven
largely by moral commitments. Yet, every time I try to understand
Bin Laden, or Hitler, or political leaders with whom I strongly dis-
agree, I feel a kind of invisible fence (the kind used for suburban
dogs) giving me a warning shock, saying “don’t go there, don’t even
think about empathizing.” In contrast, I can roam freely around
the Linda problem, the Asian Disease problem, and the visual il-
lusions that I use to show my Psych 101 students how perceptual
heuristics can sometimes misfire. It can be difficult to look at a
probability problem or a perceptual illusion in a different way, but
it is never dangerous or painful.
Sunstein’s effort to bring the well-developed tools of research
on heuristics into moral psychology is welcome and well done. His
emphasis on “System I” processes in the moral homunculus is con-
sistent with recent emphases on the role of emotion and intuition
in moral judgment (Damasio 1994; Greene et al. 2001; Haidt
2001). However, the moral domain is a weird and treacherous
world in which objects change their weights and rivers flow uphill.
Or at very least, minds that worked in one way on non-moral prob-
lems suddenly start working differently when moral concerns are
introduced. Here I discuss two such differences which I believe
can be integrated into Sunstein’s approach, giving us a fuller and
more social picture of the workings of moral heuristics.
1. Moral truths are anthropocentric truths. Sunstein contrasts
the moral domain with the “domain of facts,” suggesting that
moral truths are not facts, but this is not quite right. A useful dis-
tinction can be made between two kinds of facts – anthropocen-
tric and non-anthropocentric (Wiggins 1987). Non-anthropocen-
tric facts are those that do not depend for their truth on the way
the human mind is constituted. Facts about the physical world and
mathematical truths are true regardless of what we happen to
think about them, and they would presumably be true for any in-
telligent species that came to our solar system to inspect them. But
our judgments about beauty, humor, and morality are factual judg-
ments too. They are judgments about anthropocentric truths –
truths that are true only because of the kinds of minds that we
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happen to have, and the cultural worlds within which our minds
developed. When we give an A to one paper and a D to another
we are asserting that one paper really is better than the other,
within our academic community, although we might not expect in-
telligent extraterrestrials to agree with us.
Anthropocentric truths arise within communities, and they
then do much of the work of marking out the limits of those com-
munities. But even within the realm of anthropocentric truths,
moral facts are especially potent. Groups can usually tolerate a di-
versity of beliefs about beauty and comedy, but moral diversity is
much more damaging (Haidt et al. 2003). One cannot even co-
herently want moral diversity. For example, if a person says, “I be-
lieve that women should have the right to choose, but I would pre-
fer that there be a diversity of opinions on that matter,” then that
person treats abortion rights as a taste, not as a moral issue. Foun-
dational beliefs, such as taking the bible as the literal word of God,
or the idea that the world is full of victims of oppression who must
not be blamed for their fate, become sacralized, and those who
question them risk becoming pariahs. Many moral heuristics may
have this sacred character for some groups (e.g., don’t play God,
don’t knowingly kill anyone, don’t have sex with your family mem-
bers, don’t blame victims), so questioning them, even in special
cases where they don’t really apply, is likely to meet with resistance
and even outrage. The problem with moral heuristics is not that
there is no fact of the matter with which to compare them; rather,
it is that there are many (anthropocentric) facts of the matter, and
it is hard to get people to question their anthropocentric moral
facts.
2. In the moral domain, System II is often a slave. In Sunstein’s
analysis, System II (reasoning) either opposes System I (by reach-
ing a conclusion that the homunculus opposes) or it sits back and
does nothing while System I spits out its heuristic conclusion. But,
in any domain in which strong motivations are at work, reasoning
often becomes the “slave of the passions,” as David Hume put it.
We can sometimes see this process at work for non-anthropocen-
tric facts, as when students struggle to find reasons to explain how
Linda is more likely to be a bank teller active in the feminist move-
ment than to be a bank teller. But many people are able to reason
their way to a solution, and there is often a moment of insight in
which System II triumphs and people understand their error. Not
so for moral disputes. I have now interviewed several hundred
people about taboo violations such as consensual safe sex between
an adult brother and sister, and I have never yet seen a person say
“Oh, I see! I had this strong gut feeling that it was wrong, but now
that I understand that no child can result from the union, I real-
ize that I was mistaken.” More typically, people struggle valiantly
to find some reason why even in this special case the brother and
sister should not have sex. We can therefore expect a lot less help
from System II in challenging moral heuristics than we get from
it in challenging non-moral heuristics. In fact, whenever moral
emotions are engaged, as they often are when anthropocentric
facts are challenged, we can expect to find the System I ho-
munculus ordering System II to man the ramparts and fight off
persuasion.
I think these two differences make a difference. I applaud Sun-
stein’s call for distrust of moral heuristics when considering un-
usual or difficult cases. And I expect that many people will agree
with him, as I do, in the abstract. But when it comes time to make
policy decisions about abortion, euthanasia, cloning, or any other
difficult issue, don’t be surprised when politicians and policy mak-
ers refuse to cross their invisible fences, or when they attack those
who ask them to do so.
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Abstract: In considering a domain of knowledge – language, music,
mathematics, or morality – it is necessary to derive principles that can de-
scribe the mature state and explain how an individual reaches this state.
Although Sunstein’s heuristics go some way toward a description of our
moral sense, it is not clear that they are at the right level of description,
and as stated, they provide no guidelines for looking at the acquisition pro-
cess – the problem of explanatory adequacy.
Consider the human language faculty. When we generate sen-
tences, or comprehend them, we do so effortlessly. Our capacity
to both understand what others say and to generate new prose is
boundless. The way to make sense of this capacity is by appealing
to a dedicated faculty of the mind, a system that contains a repos-
itory of computational resources for building an externalized lan-
guage. For each individual, the language they construct, both over
their lifetime, as well as on a moment to moment basis, represents
the output of a complicated series of interfaces between the com-
putational resources dedicated to language, on the one hand, and
interactions with other mind internal–external factors, on the
other hand. Linguists interested in the underlying principles that
can account for what a mature speaker of a language knows are
studying the descriptive principles of the system.
One of the early mysteries surrounding this approach to lan-
guage was the observation that young children are able to both
generate surprisingly sophisticated sentences and comprehend
them in the absence of relevant input. This observation led in part
to the hypothesis that our species is innately equipped with a uni-
versal grammar, a set of principles and parameters that not only
enables the capacity to build a natural language, but also con-
strains the range of possible languages. The now rich description
of the principles and parameters in play early on in development
provides a sense of the explanatory adequacy of this field.
In this commentary, I make use of the importance of descrip-
tive and explanatory adequacy in characterizing a domain of
knowledge, as well as the tie in to language, to evaluate Sunstein’s
discussion of our moral psychology. I first describe the shortcom-
ings of the moral heuristics position and then provide a sketch of
an alternative which builds on an analogy with language (Dwyer
1999; 2004; Harman 1999; Hauser, in press; Hauser et al., in press;
Jackendoff 2004; Mikhail 2000; Mikhail et al. 2002; Rawls 1971;
Smith 1759/1976).
Sunstein wants to show that heuristics play a significant role in
moral, legal, and political spheres, and that sometimes they gen-
erate inappropriate judgments. As stated, it is hard to imagine that
anyone would disagree with these claims. Those who thought hard
about common sense morality, beginning with Hutcheson and
Shaftesbury, recognized that we often apply general rules of
thumb in cases of moral conflict and, as Hume importantly rec-
ognized, funnel these rules through an emotional filter that guides
our actions. What have always been the primary challenges to
these views include our ability to understand where our common
sense intuitions come from, what their representational content is,
the extent to which they are consciously available principles as op-
posed to unconscious and inaccessible, how children alight upon
them in the course of attaining a mature moral faculty, and the de-
gree to which they facilitate or detract from our interests in nor-
mative or prescriptive principles aimed at a just world. Concern-
ing the latter, the interest has always been a concern with how our
intuitions or heuristics about right and wrong interface with more
formal and explicit policies, whether they are the unstated social
norms of a hunter-gatherer society or the legal doctrine of our
founding fathers. So, on a general level, there is not much new in
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terms of Sunstein’s general framework, nor does his description il-
luminate these age-old questions.
Sunstein goes on to state that moral heuristics are different
from Kahneman and Tversky-esque heuristics in that the latter are
based on factual problems. But this strikes me as an inaccurate
reading. Certainly, much of Kahneman & Tversky’s (KT’s) work
has been based on how we judge the market, and what dictates our
views of fairness and subjective utility. Both play critical roles in
delivering moral verdicts. For the utilitarian, there is much to gain
from KT’s work because we now have a better sense of the cur-
rency over which individuals may seek to maximize overall well-
being. For the deontologically inclined, we gain a better sense of
how individuals compute fairness by appreciating that they un-
consciously appeal to the principle of a reference transaction. Al-
though it is true that much of what KT had to say about these
heuristics were more readily identified as logical flaws that led to
objective errors, and that the moral sphere is undeniably more
subjective, it is not the case that this work falls squarely outside is-
sues of moral concern.
Overall, then, though I am sympathetic to the general frame-
work that Sunstein articulates, I do not think that there is much
new here, and nor do I believe that his framing of the problem sig-
nificantly advances how one goes about doing the science of moral
psychology; of course, if the message is largely targeted at lawyers
or policy makers, who may either fail to recognize the importance
of heuristics in our common sense morality, or assume that such
heuristics are unambiguous determiners of what we ought to do,
then I couldn’t agree more.
An alternative, by no means incompatible with Sunstein’s moral
heuristics, draws on an analogy with the language faculty. If there
are either strong or weak analogies with the language faculty, then
we might expect to find the following design features:
1. A universal moral grammar [UMG] that represents a theory
of the initial state.
2. The UMG consists of a set of principles that provides a
toolkit for building possible – external – moral systems.
3. These principles are based on combinations of actions and
action sequences (“phrases”) into events, anchored by the psy-
chological processes of intentionality, motivation, cause, and con-
sequence.
4. The judgments and actions that young children make in the
moral domain cannot be accounted for by the input. As such, there
is a poverty of the stimulus-type argument, which requires the in-
ference that the initial state consists of largely content-free, ab-
stract, and innate principles. What experience does, under this
kind of model, is set the parameters, and thereby dictate which
particular moral system is acquired.
5. There is a moral organ – dedicated circuitry that consists of
principles for deciding whether actions are permissible, obliga-
tory, forbidden, and/or punishable. This circuitry must interface
with both other mind-internal processes, as well as mind-external
ones.
When this faculty breaks down, there will be specific deficits in
our moral judgments, as opposed to more general cognitive
deficits.
This is an extremely rough sketch, explicated in greater detail
in the references cited earlier. These ideas gain support in that
they have generated both new empirical findings and have also
helped to set up new research problems. For example, in a large-
scale study of moral judgments using the internet, results show
that, across considerable demographic and cultural variation, peo-
ple converge on a set of common judgments concerning permis-
sible harm, while having no access to the underlying principles
(Hauser et al., in press). This dissociation between judgment and
justification is similar, at some level, to evidence in linguistics of
grammaticality judgments, and highlights the distinction between
operative and expressed principles. It also suggests that some as-
pects of our moral judgments may well be universal. This work has
led to ongoing studies of patient populations in which the relative
contribution of unconscious emotions and principles of action in-
terface with our moral judgments. These patient studies will help
us to understand how the moral faculty is fractionated into differ-
ent component processes, and to decide which are specific to our
moral psychology as well as uniquely human.
The next frontier: Moral heuristics and the
treatment of animals
Harold A. Herzoga and Gordon M. Burghardtb
aDepartment of Psychology, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC
28723; bDepartment of Psychology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN
37996. herzog@email.wcu.edu gburghar@utk.edu
http://wcuvax1.wcu.edu/%7Eherzog/ http://web.utk.edu/~gburghar/
Abstract: Heuristics provide insight into the inconsistencies that charac-
terize thinking related to the use of nonhuman animals. We examine para-
doxes in judgments and policy related to the treatment of animals in sci-
ence from a moral intuition perspective. Sunstein’s ideas are consistent
with a model of animal-related ethical evaluation we developed twenty-
five years ago and which appear readily formulated as moral heuristics.
Sunstein’s argument is simple yet powerful – moral thinking, like
other forms of human cognition, is frequently thrown awry by sim-
ple cognitive heuristics. This insight sheds considerable light on 
a topic we have long been interested in – the fact that ethical
thinking about animals is rife with inconsistency and paradox
(Burghardt & Herzog 1980; Herzog 1993). Indeed, for several
reasons, Sunstein’s heuristics may be illuminated even more when
applied to understanding contradictions in how we think about an-
imals than it is to human-focused moral quandaries. First, with an-
imals there is ambiguity over the existence and moral relevance of
mental capacities of different species (e.g., consciousness, intelli-
gence, emotions, and the experience of pain). Second, these con-
siderations reflect subtle and often unrecognized ethical rules of
thumb. There is no shortage of examples where moral heuristics
interfere with clear thinking about the use of animals. Here we
briefly discuss two situations of interest to scientists.
The first is the comparative status of rats and dogs under the
Animal Welfare Act (AWA). Although they make up the majority
of animals used in biomedical and behavioral research, rats (along
with lab-bred mice and all birds) are denied coverage under the
AWA because they are not considered “animals” under the provi-
sions of the statutes.1 Dogs, in contrast, not only are covered by
the AWA, they are the only species that the act specifies must be
given daily exercise. Indeed, because the AWA applies to deceased
as well as living animals, a dead dog actually has legal status not af-
forded a living laboratory rat.2 There was only minor public out-
cry about the exclusion of rats, either when the act was written or
several years ago when Congress enacted legislation permanently
excluding rats from AWA coverage. Why? We suspect the rat ex-
clusion reflects the operation of a heuristic along the lines of “Rats
are pests: pests are bad.”
Dogs, on the other hand, are treated differently. One reason is
that rats are perceived as far less intelligent and sentient than dogs
(Herzog & Galvin 1997). More importantly, dogs live in 40% of
American households. For most owners, dogs assume the role of
friend or even family member (Serpell 1989). The specter of one’s
pet splayed on the dissection table evokes a particularly powerful
moral heuristic – “Don’t betray friends and family.” The inclusion
of dogs in and the exclusion of rats from AWA coverage are con-
sistent with most people’s moral intuition.3 The rat exclusion rule,
however, is increasingly viewed as an embarrassment by regula-
tors, and surveys indicate that most researchers now advocate cov-
erage of rats and mice under the AWA (Plous & Herzog 2000).
Our second example concerns the role of heuristics in approval/
disapproval decisions of Institutional Animal Care and Use Com-
mittees (IACUCs). As Sunstein indicates, it is rarely possible to as-
sess the validity of ethical judgments by holding them to some sort
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of “correct” moral yardstick. Reliability, however, is a different
matter, and inconsistency of ethical decisions precludes their va-
lidity. Two studies have examined the consistency of IACUC de-
cision-making procedures by having different IACUCs evaluate
the same protocols (Dresser 1989; Plous & Herzog 2001). Both
arrived at the same conclusion – more often than not, different
committees make different decisions. Plous and Herzog found
that even members of the same IACUC were inconsistent in their
evaluations of dimensions of protocols (e.g., clinical significance,
clarity). Interestingly, when IACUC members were provided with
specific guidelines, such as a detailed pain scale, the role of intu-
itive appraisals (heuristics) seemed to decrease, and inter-rater re-
liability substantially increased.
Before the emergence of the animal rights movement as a po-
litical force and the enactment of important 1985 amendments to
the Animal Welfare Act, we attempted to make sense of inconsis-
tencies that we observed in ourselves and others when it came to
moral judgments pertaining to other species (Burghardt & Her-
zog 1980; 1989). In order to systematize discussion in this area, we
constructed a typology of factors that influence thinking about the
ethical use of nonhuman animals in general, not just in research.
We identified 26 “ethical considerations” under four major head-
ings: human benefits (and costs), anthropomorphism, ecological,
and psychological. In retrospect, we believe many of these factors
function as moral heuristics (e.g., cuteness of the species, similar-
ity in appearance to humans, status as a pest or competitor, rarity,
domestication). And these 26 could be added to, subdivided, and
extended today. In 1980 we concluded: “We suspect that currently
it is impossible to derive from science, theology, philosophy, or any
conceivable source a consistent universal set of principles to guide
humans in dealing with members of other species” (Burghardt &
Herzog 1980, p. 767).
Sadly, despite the growth of a veritable cottage industry of pro-
fessionals in many fields and numerous journals, books, confer-
ences, and organizations, we think that little progress has been
made on general principles outside of the acceptance of some reg-
ulations and greater scientific understanding of animals. Some
scholars in this area focus on narrow issues, while others adopt
their own simple set of heuristics or insulated philosophical stance
(utilitarianism, deontology) and ignore or remain blind to their
problematic aspects. Others simply revel in the dilemmas as an en-
during contradiction of the human drama, one best minimized by
good intentions and modest melioration. Perhaps more formally
embedding animal issues into work on moral heuristics will help
clarify and resolve issues too often approached with feelings di-
vorced from thought. Research in the cognitive sciences along the
lines suggested by Sunstein may provide insights into the psycho-
logical processes that underlie differences in opinion related to
human–animal interactions. This message is certainly not lost on
Sunstein, who has contributed elsewhere to legal thinking about
the status of animals (see Sunstein & Nussbaum 2004).
NOTES
1. Although they are excluded under the AWA, rats, mice, and birds do
fall under NIH guidelines.
2. A footnote in the regulations, however, exempts dead dogs from
AWA canine cage size requirements.
3. Some moral intuitions are culture-specific; whereas common sense
may tell most North American pet lovers that dogs are family members, in
some Asian cultures puppies are dinner.
A selectionist approach integrates moral
heuristics
Robert A. Hinde
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Abstract: The nature and diversity of moral codes can be understood in
terms of a few basic propensities honed by diachronic dialectics between
what people do and what they are supposed to do in the culture in ques-
tion. Many of the moral heuristics presented by Sunstein can be seen as
by-products of these processes.
In his important contribution, Sunstein shows successfully that we
sometimes use “heuristics” or “short-cuts” in making moral judge-
ments, applying principles that usually work well in instances
where they are inappropriate. We must ask, however, where these
heuristics come from. Sunstein uses descriptive categorisations of
the heuristics as if they were causal principles, referring, for ex-
ample, to “a process of attribute substitution” or an “outrage
heuristic.” My claim is that most of the instances of moral heuris-
tics cited by Sunstein are compatible with, and perhaps could have
been predicted from, a more interdisciplinary approach (Hinde
2002).
Such an approach indicates that moral codes stem from certain
pan-cultural propensities, notably to look after one’s own interests
(selfish assertiveness) and to be cooperative and kind to others
(prosociality), especially to close kin and in-group members.
These propensities are present even in very young babies (Kagan
2000; Rheingold & Hay 1980), but are honed in development by
parenting, relationships with peers, charismatic figures, and so on.
These relationships have themselves been affected by the pre-
cepts to which they have been exposed and the physical environ-
ment. Individuals incorporate moral precepts into the way in
which they see themselves, and experience pangs of conscience
when they behave contrary to their own standards. Some individ-
uals seem to behave morally without thinking. In other words, in-
dividuals differ in what Sunstein refers to as System 1.
Morality is concerned with maintaining a balance between the
basic propensities such that group living is possible in the circum-
stances prevailing. The resulting moral precepts are reified some-
what differently between cultures. Often the processes involved
depend on diachronic dialectical relations between what people
do and what they are supposed to do. For example, the respec-
tability of divorce in western countries has changed through dialec-
tics between what people do and what they are supposed to do.
This is essentially an evolutionary approach (mentioned but not
exploited by Sunstein), but does not try to explain everything by
natural selection. There is no implication that what is natural is
right. Moral judgements change somewhat with time and circum-
stances: Cultural selection over prehistorical and historical time is
crucial. Moral precepts therefore differ somewhat between cul-
tures, but the basic principles on which they are based (selfish 
assertiveness; prosociality to in-group members) appear to be pan-
cultural. Variants of the Golden Rule, Do-as-you-would-be-done-
by, are shared by all moral codes. Most of the Ten Commandments
are compatible with the Golden Rule, and, not surprisingly, the
commandment not to kill has special potency. This is compatible
with the judgements made in, for instance, the trolley problem
(e.g., stealing to save an in-group member; answering A or D in
the Asian Disease problem). However, the basic propensity is lim-
ited to in-group members. Thus, killing out-group members may
be permissible, and the death of contemporaries is more salient
than that of remote descendants, who are seen as more distantly
associated.
Again, exchange theories, invoking reciprocity (Kelley & Thi-
baut 1978; review in Hinde 1997) explain many aspects of human
relationships, and reciprocity accompanied by prosociality is com-
patible with selectionist theory (Boyd & Richerson 1991). Because
reciprocity often involves delay, trust in the partner, honesty, and
Commentary/Sunstein: Moral heuristics
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:4 555
commitment have come to be esteemed highly. The emphasis on
trust is entirely compatible with the cases of aversion presented
by Sunstein, including those that involve a reduction in safety from
the use of a device that is supposed to increase it.
The desire for reciprocal revenge is an extension of positive rec-
iprocity, and formed the initial basis of Anglo-Saxon law (Adams
1876). Hence the preference for “pointless punishment,” the de-
sire to penalise companies in accordance with their offence, and
the perceived irrelevance of the probability of detection to the
penalty. Permitting wrong-doing for a fee contradicts the princi-
ple of reciprocity, but the view that companies should clear up
their own waste is entirely compatible with it.
An individual may be treated prosocially even though he or she
is unlikely to be met again, and will therefore not be able to reci-
procate. This appears to be contrary to the principle of reciprocity.
However, several processes encourage prosociality to strangers.
One is moral outrage, mentioned several times by Sunstein. Com-
putor simulation shows that, if the costs of being punished are high
enough, strategies involving cooperating, punishing non-cooper-
ators, and punishing those who do not punish non-cooperators,
can be stable (Boyd & Richerson 1992). Another issue is that pro-
sociality brings prestige, which can bring further rewards (Zahavi
2000). Thus, even this apparent exception to the principle of rec-
iprocity can be understood in terms of selection.
The dialectical relations between what people do and what they
are supposed to do are not the only issue shaping moral precepts.
Influential individuals or groups can propagate precepts that are
to their own benefit. Thus, the Christian emphases on humility as
a virtue, and on respect for priests, are probable examples. Incest
rules, referred to twice by Sunstein, depend both on a biological
basis that regulates the degree of in-breeding, and on culture spe-
cific rules that regulate inter-group relations or favour influential
groups, like the Church (Goody 1997). In general, precepts are
likely to carry an historical legacy, and western morality has been
heavily influenced, as well as purveyed, by the Christian Church.
So what is being claimed? The present approach argues that
moral precepts have a biological basis, and that their precise form
can be understood in terms acceptable to the behavioural sci-
ences. The dogma that moral precepts are in some sense absolute,
perhaps carved in stone, cannot be disproved but is unnecessary.
This selectionist approach to morality is able to integrate many of
the examples given by Sunstein, even though the foundations of
moral codes referred to interactions between individuals and Sun-
stein’s examples mostly involve applying precepts initially evolved
for reactions between individuals to larger social issues.
Betrayal aversion is reasonable
Jonathan J. Koehlera and Andrew D. Gershoffb
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Abstract: We accept Sunstein’s claim that people often use moral heuris-
tics to make judgments and decisions. However, in situations that include
a risk of betrayal, we disagree with Sunstein about when the relevant moral
heuristic may be said to “misfire.” We suggest that the moral heuristic peo-
ple apply to avoid the possibility of safety-product betrayal may be rea-
sonable.
We accept Sunstein’s premise that people often rely on broad, sim-
ple, moral intuitions for making judgments. Indeed, given people’s
desire for social goals such as fairness, justice, and trustworthiness,
it would be strange if moral intuitions did not impact the decisions
people make.
However, it is less clear that these moral intuitions – or moral
heuristics – are as prone to systematic error as the classic heuris-
tics (availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjust-
ment) described by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (Tver-
sky & Kahneman 1974). Tversky and Kahneman appealed to logic
and probability theory – often in combination with some contro-
versial assumptions about how people represent decision tasks –
to illustrate the occasional failures of their heuristics. The norma-
tive status of moral heuristics is less grounded. Although this
shortcoming does not make moral heuristics any less real or im-
portant than other heuristics, it does mean that there is room to
challenge Sunstein’s judgments about when moral heuristics have
misfired.
Consider the betrayal aversion phenomenon Sunstein discusses
in section 5.1.3. The research we performed on this phenomenon,
and which Sunstein reviews, suggests that people are willing to in-
cur great costs to avoid betrayals and seek to punish betrayals se-
verely when they arise (Koehler & Gershoff 2003). We provided
experimental support for these phenomena in contexts where hu-
mans betrayed and in contexts where safety products “betrayed”
(or threatened to betray) by causing the very harm that they were
employed to prevent. Sunstein states that the morality heuristic
behind betrayal aversion is “Punish, and do not reward, betrayals
of trust” (sect. 5.1.3, para. 4). We agree that a rule along these lines
operates, though we would describe the heuristic as “Avoid and
punish betrayals of trust.”
We also agree with Sunstein that this moral heuristic appears to
work well in cases involving betrayals by human actors. A security
guard who commits an act of betrayal by robbing the store he is
paid to protect deserves the tough punishment he will no doubt
receive because his crime causes multiple harms. His betrayal not
only causes the focal harm to the business, but it also damages the
victims’ ability to trust other security officers and undermines
their sense of the social order.
We are less inclined to agree with Sunstein that the moral
heuristic necessarily “misfires” when people use it in situations in-
volving betrayals by safety products rather than by people. Most
participants in our safety-product study indicated that they were
willing to double their risk of dying (from 1% to 2%) to eliminate
an even smaller risk of dying as a result of a betrayal (Koehler &
Gershoff 2003, Study 5). For example, most people preferred an
airbag that carried with it a 2% risk of dying in a serious automo-
bile crash to one that carried with it a 1% risk plus an additional
0.01% risk due to fatal deployment of the airbag. Sunstein thinks
this is an example where the moral heuristic “punish, and do not
reward, betrayals of trust” misfires and leads to error. A safety
product should be chosen, Sunstein says, “if and only if it de-
creases aggregate risks.”
However, we are not persuaded that the risk of betrayal is an ir-
relevant consideration in the safety-product context. Although a
safety product lacks the intentionality of a human actor, the nega-
tive consequences of a safety-product betrayal may be as varied,
severe, and protracted as other types of betrayals. An airbag that
kills drivers who would otherwise survive the car accident can in-
still a deep mistrust of car manufacturers and government safety
agencies among the victims’ families and friends. Safety products
that betray people in this manner – by causing the very harm we
trust them to prevent – may also increase our sense of vulnerabil-
ity in the world and arouse a variety of negative emotions. Indeed,
we show that the negative emotions associated with feelings of
broken trust from an exploding airbag are mediated by percep-
tions of breakdown in social order (Koehler & Gershoff 2003,
Study 4).
If the negative consequences of safety-product betrayals reach
beyond the immediate harm – that is, if these betrayals produce
multiple harms similar to those that arise when intentional human
actors betray – then it is not clear that people’s safety-product
preferences should be judged against a benchmark that only con-
siders aggregate risks of the immediate harm. In fact, we thought
that our empirical results were striking not because they showed
how an otherwise reasonable heuristic could lead to absurd pref-
erences, but because they indicated that the consequences of var-
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ious types of betrayal are so unbearable that people are willing to
incur substantial costs to eliminate them. Certainly it would be un-
reasonable if people chose to avoid betrayal risks at all costs. But
we are not persuaded that a finding that people are willing to in-
cur some additional cost to avoid betrayal provides sufficient evi-
dence of a moral heuristic gone awry.
Moral heuristics or moral competence?
Reflections on Sunstein
John Mikhail
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC 20001.
jm455@law.georgetown.edu http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
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Abstract: By focusing on mistaken judgments, Sunstein provides a theory
of performance errors without a theory of moral competence. Addition-
ally, Sunstein’s objections to thought experiments like the footbridge and
trolley problems are unsound. Exotic and unfamiliar stimuli are used in
theory construction throughout the cognitive sciences, and these problems
enable us to uncover the implicit structure of our moral intuitions.
After a period of neglect, philosophers and psychologists have be-
gun to focus on the problems of descriptive and explanatory ade-
quacy in the moral domain. These problems can be represented
by perceptual and acquisition models of moral intuition similar to
those utilized in the study of language (Chomsky 1964). The prob-
lem of descriptive adequacy in the theory of moral cognition seeks
to explain the human perceptual ability to individuate and inter-
pret novel acts and omissions and to recognize their moral prop-
erties – for example, whether or not they are permissible. The
problem of explanatory adequacy, in turn, seeks to explain how
this ability is acquired (Mikhail 2000; Dwyer 1999).
Sunstein does not take up ontogeny, but he does seek to explain
certain acquired patterns of moral intuition. However, unlike
Rawls, whose class of “considered judgments” denotes “those
judgments in which our moral capacities are most likely to be dis-
played without distortion” (Rawls 1971, p. 47), Sunstein focuses
attention on judgments he thinks are distorted or mistaken. This
reverses the normal order of inquiry, which seeks to understand
the ideal operations of a cognitive system before explaining its oc-
casional pathologies and disorders. What Sunstein gives us, in ef-
fect, is a theory of performance errors without a corresponding
theory of moral competence.
Sunstein recognizes the need for some benchmark to demar-
cate the set of judgments caused by heuristics. Only then can they
be characterized as unsound, unreliable, or mistaken. However,
Sunstein’s definitions of “weak consequentialism” – his proposed
benchmark – are too vague and uncontroversial to do the work re-
quired of them in this context. We are left without a clear sense of
whether Sunstein thinks moral competence even exists and, if so,
which theory adequately describes it.
Echoing a common refrain (e.g., Kaplow & Shavell 2002), Sun-
stein questions the use of “exotic cases of the kind never or rarely
encountered in ordinary life” to reveal the structure of our moral
intuitions. The objection sounds plausible, but on reflection seems
difficult to understand. Exotic and unfamiliar stimuli are used in
theory construction throughout the cognitive sciences. For exam-
ple, the discovery that infants perceive objects in accordance with
principles of cohesion, contact, and continuity utilizes novel dis-
plays that depart from previous experience and violate ordinary
expectations (e.g., Spelke et al. 1992). Or consider such con-
trivances as “blicket detectors” (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000), rotating
three-dimensional line drawings (Shepard & Metzler 1971), or
nonsense expressions like “colorless green ideas sleep furiously”
(Chomsky 1957). In any psychology experiment, the decisive
question is not whether the stimulus is unfamiliar or artificial, but
whether it reveals something interesting about how the mind
works. Although some moral dilemmas may indeed be too out-
landish to qualify, many of the specific examples Sunstein criti-
cizes appear to satisfy that test.
To take a concrete example, consider the footbridge and trolley
problems, which can readily be shown to elicit common deontic
intuitions among demographically diverse populations, including
young children (Mikhail et al. 1998; Mikhail 2000; cf. Hauser et
al., under review). Following Greene et al. (2001), Sunstein sug-
gests that these intuitions cannot be given a principled explana-
tion. Here I think a computational theory of moral competence
has been ruled out too soon. In fact, the two cases trigger distinct
mental representations whose relevant temporal, causal, inten-
tional, and moral properties can be exhibited in a two-dimensional
tree diagram, successive nodes of which bear a generation relation
to one another that is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive (Gold-
man 1970; Mikhail 2000). As these diagrams reveal, the key struc-
tural difference between the two cases is that, in the footbridge
condition, the agent commits a series of distinct trespasses prior
to and as a means of achieving his good end (Fig. 1), whereas in
the trolley condition, these violations are subsequent and foreseen
side effects (Fig. 2).
The computational hypothesis holds that when people en-
counter the footbridge and trolley problems, they spontaneously
compute unconscious representations like those in Figures 1 and
2 (Mikhail, in press). Note that in addition to explaining the rele-
vant intuitions, this hypothesis has further testable implications.
For example, we can investigate the structural properties of the
underlying representations by asking subjects to evaluate certain
probative descriptions of the relevant actions. Descriptions using
the word “by” to connect individual nodes of the tree in the down-
ward direction (e.g., “D turned the train by throwing the switch,”
“D killed the man by turning the train”) will be deemed accept-
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Figure 1 (Mikhail). Mental representation of footbridge problem (Mikhail, in press).
able; by contrast, causal reversals using “by” to connect nodes in
the upward direction (“D threw the switch by turning the train,”
“D turned the train by killing the man”) will be deemed unac-
ceptable. Likewise, descriptions using the phrase “in order to” to
connect nodes in the upward direction along the vertical chain of
means and ends (“D threw the switch in order to turn the train”)
will be deemed acceptable. By contrast, descriptions of this type
linking means with side effects (“D threw the switch in order to
kill the man”) will be deemed unacceptable. In short, there is an
implicit geometry to these representations, which Sunstein ne-
glects but an adequate theory can and must account for.
“The law has long used actors’ intent or purpose to distinguish
between two acts that may have the same result” (Vacco vs. Quill
1997, p. 802). Simple but revealing thought experiments like the
footbridge and trolley problems suggest that ordinary mortals do
so as well. Perhaps this explains why so many legal doctrines turn
on an analysis of purpose and on the distinction between intended
and foreseen effects (Mikhail 2002). Of course, some of these doc-
trines may constitute the kind of overgeneralization Sunstein use-
fully warns against. But many others presumably do not. Consider
the norms of proportionality and noncombatant immunity in the
law of armed conflict, which limit the permissibility of harming
civilians as a side effect of an otherwise justifiable military opera-
tion and categorically prohibit directly targeting them. Are these
norms the product of heuristics, or of shared principles of moral
competence? The fact that we can seriously contemplate the lat-
ter alternative – that cognitive science and human rights can be
linked in this manner – is significant and worth reflecting upon.
In the final analysis, Sunstein’s insistent homunculus may be the
human sense of justice, which behaviorism in all its varieties leads
us to ignore, but which we persistently disregard at our own peril.
Do normative standards advance our
understanding of moral judgment?
David A. Pizarroa and Eric Luis Uhlmannb
aDepartment of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California –
Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-7085; bDepartment of Psychology, Yale University,
New Haven, CT 06520. dpizarro@uci.edu eric.uhlmann@yale.edu
Abstract: Sunstein’s review of research on moral heuristics is rich and in-
formative – even without his central claim that individuals often commit
moral errors. We question the value of positing such a normative moral
framework for the study of moral judgment. We also propose an alternative
standard for evaluating moral judgments – that of subjective rationality.
Sunstein wants to extend Kahneman et al.’s (1982) thesis that gen-
erally adaptive cognitive heuristics also lead to systematic and pre-
dictable errors in judgment, and makes the provocative argument
that moral heuristics can “lead to mistaken and even absurd moral
judgments” (target article, Abstract). Sunstein makes an impor-
tant contribution to the literature on moral judgment by high-
lighting the role of intuitions in everyday moral thinking (see also
Haidt 2001). Although Sunstein does not endorse any grand moral
theory explicitly (e.g., Utilitarianism or Kantianism), he agrees
that the very concept of a “moral error” requires a normative
benchmark, and endorses “weak consequentialism” as being, in
his view, a relatively uncontroversial standard by which to judge
the successes and failures of various moral judgments.
We do not wish to debate the virtues and vices of any normative
moral theory – this is a task best left to philosophers. However, we
do question the necessity of positing a normative framework for
understanding the psychology of moral judgment. Does a good
theory of moral judgment require an objectively “right” set of
moral criteria with which to compare lay judgments? Perhaps not.
We believe that the research reviewed by Sunstein is extremely in-
formative without the additional claim that individuals are making
mistakes. For example, knowing and predicting the conditions un-
der which individuals rigidly adhere to principles despite conse-
quences is important for any successful moral theory. So the fact
that individuals are willing to accept a (slightly) increased risk of
dying in order to punish a betrayal is quite provocative – but does
it add more value to claim that this is an error?
One possible downside of such an approach is a proliferation of
error-focused work in the moral domain – a domain in which
claiming an objective standard may simply lead to a whole lot of
argument about which standard is right, at the expense of paying
attention to the data. In our opinion, this was equally problematic
with the approach of Kohlberg and his colleagues (cf. Kohlberg
1969) – a willingness to embrace a Kantian/Rawlsian theory of jus-
tice led to the questionable claim that certain individuals were at
a “lower stage” of moral reasoning. Much like focusing on Kant-
ian justice, focusing on moral errors may divert attention away
from more fruitful areas of inquiry, such as (for example) cross-
cultural differences in moral judgment (e.g., Haidt et al. 1993), or
the emotional processes that underlie moral judgments (e.g.,
Pizarro 2000).
This does not mean that psychologists must abandon all talk of
error in moral judgment – there is one sense of the word “error”
that may still be useful in this domain. To the extent that people’s
moral judgments are influenced by factors that even they perceive
as irrational, their judgments may be said to be in error (Kruglan-
ski 1989). Empirical examples of this subjective irrationality in
moral judgment are already available. For example, people be-
lieve that they punish to deter future criminals, yet their judg-
ments are driven by the severity of the crime, not deterrence-re-
lated variables (Carlsmith et al. 2002; Sunstein refers to this as the
“moral outrage” heuristic). Presumably, if a participant in this re-
search was aware of this influence she would revise her judgment,
as it fails to match her own standard.
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Figure 2 (Mikhail). Mental representation trolley problem (Mikhail, in press).
In another study, Pizarro et al. (2003) found that participants
discounted blame for intentional actions that were not carried out
quite as intended (i.e., acts that lacked “intentions-in-action”;
Searle 1983). For example, when a murderer tripped and acci-
dentally stabbed his victim in the process of attempting to kill him,
he was perceived as less blameworthy. Interestingly, when asked
to give their most rational response, participants judged acts that
did and did not possess intention-in-action to be equally blame-
worthy. This suggests that, at least for some, discounting blame for
acts that lacked intention-in-action was subjectively irrational.
In another example, Tetlock et al. (under review) examined
conservative and liberal managers’ reactions to a hypothetical em-
ployee error (failure to mail a package on time) with either mild
or severe consequences. Both conservative and liberal managers
judged the employee more harshly when the consequences of the
error were severe (this has been referred to as an “outcome bias”
and “moral luck”; Baron & Hershey 1988). Liberals viewed this
outcome bias as an error, and reduced their recommended pun-
ishment in the severe consequences case when asked to consider
how they would have reacted had the consequences been mild. In
contrast, conservatives saw it as perfectly appropriate to deter-
mine the employee’s punishment based on the consequences of
his or her actions.
Liberals and conservatives also disagree regarding whether cer-
tain socialized intuitions are rational. Ingenious studies by
Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues demonstrate that most people
find it intuitively wrong to wash one’s toilet with the American flag,
eat one’s recently expired pet, or masturbate into a dead chicken
(Haidt 2001; Haidt et al. 2003). When asked to make the most ra-
tional judgment possible, liberals appear to correct for their intu-
itions – reducing blame for eating Fido, for example (Uhlmann et
al., in preparation; see also Haidt & Hersh 2001). In contrast, con-
servatives provide essentially the same judgments when asked to
respond rationally versus intuitively. For liberals, the judgments
identified by Haidt exert a subjectively irrational influence on
their judgments. But for conservatives, who place a high priority
on traditional values, such judgments may seem perfectly well-
grounded.
If people are indeed exhibiting “absurd moral judgments” (tar-
get article, Abstract), we suggest that this is not because heuristics
lead individuals’ moral judgments to diverge from some objective
standard of morality (such as weak consequentialism), but because
these judgments would be deemed irrational by the participant
himself upon reflection. Perhaps this sense of the term “error”
may be the best way to avoid the morass of subjectivity inherent
in studying the moral judgments of other people, and may also
keep researchers from hurling insults at each other’s normative
theories of choice.
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Abstract: Preferences for options that do not secure optimal outcomes,
like the ones catalogued by Sunstein, derive from two sources: cognitive
heuristics and deontological rules. Although rules may stem from auto-
matic affective reactions, they are deliberately maintained. Because
strongly held convictions have important behavioral implications, it may
be useful to regard cognitive heuristics and deontological rules as separate
sources of nonconsequential judgment in the moral domain.
The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the
moral domain, as Sunstein notes, although examples of choices
that violate consequential principles are abundant. Among those
examples are the “punishment” of companies for cost–benefit
analyses to determine their investment in safety, the betrayal aver-
sion, the resistance to “tampering with nature,” and the rejection
of probability of detection as a normative factor in determining
punitive damages. These choices have grave consequences for the
lives and well-being of many people, and the contribution of this
article in drawing attention to these problems is highly important.
To ascertain that those nonconsequential judgments result from
the application of mental heuristics, it is necessary to address the
question of what a heuristic is. The notion of a heuristic is not well
defined in the psychological literature. As Sunstein notes, Tversky
and Kahneman (1984) used the term heuristic to refer to a strat-
egy that “relies on a natural assessment to produce an estimation
or a prediction.” These strategies take on the form of mental short-
cuts, or general purpose rules, often applied without conscious-
ness, in judgmental tasks requiring assessment of unknown values.
More recently, the evolving research on dual process theories led
to a broader view of the nature of heuristics. Heuristics have come
to be equated with processes of System I. This system, also re-
ferred to as the experiential system, operates automatically and ef-
fortlessly, is oriented to concrete images, and responds affectively.
By contrast, the rational system, or System II, operates con-
sciously and effortfully, and is deliberate and reason-oriented (Ep-
stein & Pacini 1999).
In the current broad view of heuristics, not only are estimates
of quantities by rules of thumb seen as the products of heuristics,
but any expression of preference derived through the experiential
system is regarded as such, as well. Although the boundaries of the
set have not been explicitly delineated, the most notable feature
of a heuristic process that distinguishes it from the cognitive pro-
cesses classified as reasoning or rational is its nondeliberative na-
ture. Although the outcomes of a heuristic can be deliberately
adopted by System II, judgment by heuristic is typically an intu-
itive and unintentional process (Kahneman & Frederick 2002). It
is usually passive and preconscious.
Returning to the examples discussed by Sunstein in the present
article, these can arguably be roughly classified into two kinds: the
ones that reflect the use of general cognitive heuristics in judg-
ments (applied in the moral domain), and others that deliberate
application of rules. The clearest example of a non-deliberative
heuristic is the outrage heuristic in punishment. Although people
are certainly aware of their outrage, they are most likely not aware
of using this emotional reaction as the primary, or even the sole
determinant of the punishment they set.
The resistance to cloning, stemming from the conviction that
one should not “play god,” or “tamper with nature,” is an example
of the second kind. Although the belief itself may stem from an
emotional reaction, it is explicitly adopted by the rational system.
The principle is held consciously and deliberately. It is relatively
abstract and context-general. Similarly, the rejection of the role of
probability of detection in setting punitive damages is the result
of deliberate processing, often by expert and sophisticated re-
spondents (Sunstein et al. 2000). In both of these examples, as well
as in other ones, the judgment is determined by a deontological
rule.
Deontological rules are rules that concern actions rather than
consequences. These rules are often associated with values that
people think of as absolute, not to be traded off for anything else
(Baron & Spranca 1997). These protected values, compared to
values that are not absolute in this way, have various predicted
properties, such as insensitivity to quantity: The amount of the
harm done when they are violated does not matter as much as for
other values. Furthermore, in judgments involving a deontologi-
cal rule or a protected value, the participation of the actor is cru-
cial, even when the consequences are the same. The tendency to
punish companies that base their decisions on cost–benefit analy-
sis, even if a high valuation is placed on human life, may reflect
the agent relativity characteristic of the rule “do not trade human
life for money.”
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As protected values are related to deontological rules against ac-
tion (“do not play god,” “do not tamper with nature,” “do not cause
death,” etc.) they tend to amplify omission bias (Ritov & Baron
1999). If a person has a protected value against, for example, de-
stroying species, this value seems to apply to action rather than in-
action. That person might be unwilling to take an action that
would cause the extinction of one species, in order to save five,
even when the relative outcomes are fully spelled out. By contrast,
another person, who cares just as much about preventing the ex-
tinction of species as the first person, but not as a protected value,
would prefer that action be taken in order to achieve better con-
sequences as a whole. Although the values people hold protected
vary considerably, the basic finding of greater omission bias for
protected values holds across a wide array of issues, ranging from
endangered species, to withdrawal from occupied territories (for
Israeli respondents). In all those cases, people holding protected
values deliberately preferred omission, despite the fact that they
knew explicitly that action would yield better consequences with
respect to the specific problem.
The origin of deontological rules is the subject of much re-
search. They may be the result of generalization from a range of
problems. Deontological rules are undoubtedly closely linked
with affect, but it remains an open question whether their impact
is fully mediated by emotions. Even if espousing that deontologi-
cal rules are primarily an expression of extreme affect, the judg-
mental process is different from other experiential processes in its
explicit and deliberate nature. Until further research provides bet-
ter understanding of those processes, it may be more useful to re-
gard cognitive heuristics and deontological rules as separate
sources of nonconsequential judgment in the moral domain.
Intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism
Peter Singer
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Abstract: A common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our
common moral intuitions. Understanding the role that heuristics play in
moral judgments undermines this objection. It also indicates why we
should not use John Rawls’ model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for
testing normative moral theories.
At one point Cass Sunstein suggests that his assertion that heuris-
tics play an important role in our moral judgments does not really
favor one side or the other in the debate between utilitarians and
deontologists:
If moral heuristics are in fact pervasive, then people with diverse foun-
dational commitments should be able to agree, not that their own pre-
ferred theories are wrong, but that they are often applied in a way that
reflects the use of heuristics. Utilitarians ought to be able to identify
heuristics for the maximization of utility; deontologists should be able
to point to heuristics for the proper discharge of moral responsibilities;
those uncommitted to any large-scale theory should be able to specify
heuristics for their own more modest normative commitments. (target
article, sect. 1, para. 4)
This seems to me to lean too far towards normative neutrality.
Seen against the background of a long-running debate in norma-
tive ethics, Sunstein’s illuminating essay gives support to utilitari-
ans, and not to deontologists.
A major theme in normative ethics for the past two centuries
has been the debate between those who support a utilitarian, or
more broadly consequentialist, normative ethical theory and those
who ground their normative ethics on our common moral judg-
ments or intuitions. In this debate, the standard strategy employed
by deontologists has been to present examples intended to show
that the dictates of utilitarianism clash with moral intuitions that
we all share – and that fit with deontological views of ethics. A fa-
mous literary instance occurs in Dostoyevsky’s The Karamazov
Brothers. Ivan challenges Alyosha to say whether he would con-
sent to build a world in which people were happy and at peace, if
this ideal world could be achieved only by torturing “that same lit-
tle child beating her chest with her little fists.” Alyosha says that
he would not consent to build such a world on those terms (Dos-
toyevsky 1879). Hastings Rashdall purported to refute hedonistic
utilitarianism by arguing that it cannot explain the value of sexual
purity (Rashdall 1907, p. 197). H. J. McCloskey, writing at a time
when lynchings in the American South were still a possibility,
thought it a decisive objection to utilitarianism that the theory
might direct a sheriff to frame an innocent man in order to pre-
vent a white mob from lynching half a dozen innocents in revenge
for a rape (McCloskey 1957). Bernard Williams invited utilitari-
ans to ponder a similar example, of a botanist who wanders into a
village in the jungle where twenty innocent people are about to be
shot. He is told that nineteen of them will be spared, if only he will
himself shoot the twentieth (Williams 1973).
Initially, the use of such examples to appeal to our common
moral intuitions against consequentialist theories was an ad hoc
device lacking meta-ethical foundations. It was simply a way of
saying: “If Theory U is true, then in situation X you should do Y.
But we know that it would always be wrong to do Y, therefore U
cannot be true.” This is an effective argument against U, as long
as the judgment that it would always be wrong to do Y is not chal-
lenged. But the argument does nothing to establish that it is al-
ways wrong to do Y, nor what a sounder theory than U would be
like.
John Rawls took the crucial step towards fusing this argument
with an ethical methodology when he argued that the test of a
sound moral theory is that it can achieve a “reflective equilibrium”
with our considered moral judgments. By “reflective equilibrium”
Rawls meant that, where there is no inherently plausible theory
that perfectly matches our initial moral judgments, we should
modify either the theory, or the judgments, until we have an equi-
librium between the two.
The model here is the testing of a scientific theory. In science,
we generally accept the theory that best fits the data, but some-
times, if the theory is inherently plausible and fits some of the data,
we may be prepared to accept it despite its failure to fit all the data.
We assume, perhaps, that the outlying data are erroneous, or that
there are undiscovered factors at work in that particular situation.
In the case of a normative theory of ethics, Rawls assumes that the
raw data are our prior moral judgments. We try to match them
with a plausible theory, but if we cannot, we reject some of the
judgments, and modify the theory so that it matches others. Even-
tually the plausibility of the theory and of the surviving judgments
reach an equilibrium, and we then have the best possible theory.
In this view, the acceptability of a moral theory is not determined
by the internal coherence and plausibility of the theory itself, but
rather, to a significant extent, by its agreement with those of our
prior moral judgments that we are unwilling to revise or abandon.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls uses this model to justify tinkering
with his original idea of a choice arising from a hypothetical con-
tract, until he is able to produce results that are not too much at
odds with our ordinary ideas of justice (Rawls 1951; 1971, p. 48).
The model of reflective equilibrium has always struck me as du-
bious. The analogy between the role of a normative moral theory
and a scientific theory is fundamentally misconceived (Singer
1974). Our common moral intuitions are not “data” in the sense
that a series of measurements of the positions of electrons may be
data that any credible scientific theory must explain. A scientific
theory seeks to explain the existence of data that are about a world
“out there” that we are trying to explain. Granted, the data may
have been affected by errors in measurement or interpretation,
but unless we can give some account of what the errors might have
been, it is not up to us to choose or reject the observations. A nor-
mative ethical theory, however, is not trying to explain our com-
mon moral intuitions. It might reject all of them, and still be su-
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perior to other normative theories that better matched our moral
judgments. For a normative moral theory is not an attempt to an-
swer the question “Why do we think as we do about moral ques-
tions?” Obviously, that question may require a historical, rather
than a philosophical, investigation. On abortion, suicide, and vol-
untary euthanasia, for instance, we may think as we do because we
have grown up in a society that was, for two thousand years, dom-
inated by the Christian religion. We may no longer believe in
Christianity as a moral authority, but we may find it difficult to rid
ourselves of moral intuitions shaped by our parents and our teach-
ers, who were either themselves believers, or were shaped by oth-
ers who were.
Similarly – to come at last to Sunstein’s article – an under-
standing of the way in which we tend to use heuristics may cast
doubt on the value of our moral intuitions as a test for the accept-
ability of a normative theory, even when, as Sunstein says, “they
are very firm.” We may not appreciate that these intuitions are
heuristics, nor that in the special situation in which we find our-
selves, the heuristic does not give us the right answer. The case
against these intuitions gains further support from recent work ex-
ploring what is actually going on in the brain when people are con-
sidering moral dilemmas. This work enables us to see differences
between intuitive, more or less automatic, responses, and those in-
volving cognitive processes (Greene et al. 2001).
Whenever it is suggested that normative ethics should disregard
our common moral intuitions, the objection is made that without
intuitions, we can go nowhere. There have been many attempts,
over the centuries, to find proofs of first principles in ethics, but
most philosophers consider that they have all failed. Even a radi-
cal ethical theory like utilitarianism must rest on a fundamental in-
tuition about what is good. So we appear to be left with our intu-
itions, and nothing more. If we reject them all, we must become
ethical skeptics. If some of our moral intuitions are heuristics,
however, it isn’t hard to see how we can criticize them without
ending up as skeptics. We need to think about what our underly-
ing values are, and then distinguish these values from the moral
intuitions that merely have a heuristic role in furthering them.
A defender of the idea of reflective equilibrium might say that
the knowledge that some of our moral intuitions are heuristics can
itself be part of the process of achieving a wider equilibrium be-
tween a theory and our considered moral judgments (Daniels
1996). That approach renders the model of “reflective equilib-
rium” relatively innocuous by making it so all-embracing that it
can include any grounds for rejecting intuitions, even, in the lim-
iting case, grounds for rejecting all of them. Now, the “data” that
a sound moral theory is supposed to match have become so
changeable that they are no longer a barrier to the acceptability of
utilitarianism. In that form, there is no need to object to reflective
equilibrium.
As Sunstein notes, utilitarians from Mill and Sidgwick onwards
have discussed the role of rules and intuitions in moral thinking,
sorting through which intuitions we ought to preserve because
they are conducive to the larger utilitarian goal, and which we
should reject. Sunstein has added a more sophisticated under-
standing of heuristics to this tradition, thereby helping to refute
the objection most commonly invoked against utilitarianism as a
normative ethical theory. Admittedly, as Sunstein himself notes,
there are many further objections, not based on an appeal to com-
mon moral intuitions, which can be asked about utilitarianism.
Debate in normative ethical theory will continue. Perhaps, how-
ever, one chapter is drawing to a close.
Wide reflective equilibrium as an answer to
an objection to moral heuristics
Edward Stein
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York, NY 10003.
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Abstract: If, as is not implausible, the correct moral theory is indexed to
human capacity for moral reasoning, then the thesis that moral heuristics
exist faces a serious objection. This objection can be answered by em-
bracing a wide reflective equilibrium account of the origins of our norma-
tive principles of morality.
Sunstein’s central thesis is that moral heuristics, shortcuts that
sometimes lead to serious errors, exist. This comment considers a
serious conceptual objection to this thesis and provides an answer
to it.
It is important to distinguish between determining what the
right moral principles are and determining how humans reason
about morality. Sunstein focuses primarily on the second project;
for example, he shows we favor inaction over a statistically prefer-
able action. Sunstein’s thesis has implications for the first project:
that is, by identifying rules of thumb that lead us to make moral
mistakes, he is implicitly suggesting what the correct moral prin-
ciples are. Making the distinction between moral norms and hu-
man moral competence does not entail that the two must diverge
or that they are unrelated. For comparison, consider researching
whether humans have a good sense of humor. Imagine researchers
telling subjects jokes (some funny and some not), then asking
them whether each joke was funny, and, on the basis of their as-
sessments, concluding that humans have (or lack) a good sense of
humor. Something seems seriously amiss about this research pro-
ject, in part because (a) there might be no objective standards of
funniness, perhaps because funniness is relative to individual
tastes; (b) there might be objective standards of funniness, but
they might be indexed to human faculties; and (c) there might be
objective, human-independent standards of funniness, but we
might lack access to them (Stein 1996, pp. 29–34). In the context
of morality, these positions are: (a) relativism about morality, (b)
norms of morality are indexed to human moral competence, and
(c) moral norms are epistemologically inaccessible. The signifi-
cance of moral heuristics would change dramatically if any of these
positions were true. Sunstein implicitly rejects (a) and (c) by ap-
pealing to and identifying objective moral truths, but he does not
discuss (b). If norms of morality are indexed to moral capacity,
then it is impossible that we make systematic moral mistakes; if
our moral competence sets the standards of morality, then sys-
tematic moral errors are not possible. This would completely un-
dercut Sunstein’s central thesis.
The comparison to sense of humor is just one reason for think-
ing that this conceptual argument against moral heuristics war-
rants examination. A similar objection arises in the context of hu-
man reasoning more generally. Our use of the availability heuristic
and other cognitive shortcuts suggests that human reasoning com-
petence diverges from the norms of reasoning. Despite psycho-
logical evidence that cognitive heuristics exist, some have argued
that human reasoning competence necessarily matches the norms
of reasoning because such norms are indexed to our cognitive ca-
pacities (Cohen 1981; Macnamara 1986). This argument is even
more plausible in the context of morality, because, as Sunstein ad-
mits, it is harder to demonstrate that an intuitively plausible rea-
soning practice leads to serious errors in the context of morality
than in the context of probability or logic.
This conceptual argument against moral heuristics can be re-
futed by focusing on the origins of moral norms. Sunstein briefly
mentions narrow and wide reflective equilibrium, but a more de-
tailed discussion is necessary. Narrow reflective equilibrium is
achieved when a set of first-order judgments is coherently sys-
tematized by (that is, brought into balance with) a set of general
principles. This would be accomplished in the moral realm by ar-
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ticulating a set of ethical principles from which all and only our
somewhat altered and refined moral judgments follow. Wide re-
flective equilibrium is achieved when a set of first-order judg-
ments, a set of general principles, and a set of philosophical theo-
ries (e.g., theories of personal identity, metaphysics, and the social
role of moral and political theory) are brought into agreement.
The process of wide reflective equilibrium begins with the search
for a narrow reflective equilibrium, but once first-order judg-
ments and general principles are brought into agreement, alter-
native pairings of judgments and general principles are considered
with an eye towards bringing them into balance with philosophi-
cal theories through the reflective equilibrium process at the more
abstract level. This process, rather than producing a systematiza-
tion of our revised first-order judgments, is more revisionary. Also,
the results of wide reflective equilibrium have a broader network
of support, including significant philosophical backing. There is,
thus, a greater likelihood that wide reflective equilibrium will pro-
duce a theory that diverges from intuitions (Daniels 1979; Stein
1996, Ch. 5).
If, as some have argued, our moral norms result from wide re-
flective equilibrium (Daniels 1979; Rawls 1974–1975), insofar as
moral heuristics exist, they are likely to be rejected by a wide re-
flective equilibrium process because of its revisionary character.
Consider, for example, Derek Parfit’s discussion of utilitarianism
(Parfit 1984). A standard objection to utilitarianism is that it re-
quires balancing losses and gains between people. Such interper-
sonal balancing is seen as problematic because individual persons
are the relevant units for moral theory. According to this standard
objection, utilitarianism should be rejected because it requires in-
terpersonal balancing. Parfit tries to show that persons are not the
relevant units for moral theory. Rather, according to Parfit’s meta-
physical arguments, psychological continuity and connectedness
are what matters to moral theory. Since one may be psychologi-
cally connected to other people, benefits and harms, pleasures and
pains can be balanced among various people. If Parfit’s meta-
physical argument is right, then the original objection to utilitari-
anism is not strong. Even though utilitarianism might be rejected
in narrow reflective equilibirum, according to Parfit, in light of
metaphysical theories about personhood and theories of value,
utilitarianism will be supported by a wide reflective equilibrium
process in the moral context.
Sunstein needs to defend his thesis that moral heuristics exist
against the objection that the norms of morality are indexed to hu-
man moral competence. Wide reflective equilibrium provides an
answer to the conceptual argument that humans must be rational,
even though psychological evidence suggests that general reason-
ing competence diverges from the norms (Stein 1996, Ch. 5; Stich
1990, Ch. 4). A wide reflective equilibrium account of the norms
of morality similarly provides a strong answer to this objection to
Sunstein’s thesis.
Gauging the heuristic value of heuristics
Philip E. Tetlock
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1900.
tetlock@haas.berkeley.edu
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/faculty/tetlock.html
Abstract: Heuristics are necessary but far from sufficient explanations for
moral judgment. This commentary stresses: (a) the need to complement
cold, cognitive-economizing functionalist accounts with hot, value-expres-
sive, social-identity-affirming accounts; and (b) the importance of con-
ducting reflective-equilibrium thought and laboratory experiments that
explore the permeability of the boundaries people place on the “think-
able.”
I appreciate – as much as any good Lakatosian – the importance
of pushing powerful research programs to their limits (Tetlock
2002). Sometimes the surest way to discover when we have had
enough of an approach is to help ourselves to more than enough.
I also appreciate how tricky it is to ascertain when we have reached
the point of diminishing marginal epistemic returns. Nonetheless,
I am prepared to speculate that Sunstein’s argument brings us
right up to the inflection point, and perhaps beyond.
This may seem a dubious compliment. But, as Lakatosians well
know, it is high praise. The heuristics-and-biases research pro-
gram is one of the most phenomenally successful programs in the
behavioral and social sciences. I agree with Sunstein that there is
a great deal of suggestive evidence – laboratory and field – that
people often rely on simple moral heuristics in reaching conclu-
sions on complex issues. And I agree that, as a result, there is ob-
vious potential for rhetorical and policy mischief.
But there are also good reasons for wariness, some of which
Sunstein himself endorses. Certain of these objections have been
trotted out so many times that they feel a tad hackneyed. The list
of heuristics is indeed endless, ranging from the idiosyncratic (the
Scalia heuristic) to the extremely general (equity, equality, proce-
dural, and retribution heuristics). From a theory-building per-
spective, it is necessary to advance beyond lists and articulate: (1)
a taxonomy of heuristics so that we do not come quite so close to
a one-to-one correspondence between explanans and explanan-
dum; and (2) a set of hypotheses that specify when particular types
of heuristics are likely to be activated.
From a theory-building perspective, it will also eventually be
necessary to circumscribe the explanatory applicability of heuris-
tic-based explanations. I do not challenge the cognitive economy
gained from heuristics, but I wonder whether the language of
heuristics is too coldly cognitive to capture the red-hot passions
implied by betrayal, revenge, and disgust. When people categori-
cally declare certain transactions or even forms of thought (such
as cost–benefit analysis) off-limits, they are not just simplifying
their decision task. They are rising to the defense of sacred values
by refusing even to consider taboo trade-offs. Perhaps the most
intriguing property of taboo trade-offs is that they are morally cor-
rosive. Decent people do not contemplate the advantages of “play-
ing God,” or of “improving returns to shareholders by killing a
handful of customers,” or of “shortening airport security lines by
ethnic-racial profiling.” Mere contemplation of such possibilities
(failure to tell those who float such ideas to “go to hell”) is enough
to undercut one’s standing in one’s moral community (Tetlock et
al. 2000).
The moral outrage triggered by such policy proposals is much
more than a heuristic; it is a powerful emotion-laden statement
about who we collectively are and the types of conduct we coun-
tenance (McGraw & Tetlock 2005; McGraw et al. 2003). This
makes it easy for moral arguments to degenerate into name-call-
ing. Leon Kass’s prose turns progressively brighter shades of pur-
ple as he reaches for terms to characterize those “shallow souls”
who have the temerity to think beyond the boundaries he wants
to place on stem-cell research and genetic engineering: bizarre,
grotesque narcissism, and Frankensteinian hubris. It is small won-
der that when ordinary folks are caught straying into the territory
of the unthinkable, they rush to repair the damage to their social
identities through symbolic acts of moral cleansing (Tetlock 2003).
My deepest point of agreement with Sunstein is that he – un-
like some cognitive psychologists whose skepticism of human in-
tuition runs truly deep – has not abandoned all hope in the
“method of reflective equilibrium.” Imperfect though it may be,
reflective equilibrium is the best tool at our disposal for encour-
aging thoughtful responses to cognitive dissonance. Dissonance
theory predicts that people gravitate toward low-effort strategies
of resolving inconsistency, such as denial of the weaker cognition
and bolstering of the stronger, thereby producing a spreading of
alternatives. But what happens when the clashing cognitions are
equally powerful and neither denial nor bolstering is feasible. In
the value-pluralism model (Tetlock 1986), I sketched the condi-
tions under which people will respond to value conflict by engag-
ing in more effort-demanding, System II cognitive maneuvers,
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such as delineating boundary conditions for competing principles
and merging those principles into higher-order composites.
From this standpoint, there is value in conducting reflective-
equilibrium experiments even in “exotic” cases. I have done some
small-scale experiments along these lines and they reveal how
flummoxed people become when researchers design head-on col-
lisions between powerful moral intuitions. Pilot work has shown
that, although most people initially agree with Kass’s arguments
against biotechnology, their opposition even to currently far-out
proposals, such as designer babies, is not absolute. Opposition sig-
nificantly tapers off when we pit Kassian categorical imperatives
against countervailing pragmatic pressure (e.g., a major interna-
tional competitor, China, moving ahead with “modifying the
genome of its population” and raising its average IQ to 165,
thereby dominating high technology, and sweeping both the No-
bel prizes and the Olympics). And most of the remaining opposi-
tion is confined to resisting the premise (“that just is not possi-
ble”), raising the possibility that if the “impossible” proved
possible, they too might change their minds. Few feel comfortable
consigning their descendants to perpetual inferiority. History, it is
useful to remember, offers many precedents for overwhelming
majorities turning into eccentric minorities.
In sum, Sunstein is right that much moral reasoning is more
rigid and simplistic than we academics like. But heuristics are but
one component of a comprehensive explanation. “Rigidity” also
serves valuable self-control and social-solidarity functions. And
people are far from hopelessly rigid; they can be quite flexible
when reality demands it and politicians obligingly provide the
right rhetorical framing.
Towards a taxonomy of modes of moral
decision-making
Elke U. Webera and Jessica S. Anckerb
aCenter for the Decision Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY
10027; bDepartment of Sociomedical Sciences, Mailman School of Public
Health, Columbia University, New York, NY 10032.
euw2@columbia.edu jsa2002@columbia.edu
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/whoswho/full.cfm?id=55663
Abstract: Sunstein advocates a more systematic approach to the study of
moral decision-making, namely the heuristics-and-biases paradigm. We
offer two concerns and suggest that a focus on decision processes can add
value. Recent research on decision modes suggest that it is useful to dis-
tinguish between the qualitative differences in the ways in which moral
decisions can be made when they are not made by reflective, consequen-
tialist reasoning.
Because psychological and economic decision researchers have
tended to focus on content-independent aspects of judgment and
choice (Goldstein & Weber 1995), they have only occasionally dis-
cussed decisions with moral implications. Even when such topics
have been considered, their treatment has been unsystematic.
Sunstein advocates a more systematic approach, namely, to apply
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) heuristics-and-biases research
paradigm to moral decision-making. We endorse his goal of a sys-
tematic research program, offer two concerns, and suggest fruit-
ful research extensions to Sunstein’s call for action.
As Sunstein acknowledges, the heuristics-and-biases research
program examined how individuals thought about questions of
fact, such as event probabilities. Judgments and decisions could
be compared to objective facts, and systematic deviations from
normatively correct answer were dubbed biases. In the moral do-
main, such a research program cannot be pursued without a con-
sensus on the normatively correct answer. Sunstein suggests that
virtually everyone would agree on the moral superiority of the
weak consequentialist perspective, which should thus be treated
as the normatively correct moral model. Yet he is forced to ac-
knowledge that the weak consequentialist model is not uncontro-
versial; for example, strong deontologists, such as religious conser-
vatives, might disagree that negative consequences of a moral
choice should carry moral weight. Consequently, Sunstein’s sug-
gested research program cannot be considered analogous to Kah-
neman and Tversky’s original work in probabilistic reasoning. It
must instead be considered the product of a particular ethical
worldview. Baron has explicitly acknowledged this in Thinking
and Deciding (1994b) and Morality and Rational Choice (1993b).
In both books, he prefaces his discussion of moral decision-mak-
ing with arguments in favor of utilitarianism as the normatively
correct moral framework. Only if utilitarianism is accepted can a
heuristics-and-biases interpretation be applied.
Our second concern relates to Sunstein’s loose definition of the
term “heuristic.” He uses the term to denote decisions made by
attribute substitution, those made by consulting an authority fig-
ure, and those made by recognizing the similarity between the
current situation and another for which the decision-maker al-
ready has determined the best course of action. Elsewhere, he de-
fines a heuristic as being any form of reasoning other than re-
flective reasoning. Thus, in Sunstein’s article, heuristic reasoning
is any decision process that is less cognitively effortful than re-
flective, consequentialist reasoning and that produces a different
outcome (if it produced the same decision, it would not be de-
tected). Simply put, Sunstein seems to blame “heuristics” for all
instances in which moral decisions deviate from the weak conse-
quentialist perspective.
These two concerns about Sunstein’s arguments are offered in
a constructive spirit. The second, in particular, suggests directions
for research that will further Sunstein’s goal of a better and more
systematic understanding of moral decision-making. We review
recent research on modes of decision-making and outline impli-
cations for the study of moral decisions. A decision-modes ap-
proach would subsume the heuristics-and-biases approach into a
broader and perhaps less judgmental framework.
Several taxonomies of the variety of processes used to arrive at
decisions have recently been suggested (Hammond 1996; Weber
& Hsee 2000; Yates & Lee 1996). The modes include the follow-
ing: (a) reflective, consequentialist reasoning such as utilitarian-
ism (often referred to as calculation-based decision-making, with
evaluation of component outcomes and their likelihoods, and in-
tegration of such information into a judgment), (b) recognition-
and-rule-based decisions, where the situation is recognized as a
member of a category or schema for which a judgment or best ac-
tion has already been stored and behavior is triggered as a pro-
duction rule (schema-based reasoning has been claimed to be an
important component of moral decisions; Narvaez 1999; Rest et
al. 1999); (c) story-based decisions, where people construct and
evaluate alternative “stories” of what might happen under differ-
ent courses of action; and (d) affect-based decisions, where peo-
ple base their decisions on holistic affective reactions to choice al-
ternatives.
Decision modes often operate in parallel and at different
speeds, and different modes often (though not always) lead to dif-
ferent decisions. We tend to become aware of the operation of dif-
ferent decision modes when our heads point us in one direction
(by calculation-based decision-making), but our hearts point us in
another (by affect-based processing). Using the very broad taxon-
omy offered by Kahneman and Frederick (2002) and others be-
fore them (see Table 3 of Stanovich & West 2000), we can iden-
tify this situation as a conflict between one of the modes from the
fast, associative, and intuitive System I, and another from the an-
alytic System II. Confidence in a decision is inversely related to
the degree of conflict experienced as the result of parallel decision
processes (Weber et al. 2000). Preference for different decision
modes appears to be related to decision domain (e.g., social vs. fi-
nancial vs. ethical decisions), culture, and goal (e.g., the maxi-
mization of material well-being vs. social needs) (Weber et al.
2004). There seems to be social consensus about the desirability
of certain modes for specific types of decisions (Ames et al. 2004).
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What are the implications of decision-mode research for moral
decision-making? We suggest that deviations from reflective, con-
sequentialist reasoning should not always be considered errors,
but also that decision-mode research can help in the design of in-
terventions or decision aids in situations in which such answers are
considered suboptimal. It matters, for example, whether the out-
rage heuristic cited by Sunstein is an affective response, or the im-
plicit or explicit application of a rule.
A decision-mode approach to the study of moral decision-mak-
ing would determine the variety of processes by which decision-
makers arrive at moral decisions and study how these processes
result in different choices. How many different decision modes
are there? How do decision-makers select a decision mode? When
do decision-makers reason in a consequentialist way, and when do
they apply deontological rules? Can choice of decision mode be
influenced? What is the role of culture, religion, or political affil-
iation in determining decision mode? Lumping all of these differ-
ent modes of decision-making into a single “heuristic” category
fails to take advantage of the knowledge conveyed by a process-
level analysis of decision-making.
Regulation of risks
Paul Weirich
Philosophy Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211.
weirichp@missouri.edu http://www.missouri.edu/~weirichp/
Abstract: Sunstein argues that heuristics misguide moral judgments.
Principles that are normally sound falter in unusual cases. In particular,
heuristics generate erroneous judgments about regulation of risks. Sun-
stein’s map of moral reasoning omits some prominent contours. The sim-
ple heuristics he suggests neglect a reasoner’s attempt to balance the pros
and cons of regulating a risk.
Prejudice, bias, and unreliable general reasoning heuristics yield
mistaken moral judgments. Sunstein shows that, in addition, un-
reliable moral heuristics generate errors. He presents heuristics to
explain bad moral judgments about regulation of risks. The heuris-
tics he suggests ignore considerations that many reasoners recog-
nize as relevant. I sketch an alternative, more fine-grained account
of the reasoning behind their judgments. However, in agreement
with Sunstein, I acknowledge a need for additional psychological
studies of moral reasoning.
A heuristic is a principle. Its application to a case may be unre-
liable and so yield an inaccurate judgment about the case. Sun-
stein offers several illustrations concerning risk regulation. For
various regulatory issues, he suggests a heuristic and points out its
unreliability in reaching a judgment about the issue. Do people
use the heuristic suggested to reach the judgment presented? A
heuristic may yield a judgment and yet not guide the reasoning
that people use to reach the judgment. Also, a heuristic may guide
some populations but not other populations. Consequently, the
suggested heuristics are not full explanations of judgments.
People condemn failures to make cars safer even when the costs
of additional safety devices are very high. Sunstein suggests that
they follow the moral principle: Do not knowingly cause a human
death. He takes this usually reliable heuristic to yield bad judg-
ments about risks. He contends that it is not morally wrong to hold
down the production costs of cars by forgoing expensive safety de-
vices that will save only a few lives.
Conflicting moral principles apply to risk regulation. Auto
safety triggers, besides principles concerning lives, principles con-
cerning efficient use of resources to improve the standard of liv-
ing. Judgments may follow one principle to the exclusion of oth-
ers, but they may also seek a balance between considerations the
conflicting principles express.
Typical reasoners do not use the simple heuristic Sunstein sug-
gests. They do not conclude that an auto company knowingly
causes highway deaths. Rather, they object to profiting from a dis-
regard for life. Their judgments about safety therefore balance
considerations and do not narrowly attend to just one considera-
tion.
A second example considers emissions trading. People con-
demn the practice despite its effectiveness in reducing pollutants.
Sunstein suggests that they misapply the heuristic: People should
not be permitted to engage in moral wrongdoing for a fee. The
heuristic reliably applies to only immoral acts. Emissions are not
immoral when justified by the products whose manufacture gen-
erates the emissions. The heuristic falls outside its range of relia-
bility.
Another explanation of the judgment against emissions trading
is that people regard pollution as non-cooperative behavior. A bal-
ance of reasons supporting cooperation leads them to favor a ban
on pollution instead of emissions trading, just as it leads them to
favor a no-parking zone in front of a hospital instead of high fees
for parking there.
A third example concerns fatalities caused by safety measures
such as air bags. Sunstein suggests that people use the heuristic:
Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust. The heuristic is out
of its element because the safety measures, not being agents, do
not literally betray anyone. Do people follow a heuristic that fits
the case so loosely? Its not applying well is evidence that people
do not use it. In fact, they do not apply it to other risky interven-
tions, for example, anesthesia during surgery.
A fourth example comes from the section on playing god (sect.
5.3). It concerns food from genetically engineered crops. Sunstein
presents the heuristic: Do not tamper with nature. He uses it to
explain public support for regulation of genetic engineering.
Are there other explanations for the public’s resistance to ge-
netically modified food? Some come to mind readily. For exam-
ple, the public may not trust scientific assessments of risks. Peo-
ple may believe that the assessments are unreliable because they
are sponsored by industries heavily invested in agbiotechnology.
The heuristic suggested identifies a source of caution, but does not
fully explain judgments about regulations. People do not mind
tampering with nature to halt the spread of tooth decay, for ex-
ample. Perhaps they use the milder maxim: Tampering with na-
ture is risky. A majority of people may favor regulation to reduce
risks they perceive, even when evidence about those risks is in-
complete, as Weirich (2001, Ch. 7) explains.
Moral rules of thumb such as “Be honest” acknowledge excep-
tions such as harmless lies to spare another’s feelings. Such max-
ims have two interpretations. They may express heuristics that are
occasionally unreliable. Or, they may express nondecisive reasons
for acts. Taking them to express reasons yields a better account of
their role in moral deliberations. A moral heuristic attends to a 
single reason, and exclusive reliance on the heuristic makes that
reason decisive. Such narrow-mindedness is unreliable. In the 
|examples concerning risk regulation, errors may arise not from
unreliable heuristics, but from overlooking or poorly balancing
reasons.
People who consider regulatory issues recognize the complex-
ity of the issues. Sunstein’s heuristics oversimplify their reasoning.
Their deliberations weigh pros and cons and seek a judgment that
is best supported by the reasons behind simple maxims.
A convenient deliberational heuristic makes decisive the reason
that looms the largest. Gigerenzer (2000, p. 125) proposes this
heuristic, and it reconciles Sunstein’s moral heuristics with the
multiplicity of reasons concerning regulations. It yields Sunstein’s
heuristics, given that in his examples they identify the weightiest
reasons. A supplementary account of the framing of the regulatory
issues may explain the salience of those reasons. The reconcilia-
tion just sketched, although intriguing, does not have enough em-
pirical support to dethrone the rival view that moral reasoning
about risks balances multiple considerations.
Investigating the reliability of moral reasoning teaches us which
moral judgments to trust. Its lessons require accurate identifica-
tion of the reasoning that yields a judgment. Moral judgments
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arise in various ways. A judgment may be immediate, rather than
a product of a principle’s application. Also, many moral principles,
of differing reliability, may yield the same judgment. The judg-
ment may be correct even if some principle generating it is unre-
liable. For example, a moral heuristic and reflection may both
yield an intuition about an exotic case. The intuition may be trust-
worthy on account of support by reflection, despite its arising also
from an unreliable heuristic. A strong argument against trusting a
judgment requires showing that the judgment rests exclusively on
an unreliable process. Moral heuristics are just a step toward the
necessary, full account of moral reasoning.
Author’s Response
On moral intuitions and moral heuristics:
A response
Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science,
Chicago, IL 60637. csunstei@uchicago.edu
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/sunstein/
Abstract: Moral heuristics are pervasive, and they produce moral
errors. We can identify those errors as such even if we do not en-
dorse any contentious moral view. To accept this point, it is also
unnecessary to make controversial claims about moral truth. But
the notion of moral heuristics can be understood in diverse ways,
and a great deal of work remains to be done in understanding the
nature of moral intuitions, especially those that operate automat-
ically and nonreflectively, and in exploring the possibility of alter-
ing such intuitions through modest changes in context and narra-
tive.
R1. Introduction
I am grateful to the commentators for their exceptionally il-
luminating discussions of moral intuitions and moral
heuristics. A pervasive theme is the automatic and pre-re-
flective character of many moral judgments. The commen-
taries raise three questions: (1) Do moral heuristics really
produce moral blunders? (2) Isn’t there an important dif-
ference between heuristics and freestanding moral princi-
ples? (3) To make progress, don’t we need to settle on some
method for establishing moral truth, or at least on the ori-
gins of moral judgments by human beings?
Recall that I am understanding moral heuristics to be
mental shortcuts, in the form of simple rules of thumb that
generally work well, but that also misfire. On this under-
standing, moral heuristics are parallel to the heuristics that
people use when assessing simple questions of fact. It fol-
lows that the answer to the first question is yes; moral blun-
ders are often a product of moral heuristics. True, moral
heuristics can sometimes lead us to correct moral outcomes
on erroneous grounds, as opposed to leading us to morally
erroneous outcomes; and both phenomena are important.
Of course, there is a difference between heuristics and
deeply held principles. What a utilitarian sees as a moral
heuristic (never lie!) might be regarded as a freestanding
moral principle by a deontologist. But whatever one’s view
of the foundations of morality, I believe that many appar-
ently freestanding moral principles can be shown to be
mere heuristics. For this reason, we can learn a lot about
moral reasoning and moral error without getting philo-
sophically ambitious. Nothing in my argument is meant, for
example, to suggest that utilitarianism provides the right
foundation for morality. It is clear that moral heuristics are
pervasive; we need to learn much more about their sources
and their nature. Of particular interest are moral judgments
that operate automatically and without much reflection
from those who make them.
R2. Moral heuristics and moral blunders
Many of the commentaries raise the question of whether
moral heuristics produce moral blunders. It is best to begin
with an example, which Koehler & Gershoff helpfully
provide. In their view, betrayal aversion is quite reasonable.
(Their excellent work on betrayal aversion helped to inspire
my article; should I feel betrayed?) As they note, betrayal
aversion makes people willing to double their death risk in
order to eliminate a betrayal risk. But they contend that this
seemingly irrational behavior makes perfect sense, because
a “safety-product betrayal” will have all sorts of negative
consequences. It may, for example, produce a deep societal
mistrust of car manufacturers and government agencies as
well as increase our feelings of vulnerability. Koehler &
Gershoff conclude that in seeking to avoid the negative con-
sequences associated with betrayals, people are not led
astray by a heuristic; they are acting sensibly.
For two reasons, I am unconvinced. The first is that for
the argument to work, people must be perfectly altruistic,
increasing their own safety risks in order to prevent adverse
effects for others. The second reason is more fundamental:
Koehler & Gershoff have shown only that betrayal aver-
sion is reasonable given that people are averse to betrayals.
The unfortunate consequences they describe are artifacts
of betrayal aversion; the aversion cannot, without circular-
ity, be justified by reference to itself. To be sure, this prob-
lem might be reduced if we assume that those who show
betrayal aversion are not only perfectly altruistic but also ex-
ceedingly sophisticated. Perhaps they know that by itself,
betrayal aversion is a form of bounded rationality – but they
also know that human beings are boundedly rational. They
display betrayal aversion only because they want to protect
their fellow citizens from the multiple problems that arise
when betrayal risks come to fruition. Even if this is so, a
kind of circularity remains: Sophisticated people are willing
to display betrayal aversion only because they know that
other, less sophisticated people are subject to betrayal aver-
sion. In any case, I much doubt that the subjects in the ex-
periments conducted by Koehler & Gershoff are thinking
so elaborately. In short, the special aversion to betrayal
risks, which leads people to make themselves less safe,
seems to me to be a clear case in which moral heuristics pro-
duce errors.
Might some moral intuitions, based on moral heuristics,
protect us from moral error? Bartsch & Wright think so.
Moral maturity, they contend, may not be so different from
expertise in skiing, music, or chess, in which extremely
rapid judgments usually lead experts to make correct judg-
ments. Bartsch & Wright are right to say that from the
moral point of view, heuristic-driven intuitions may do far
better than moral principles, even if the latter are based on
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System II. We can easily imagine monstrous moral princi-
ples; a system of morality based on Nazism, for example,
runs afoul of widespread and deeply felt moral intuitions.
Such intuitions work, every day of every year, to save peo-
ple from making terrible moral errors. I do not suggest that
moral heuristics are more likely to produce error than more
systematic moral thinking of any particular sort. And I agree
with the suggestion, ventured by Bartsch & Wright, that the
most mature moral thinkers respond intuitively and well to
a wide range of relevant particulars. But their point should
be taken as a celebration of moral maturity, not of moral
heuristics as such. It remains true that in numerous do-
mains in morality, politics, and law, such heuristics lead peo-
ple to err.
Mikhail offers the most sustained challenge to my focus
on moral mistakes. He thinks that to identify mistakes as
such, we need an account of moral competence. Mikhail
objects to my criticism of the use of exotic cases to uncover
intuitions; he believes that such cases can teach us a great
deal about how the mind works. Perhaps so; but what ex-
actly do we learn? I am not at all sure that those who en-
counter exotic problems “spontaneously compute uncon-
scious representations” of the complex kind depicted by
Mikhail. (It would be very lucky indeed if spontaneous
computations turn out so elaborate.) But even if so, Mikhail
has said nothing to demonstrate that we should have confi-
dence in the reliability of people’s reactions to weird dilem-
mas never encountered in ordinary life. At the very least,
there is a problem if people have different moral judgments
about identical (but differently framed) moral problems –
and also if people’s moral judgments can be shown to be
wrong by reference to a fairly uncontroversial moral bench-
mark. My discussion of moral framing effects and of weak
consequentialism is meant to establish that this problem is
all too real.
Sharply disagreeing with Mikhail, Pizarro & Uhlmann
believe that the psychology of moral judgment can be stud-
ied without any moral benchmark – that it is illuminating
and for many purposes adequate to proceed without claim-
ing that people make moral mistakes. With respect to error,
Pizarro & Uhlmann suggest that we should focus on
whether people’s moral judgments are produced by factors
that they themselves believe to be irrational grounds for
judgment. For example, many people believe that their
punishment judgments are meant to deter crime, but the
evidence suggests that for most people, deterrence plays a
modest role, at best, in their punishment judgments.
Hence, people might be embarrassed by their own moral
intuitions. That is an important possibility, one that those
interested in moral heuristics should exploit. But I think
that we should be more ambitious. Sometimes people can’t
easily be embarrassed, but it is very much worth consider-
ing the possibility that they have been led astray by a heuris-
tic. We wouldn’t want to say that people’s immunity from
embarrassment is proof that they are on the right track. If
we did, that would mean that the louder and more tena-
cious the homunculus, the less likely System II is to correct
the System I error, and the less likely it is that a moral
heuristic will be seen to be at work – not the most produc-
tive way to approach moral judgments.
Which brings us to Haidt’s entertaining essay, contend-
ing that policy makers (and others) are likely to resist the
claim that they are being led astray by their homunculus. In
a way he is obviously right (and he is supported by his own
evidence on moral dumbfounding, see Haidt et al. 2004).
But I think he is too pessimistic. In environmental law, con-
sider tradable emissions permits, by which companies are
given a license to pollute, one that can be bought and sold
on the open market. For many years, such permits were re-
jected on the ground that they violated deeply held moral
intuitions. But they are clearly the wave of the future in en-
vironmental law, having received bipartisan endorsement
on many occasions in the last decade. Squawking all the
way, the homunculus is on the run. System II is often a slave
to System I, but in politics and law, it’s not always clear who
is the master.
In this regard, I much appreciate Herzog’s emphasis on
the inconsistencies in people’s thinking about animals. Her-
zog stresses that the Animal Welfare Act protects dogs but
not rats, perhaps because of a heuristic to the effect that
“Rats are pests; pests are bad.” With respect to animals,
many people have immediate, affective reactions that drive
their moral judgments; perceived similarity to human be-
ings evidently has a large impact. Indeed, we might specu-
late that a particular heuristic is operating here for human
judgments: Protect nonhuman animals to the extent that
they resemble human beings. To know whether this heuris-
tic generally works well, we would need to settle on a moral
judgment about the appropriate status of animals. But even
without so settling, we might well agree, after a little re-
flection, that the heuristic is likely to misfire in identifiable
cases – as, for example, in cases in which a failure to pro-
tect nonhuman animals creates preventable suffering. A
great deal of work remains to be done on this topic.
R3. Moral heuristics and freestanding moral
principles
Some moral principles might be freestanding; they may or
may not be moral heuristics. Consider the prohibition on
torture; is this a mere heuristic? The answer depends on
what morality requires; if torture is always forbidden from
the moral point of view, then the prohibition is a freestand-
ing principle, one that does not misfire. Many of the com-
mentators suggest that I have misdescribed ordinary moral
reasoning by arguing that it is driven by heuristics when a
freestanding principle, or a set of freestanding principles,
might be at work instead.
Weirich offers the most ambitious defense of ordinary
moral reasoning. He thinks that in the risk regulation cases
I discuss, people are not using a simple heuristic; in fact,
their reasoning is often quite complex. In the context of au-
tomobile safety, for example, he thinks that people object
whenever companies profit from disregarding life. In the
context of emissions trading, he contends that people see
pollution as non-cooperative behavior, and they want to ban
that behavior, rather than to allow pollution markets. But
Weirich provides no evidence to support his views about
how ordinary people reason, and some of his claims seem
to me implausible. (Do people really want to ban pollution
– and hence to ban both cars and major sources of elec-
tricity? Do people really think that hard questions about
how to trade off prices and risks can be answered by pro-
claiming, homunculus-style, that companies shouldn’t profit
from disregarding life?) Even if his account is right, Weirich
has supported my general argument, simply because he has
offered an alternative set of heuristics to explain my risk
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regulation examples. Weirich does not defend his sugges-
tion that people considering regulatory issues “recognize
the complexity of the issue” and “weigh pros and cons.” On
the contrary, his own reconstruction of their reasoning sug-
gests that they fail to weigh pros and cons and instead rely
on simple (and crude) heuristics.
Ritov rightly insists on the distinction between heuristics
and deontological rules. She understands the former to 
operate automatically and effortlessly, and also affectively,
and therefore to be distinct from the latter, which operate
consciously and reflectively. A minor qualification: Some
heuristics, such as availability, need not be accompanied by
affect. A larger qualification: I believe that many apparent
deontological rules are productively seen as heuristics, in
the form of simple rules of thumb that generally work well
but that also lead to major blunders. The literature on pro-
tected values, emphasized by Ritov, strongly supports this
understanding; it shows that protected values become less
absolute once people’s attention is drawn to tradeoffs
(Baron & Leshner 2000). People’s automatic moral intu-
itions, based on heuristics, can often be shown to be too
crude, even to the satisfaction of the very people who
strongly hold those intuitions. One of my major goals, in
fact, is to raise the question of whether numerous deonto-
logical rules are best seen in this light.
Adler accepts the claim that moral heuristics lead to
moral mistakes, but he would like me to endorse conse-
quentialism. He thinks that without some kind of con-
tentious moral position, my examples may not be able to get
off the ground. Before reading Adler’s discussion, I would
have thought that moral framing was the simplest response
to this concern. We need not adopt a contentious moral po-
sition to think that different moral judgments ought not to
be produced by different framing of identical problems. In-
geniously, however, Adler defends framing effects with the
suggestion that moral loss aversion might be an effort to
economize on the costs of deliberation while also reducing
the aggregate level of moral error. Going much further,
Adler suggests, correctly, that if weak consequentialism is
really very weak, then many of my examples will not work.
If we are thoroughgoing retributivists, or believe that harm-
ful acts are much worse than harmful omissions, or don’t
want to tamper with nature, then my examples do not in-
volve blunders at all.
In the end, Adler might be right. In the moral domain,
clever readers might well be able to generate plausible,
principled, heuristic-free explanations for why people think
as they do. But I wonder how many of these explanations
can be made convincing. A rule-utilitarian defense of moral
framing may not be entirely implausible, but in deciding
what morality requires, people can surely do far better than
to rely on the easily manipulated distinction between gains
and losses. True, some of my examples won’t work unless
consequences have a nontrivial weight. Those who believe
that consequences matter exceedingly little might insist
that freestanding moral principles, rather than moral
heuristics, are responsible for their belief in, for example,
pointless punishment. But my hunch is that unless subjects
are extremely stubborn, they can be brought, on reflection,
to agree that their moral intuitions have misfired, by their
own lights, in many of the relevant cases.
Baron would also like me to adopt a contentious theory
– indeed he would like me to endorse utilitarianism (a more
controversial idea than consequentialism, which need not
accept the idea that all consequences must be described in
terms of their effects on utility). Baron is certainly right to
say that the fact of disagreement is not a decisive objection
to ambitious normative theories. But disagreement is none-
theless a fact; and it is at least useful to show, if it can be
shown, that moral heuristics can be described as such, and
can be shown to produce error, even when we disagree
about many normative questions. There is something to be
gained by learning about the uses and abuses of moral
heuristics even when people cannot converge on a moral
theory. Baron is certainly correct to say that it is productive
to demonstrate that if people are concerned about conse-
quences, some moral judgments will make them better, and
others will make them worse.
Fried is also interested in the possibility that some moral
intuitions are freestanding moral principles rather than
mere heuristics. She contends that my own approach favors
moral coherence and that it is not, in fact, neutral among
different moral principles. In her view, an approach that fa-
vors coherence is biased in favor of welfarism, simply be-
cause welfarists have an easier time in achieving coherence
among their principles (as compared, for example, to de-
ontologists). To know whether a heuristic is at work, she ar-
gues that we should shed the idea of coherence in favor of
a purely procedural test, to the effect that a freestanding
moral principle counts as such only if, after scrutiny, one
judges it as an end in itself.
As Fried suggests, her test might support many of my ex-
amples. But I am not at all sure that she is right to say that
my approach is biased in the direction of welfarism; deon-
tological principles can certainly cohere, and deontologists
work extremely hard to achieve coherence. Rawls, after all,
is a deontologist – indeed, the most powerful critic of util-
itarianism – and an understanding of the search for re-
flective equilibrium (more on this later) is one of his pri-
mary contributions to philosophy (Rawls 1971). What Fried
misses, I think, is that to identify moral heuristics as such,
it is not necessary to make especially ambitious claims about
coherence. Far less stringent tests seem to me sufficient in
many cases. I have suggested that some heuristic-driven in-
tuitions cannot be defended by reference to any moral the-
ory; others seem wrong on a minimally contentious moral
theory, one that does not force people to choose between
utilitarianism and deontological approaches.
Sounding much like Adler, Weber & Ancker object
that my approach depends on a consensus on morally cor-
rect answers. They contend that the heuristics-and-biases
approach can be applied in the context of morality only if
utilitarianism is accepted. But this is not so. As Adler
demonstrates, we can find heuristics within theories; for
those who accept any particular theory, heuristics can be
shown to be at work in the real world. (Deontologists can
find heuristics for what deontology requires; so too for util-
itarians; so too for Aristotelians.) And in many cases, I be-
lieve that moral heuristics can be identified as such regard-
less of one’s theory. Contrary to what Weber & Ancker
suggest, I do not mean to accept utilitarianism. Weber &
Ancker are right to say that weak consequentialism is not
entirely uncontroversial, but I believe that in many of the
cases I discuss, most people would be willing, on reflection,
to agree that their intuitive judgment is difficult to defend.
Weber & Ancker also suggest that it is helpful to iden-
tify different “modes” of decision-making, including conse-
quential reasoning, decision by affect, story-based decision,
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and recognition-and-rule-based decisions. The existing re-
search on this count is indeed illuminating. What I would
add is that several of their “modes” are strong candidates
for analysis as moral heuristics. If, for example, people
make decisions by consulting their affective reactions, they
are probably using those reactions as a heuristic for some-
thing – in the moral domain no less so than in the personal
one. (Of course, affective reactions to moral problems can
be better, from the moral point of view, than moral princi-
ples, for reasons suggested by Bartsch & Wright.) And if
people assess moral dilemmas by recognizing them as part
of some category that triggers a rule, then a heuristic, in the
sense of a moral shortcut, is undoubtedly at work.
Hahn, Frost & Maio (Hahn et al.) rightly emphasize
that the term “heuristic” can be understood in many differ-
ent ways. They point out that, most of the time, I under-
stand moral heuristics to be general propositions that usu-
ally work well but that also produce errors in identifiable
cases. They worry that this understanding renders my ar-
gument essentially pointless. General propositions, as used
in morality or even law, typically give rise to undesirable
outcomes if they are applied rigidly. Along with Ritov,
Hahn et al. want to restrict the term “moral heuristics” to
processes in which subjects are not aware of the motivations
for their judgments. In this way, they seem to think that the
study of moral heuristics should emphasize the difference
between the system of reasoning and the intuitive system,
where processing is unintentional.
I agree that this difference deserves much more investi-
gation, but Hahn et al. seem to me to underrate the im-
portance of studying moral rules of thumb that generally
work well but that also misfire. In the abstract, it is no news
to say that general principles have exceptions. But it is far
from pointless to identify a number of cases where intuitive
moral objections are extremely strong, and where the moral
homunculus is squawking even though no moral wrong is
being done. As in cognition, so to in morality: Mental short-
cuts can be exceedingly helpful, but they can get us in a lot
of trouble, too.
R4. Method: Reflective equilibrium, evolution, 
and beyond
What is the relationship between moral heuristics and the
search for reflective equilibrium? My answer here is cau-
tious. I do not suggest that reflective equilibrium is re-
quired to expose heuristics as such; more modest reflection
is often enough. Nor do I suggest that an understanding of
moral heuristics is incompatible with the search for re-
flective equilibrium. If we know that moral heuristics are
pervasive, we will be aware that some of our most deeply
held moral intuitions might be unreliable, and we will scru-
tinize them in light of the possibility that they are overgen-
eralizations from ordinarily sound principles. Many of the
commentators argue for closer attention to reflective equi-
librium and to the foundations of moral judgments.
Tetlock believes in the search for reflective equilibrium,
contending that it is the best available tool for producing
thoughtful responses to moral problems. In his view, those
who attempt to reach equilibrium are ultimately able to 
enlist System II in favor of more demanding efforts to 
describe the boundaries of principles and to create what 
he calls “higher-order composites.” For example, Tetlock’s
own empirical work suggests, importantly, that people’s ini-
tial agreement with arguments against biotechnology tend
to dissipate when they are made alert to tradeoffs (see Tet-
lock 2000). Other work strongly supports his general point,
demonstrating that once people are alerted to tradeoffs and
complexities, their strong moral intuitions tend to shift
(Baron & Leshner 2000). So far, we are in complete accord.
But Tetlock is also concerned that in some cases, what I call
moral heuristics are not merely an effort to simplify deci-
sion tasks; perhaps people are instead defending sacred val-
ues by refusing to consider taboo tradeoffs. I wonder about
the sharpness of the distinction between moral heuristics
and sacred values, and I think that Tetlock’s own work
throws that distinction into question (cf. Tetlock 2000).
Some sacred values, and some refusals to consider trade-
offs, are best seen as moral heuristics, simplifying decision
tasks. Some religious taboos, involving practices of eating
and cleaning, can be understood in just this way. I also be-
lieve that the moral opprobrium directed against cost-ben-
efit analysis, certain sexual practices, and “tampering with
nature” are best seen in the same terms. As Tetlock sug-
gests, the search for reflective equilibrium can be a helpful
corrective here.
E. Anderson does not refer to reflective equilibrium as
such, but her discussion of John Dewey is not inconsistent
with Tetlock’s position. She argues that when people are de-
liberating successfully, they do not abandon heuristics; they
use them. In her view, I adopt a “standard reason–emotion
dichotomy.” Following Dewey, Anderson argues that in
contexts that are well-suited to deliberation, our heuristics
are not really supplanted; they are incorporated into moral
deliberation. I agree with her. I do not mean to accept a rea-
son–emotion dichotomy, in part because emotional reac-
tions are usually based on reasons. (If jurors are outraged
by corporate misconduct, it is for reasons.) I hope that noth-
ing I have said is incompatible with Anderson’s account of
the proper place of heuristics.
In the most philosophically ambitious commentary,
Stein also wants to emphasize the search for reflective
equilibrium, so long as it is wide rather than narrow. By
wide reflective equilibrium, Stein means a situation in
which our moral judgments are in accord not only with our
other moral judgments, including our general moral com-
mitments, but also with our theories of personal identity,
metaphysics, and more. Stein believes that it is necessary to
focus on the origins of moral norms, and thus on wide re-
flective equilibrium, to rebut what would otherwise be a
strong conceptual attack on the very idea of moral heuris-
tics, to the effect that whatever moral norms exist are in-
dexed to human moral competence. If moral norms are so
indexed, moral errors are not possible, and the project of
identifying moral heuristics cannot get off the ground. Stein
invokes the analogy of humor, where standards of what is
funny are indexed to human faculties. He thinks that the
search for wide reflective equilibrium can show that moral
heuristics exist, because those who seek that equilibrium
are perfectly willing to revise their moral views and to con-
cede, on reflection, that they are moral errors.
To identify many such errors, however, I am not sure that
it is necessary to seek wide reflective equilibrium. (To para-
phrase an unpublished remark by Rawls: “No deep think-
ing here. Things are bad enough already.”) In the case of
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moral framing (and notwithstanding Adler), mistakes are
easy to show without much worrying about reflective equi-
librium. And in many of the cases I discuss, no particularly
contentious theory is necessary to demonstrate mistakes.
Stein’s example of humor actually supports my strategy.
Even if funniness is indexed to human capacities, there are
heuristics for humor; these usually work well, but they also
misfire. It’s often funny if someone slips on a banana peel,
but not if the person who slips has Down’s syndrome. In
fact, bad television comedies typically fail because they use
heuristics for humor. But Stein may be right to say that in
order to be certain that moral error has occurred, we will
have to become ambitious about the nature and origins of
moral norms.
Also concerned with the sources of moral intuitions, C.
Anderson focuses in particular on the act–omission dis-
tinction. In his view, omission bias stems from a distortion
in human perception, a distortion that leads people to focus
more on the consequences of action than on the conse-
quences of inaction. One reason for omission bias may be
an acute awareness of the losses produced by action, along-
side relative inattentiveness to the losses produced by inac-
tion. C. Anderson’s account might be right. Compare the
endowment effect, by which people tend to demand more
to give up goods that they own than they are willing to pay
for the identical goods when in the hands of others (Thaler
1993). The endowment effect might well be explained by
“opportunity cost neglect”: People are relatively uncon-
cerned with the opportunity costs of failing to trade a good
that they already have. I believe that opportunity cost ne-
glect is a pervasive cognitive phenomenon, and it may help
to explain omission bias. In any case, I much appreciate C.
Anderson’s suggestion that we might be able to isolate the
sources of moral error without making contentious philo-
sophical claims.
I anticipated that some readers would use an under-
standing of moral heuristics as a basis for a large-scale chal-
lenge both to deontology and to the search for reflective
equilibrium. Singer has done exactly that. Where Pizarro
& Uhlmann and Fried object that I have not been neutral
on normative questions, and make suggestions for achiev-
ing greater neutrality, Singer contends, approvingly, and
along the lines of Baron, that my article supports utilitari-
ans and undermines deontologists. The reason is that deon-
tologists often argue against utilitarians by demonstrating
that, in particular cases, utilitarianism leads to unacceptable
outcomes. With Baron, Singer says, rightly, that the prob-
lem may lie with our intuitions, not with utilitarianism. In-
deed, he goes much further. He thinks that we ought not to
test moral judgments by seeking reflective equilibrium, be-
cause the intuitions that go into the search for equilibrium
may themselves be misconceived. But as I have said, my ar-
gument can easily be incorporated into the search for re-
flective equilibrium; it need not be taken as an attack on
that search. Nonetheless, Singer is right to say that utilitar-
ianism cannot be defeated by showing that it leads to results
that seem strongly counterintuitive. I agree with Singer that
many challenges to utilitarianism, based on our reactions to
exotic cases, are much weaker than they seem.
Several commentaries go beyond the search for re-
flective equilibrium to suggest other foundations for moral
beliefs. Evolution looms large here. Hinde suggests that an
evolutionary approach can help to identify the sources of
moral norms. He emphasizes norms of reciprocity, which
he sees as pan-cultural. In his view, such norms help to ex-
plain some of the phenomena I describe, such as the pref-
erence for pointless punishment. Certainly, moral heuris-
tics may have evolutionary foundations. Note, however, that
in the cognitive domain, heuristics (such as availability) 
are of interest whether or not we can explain them in evo-
lutionary terms. And in the domain of morality, many
heuristics have social rather than evolutionary origins. To
Hinde, then, my response is that it is certainly valuable to
explore the evolutionary sources of moral norms, but that
we can learn a great deal without taking a stand on that
question.
Hauser wants to understand moral reasoning by analogy
to the language faculty. He thinks that there is some “cir-
cuitry” for deciding what is permitted and forbidden; he 
believes that we can make a great deal of progress in un-
derstanding moral thinking by studying that circuitry. In-
triguingly, he suggests that diverse people agree on many
judgments involving permissible harm even if they do not
have access to the underlying principles (see Kahneman et
al. 1998 for a similar finding). Hauser speculates that some
aspects of our moral judgments may well be universal. The
speculation is both interesting and plausible, but I think
that Hauser should be more careful about the analogy to
language. In the most interesting cases, people dispute
what morality requires. These disputes are crucial to ethics,
politics, and law. What I am trying to show is that heuristics
often lead us in the wrong directions in those domains.
Casebeer’s ambitious commentary asks, among other
things, for a neurobiological foundation for heuristics and for
an appreciation of neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. I am ag-
nostic on both. Some heuristics may have an identifiable neu-
robiological source, but others probably do not. The avail-
ability heuristic is a heuristic regardless of what neurobiology
says. Neo-Aristotelian virtue theory has many defenders, but
its claims are controversial, and neo-Aristotelians disagree
among themselves. My hope is that neo-Aristotelians will
find at least some of my examples plausible.
Gorman is also concerned with the sources of moral in-
tuitions. He thinks that it is important for people to use
their moral imagination so as to identify a range of possible
solutions. In his view, we should attempt to track the pro-
cess of moral reasoning as it occurs, in part to learn about
how people will react to emerging technologies, including
cloning and the extension of human capabilities. What I
would add to Gorman’s sensible account is that for issues at
the frontiers of scientific understanding, people are espe-
cially likely to use unreliable heuristics. Often they rely on
a version of the view that we should not “tamper with na-
ture.” As Tetlock suggests, an effort to achieve reflective
equilibrium, through encounters with specific practices as
well as general principles, can provide an important cor-
rective here.
Gerrig makes the intriguing suggestion that within nar-
ratives, different identifications, and in a sense different
heuristics, take hold. If we identify with the hero of a movie,
we’re likely to want him to succeed, even if he is somewhat
evil, and even at the expense of other characters who are
both worthy and honest. Gerrig is right and his point seems
to me quite important. Suppose that your best friend is in
the midst of an unpleasant divorce. His wife is seeking to
claim well over half of the couple’s assets. His income is sig-
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nificantly lower than hers, and he believes that he is enti-
tled to at least half. You might well end up taking his side.
Because his moral claim is embedded in a compelling nar-
rative, and because he is, in a sense, the hero of that narra-
tive, you might even feel moral outrage on his behalf.
But your moral judgment might well be reversed if the
narrative context, and the emotional identification, is differ-
ent. Suppose that it is the wife, in our little narrative, who
is your best friend. Suppose that she has worked extremely
hard to earn a decent living. Suppose that she is claiming a
share of the couple’s assets that is over 50% but that is still
significantly below her economic contribution. Suppose fi-
nally, that in her view, her ex-husband-to-be is quite lazy,
and his relatively weaker economic position is a direct prod-
uct of his laziness. If so, you might feel moral outrage on
her behalf rather than his.
There is a larger point here. Each one of us sees ourselves
as a principal player in the narrative of our own lives, and
each one of us identifies closely with that particular player.
Moral judgments will inevitably be skewed as a result. I am
not exactly sure what all this has to do with heuristics. But
if Gerrig is right to say that we follow a heuristic to the ef-
fect that The hero should succeed, and if it is easy to iden-
tify the hero of your own life (you!), then moral blunders
are inevitable.
In a way that is closely linked to Gerrig’s emphasis on
narratives, Fernandez-Berrocal & Extremera are con-
cerned with the role of emotions in producing moral deci-
sions. They offer two interesting findings. First, those who
understand their own emotions are more likely to think that
a wife and mother (Meryl Streep, as it happens) should stick
with her husband (instead of running away with Clint East-
wood). Second, those who can regulate their feelings are
less likely to choose a definite outcome in the Asian disease
Problem; such people are more likely to gamble. These
findings raise at least two more general puzzles: When emo-
tions are intensified, how, exactly, are people’s moral judg-
ments affected? And when emotions are intensified, do
people’s moral judgments get better or worse? The first
question is an empirical one on which it would be good to
know much more. The second question is only partly em-
pirical (should Meryl Streep have run away with Clint East-
wood?), but we could undoubtedly make much progress on
it as well. My discussion of moral heuristics does not spec-
ify or explore the role of emotion, nor does it explore the
contested distinction between reason and emotion in the
moral domain. There is much more to do on these ques-
tions.
This, in fact, seems to me to be the largest lesson of the
diverse commentaries presented here. The idea of moral
heuristics can be understood in many different ways, and
there is a great deal to learn about the sources and nature
of moral intuitions – the processes that give rise to them,
their occasionally automatic character, and their substance
in diverse contexts. Let’s go to work.
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